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I. INTRODUCTION
The status of the small area between the Jordan River and
the Mediterranean Sea has been hotly contested for millennia
by disparate religions, competing cultures, empires and migra-
tions. Over the last hundred years, Jews and Arabs have re-
peatedly fought wars over what some call Israel and others call
Palestine. Foreigners are surprised by the fact that on maps of
the Middle East, the area in question is so small that the coun-
try name is printed in the Mediterranean Sea. A smaller area
still, the West Bank and Gaza strip, with zones under Pales-
tinian, joint Palestinian-Israeli and Israeli local civil gover-
nance, reveals a great deal about the difficulties of implement-
ing the interim agreements of the Oslo peace process. The
enmeshed populations, intertwined economies and tangled
infrastructures clearly constitute formidable obstacles to coop-
eration. This would be true even without the very real internal
and external security concerns.
Proponents of Israeli and Palestinian nationalism have
been locked in conflict over essentially the same land for a
century. The tempo of this conflict and its modes of expression
have mutated over time. With the Declaration of Principles
("DOP") in 1993, hopes blossomed that within less than six
years an era of trust could write a new page of history,' re-
sulting in an enduring permanent status agreement, and
thereby resolving all dimensions of the conflict. However, the
fact that both sides have not abided by numerous stipulations
of the interim accords demonstrates that while they were able
to overcome differences to negotiate the ensuing agreements,
compliance is an entirely separate issue. The strategy that
brought Israel and the PLO into diplomatic relations no longer
1. In the words of Professor Aaron Klieman:
it is quite apparent . . . that people like Francis Fukuyama, George
Bush and Charles Krauthammer were far off the mark in 1990-1991 in
hastily pronouncing "the end of history," the advent of a "new world
order" and a "uni-polar moment" inaugurating a peaceful age under be-
nevolent American hegemony. If anything, in the aftermath of the Cold
War, the larger systemic reality underscores the recurrent historical pat-
tern of disorder, a warring and re-dividing world, and the renewed quest
for global equilibrium through the balancing of power.
AARON S. KLIEMAN, APPROACHING THE FINISH LINE: THE UNITED STATES IN POST-
OSLO PEACE MAKING 7 (1995).
20001 593
594 BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XXVI:2
will be effective, as their political pact appears only to have
been skin deep. Resolving conflicts between the two popula-
tions requires a degree of mutual trust and cooperation in the
operational sphere rather than in the political sphere.
In the past, there have been numerous unsuccessful and/or
incomplete efforts to secure Israeli-Palestinian or Arab-Israeli
peace agreements. They include the 1949 Armistice Agree-
ments,2 the Jarring mission of 1967,' the United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution 242 of November 1967,4 the Allon
Plan of 1967,' Johnson's Five Point Plan of June 1968,6 the
2. "The 1949 Armistice Agreements," THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS
RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 74-99 (Ruth Lapidoth & Moshe Hirsch, eds.
1992). In retrospect it is interesting to highlight some of the provisions in these
agreements that were not observed. For example, the Egyptian-Israeli agreement
states the objective of "facilitat[ing] the transition from the present truce to a
permanent peace in Palestine" (Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, id.
at 80), and that "[the right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of
attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected." Id. at 75. Mem-
bers of the Israeli delegation to the armistice agreements viewed peace as immi-
nent since the Arab states had no reasonable alternative but to accept the reality
of Israel's existence. See AARON KLIEMAN, ISRAEL AND THE WORLD AFTER 40 YEARS
18 (1990). This optimism was quickly dispelled, however, as the Arab leaders re-
fused to reconcile themselves with Israel's existence and no progress was made
toward peace in the following years. Id.
3. Gunnar Jarring, a UN mediator, attempted to work out a modus vivendi
under which Israel would withdraw from the territory captured in the 1967 War
in return for an Arab commitment to peace. When the Arab states were unwilling
to give the kind of commitments upon which Israel insisted, such as a peace
agreement, the mediation effort failed. Thereafter Israel became more reluctant to
exchange land for promises. See RICHARD B. PARKER, THE POLITICS OF MISCALCU-
LATION 128 (1993).
4. Passed in the aftermath of Israel's stunning victory in the 1967 War, this
landmark resolution enshrined the notion of Israel relinquishing captured Arab
lands in exchange for peace and agreements on secure and recognized borders.
Article 1, sections i and ii, call for the removal of Israeli forces from territory
occupied during the war in exchange for "respect and acknowledgement of the sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the ar-
ea." The Arab states and the Palestinians rejected Resolution 242 and at the sub-
sequent 1967 Arab League Summit Conference in Khartoum, where they pro-
claimed they would not recognize, negotiate with or sign peace treaties with Israel.
DAVID MAKOVSKY, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLO 3-4 (1996).
5. The Allon Plan called for Israel to withdraw from the densely populated
Palestinian areas comprising approximately 60 percent of the West Bank, but to
annex strategic military positions around Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley. See
CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE SIEGE 459-60 (1986). Never fully adopted by Israel's
government, the Allon Plan was considered inconceivable to Jordan's King Hussein.
See id. Hussein turned down an Israeli proposal for a comprehensive settlement
based on the Allon Plan several years later. See NADAV SAFRAN, ISRAEL: THE EM-
BATTLED ALLY 537 (1981).
6. This general plan, which was presented by President Lyndon Johnson to
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USSR's Three Point Plan of September 4, 1968,' Rusk's Seven
Point Plan of November 2, 1968,8 the Soviet Peace Proposal of
December 1968,' the U.S. 12-Point Counterplan, January 15,
1969,10 the Rogers plan of 1970,1" the 1973 Geneva Peace
Soviet Chairman Kosygin, proposed recognizing the right of national life for Israel
and the Arab states, justice for the Palestinian refugees, limits of the arms race
and political independence and territorial integrity for all states in the region. See
PARKER, supra note 3, at 127, 132. These principles were the basis for a draft
resolution presented to the UN General Assembly but it was never brought to a
vote. See id.
7. This plan proposed that the Arabs and Israelis would accept Resolution
242, a timetable would be devised for Israeli withdrawal and both sides would
sign a multilateral document committing them to respect all the provisions of
Resolution 242. PARKER, supra note 3, at 131. Yitzhak Rabin, then the Israeli Am-
bassador to the United States, urged the U.S. to reject the proposal, restating
Israel's insistence on a bilateral, contractual peace agreement. Id. The U.S. reject-
ed the proposal on the ground that it preferred to follow the original principles
articulated in the Johnson Five Point Plan. Id.
8. Secretary of State Dean Rusk met informally with Egyptian President
Riad in New York. After a drink, Rusk "fished out of his pocket a piece of paper
that came to be known as Rusk's seven points," although it actually included eight
points. Id. at 132. Most of the points articulated a new understanding of what a
peace between Israel and Egypt should entail. The proposal also included, howev-
er, finding an answer for the Palestinian refugees on the basis of personal and
secret choice of where to live. Id. The plan was rejected by Egypt, which did not
want to make a separate peace with Israel without the other Arab states. Al-
though unthinkable in 1969, isolating Egypt from other Arab nations was "exactly
what happened" at Camp David ten years later. Id.
9. The Soviet Union, disconcerted by the lack of progress made in the peace
negotiations, decided to restart deliberations with its own formal initiative. In
another formal note, it proposed a plan which included provisions for formal recog-
nition of UN Security Council Resolution 242, commitment of Israel to withdraw
from the captured territories in exchange for an Arab declaration of readiness to
reach a peaceful settlement, and a just solution to the Palestinian refugee prob-
lem. Israel would withdraw to the pre-1967 lines and these borders would be
guaranteed by the U.S., the USSR, Britain and France. LAWRENCE L. WHETTEN,
THE CANAL WAR: FOUR-POWER CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 68-69 (1974). This
Soviet proposal was met by the 12-Point U.S. Counterplan announced two weeks
later. See PARKER, supra note 3, at 133.
10. The U.S.'s 12-point counterplan called for, inter alia, cessation of Arab ter-
rorism, the Arab belligerents to clarify their position on Resolution 242, Israel
withdrawal from the occupied territories, the boundaries not to conform to the pre-
June: 1967 lines, Resolution 242 not to be construed to state that Israeli troops
must be withdrawn from all the occupied territories, and peace to be agreed upon
and not imposed. See WHETTEN, supra note 9, at 70.
11. Secretary of State William Rogers' plan, which involved a secure interna-
tional frontier between Egypt and Israel and a formal state of peace, was "so
watered down in the name of realism that there was not enough in it for either
side." PARKER, supra note 3, at 138. See also O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at 495. Al-
though in retrospect the plan appears favorable to the Arabs, at the time Egypt
was not ready to consider real peace with Israel and rejected it.
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Conference, 12 the 1978 Camp David Accords and the ensuing
Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979,"3 the Reagan Plan of
1982,"4 the Arab League's Fez peace plan of 1982,"s the abor-
tive May 17, 1983, Israel-Lebanon peace agreement, 6 the
12. The "first ever" Middle East Peace Conference opened in Geneva in De-
cember 1973. Initiated by the United States after the 1973 War, the Palestinians
were represented by Jordan. After the initial speeches, the conference devolved
into bilateral Israeli and Egyptian negotiations on disengagement and never re-
sumed its plenary session. The United States proposed a separate scheme for
Israel to cede Jericho to Jordan, but Israel rejected this. The failure of the Ameri-
can effort to appease the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation angered the Arab
League, and served as the basis for its 1974 declaration that henceforth the PLO
would be the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. See
MAKOVSKY, supra note 4, at 4.
13. The Israel-Egypt peace treaty, long the shining example of what could be
achieved in Middle Eastern peacemaking, is part of this list, given its failure to
facilitate a more comprehensive peace and the low ebb of bilateral Israeli-Egyptian
relations in recent years. See, e.g., Steve Rodan, Camp David: Is There Life 18
Years Later?, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 20, 1996, at 8. At Camp David, the goal was
to establish a "self-governing authority" for the Palestinians as an interim arrange-
ment, pending a final resolution of the issues of peace and territory. Camp David
Agreements, Sept. 17, 1978, Egypt-Isr.-U.S., 17 I.L.M. 1466 (1978). This autonomy
was to have been negotiated by Egypt, Israel, and representatives of the Palestin-
ians. Under pressure from the PLO, prospective Palestinian participants boycotted
the negotiations from the outset. Egypt initially participated in the negotiations,
but then walked out before an agreement could be reached. Subsequently, Israel,
of its own accord, took a major step toward creating autonomy by replacing the
military government with a Civil Administration in an effort to normalize the
daily life of the Arab residents of the Administered Areas by diminishing their
interaction with the Israel Defense Forces. See Justus R. Weiner, Human Rights
in the Israeli Administered Areas during the Intifada: 1987-1990, 10 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 185, 185-192 (1992). Israeli-Egyptian relations have been very troubled in
recent years. See Steve Rodan, US-Egyptian Ties Under Growing Strain, JERUSA-
LEM POST, Apr. 18, 1997, at 14; see Ian Black, Nails Hammered Into Coffin of
Peace, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 2, 1997, at 7.
14. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, U.S. President Ronald Reagan pro-
posed his vision for "the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to
the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza." WILLIAM B. QUANDT,
PEACE PROCESS 480 (1993). Reagan stated the U.S. would not support "annexation
or permanent control by Israel" or an independent Palestinian state. Id. at 481.
Reagan also proposed a freeze on the building of Israeli settlements in the occu-
pied territory and stated, "We base our approach squarely on the principle that
the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through negotiation involving an ex-
change of territory for peace." Id. at 476-83. This plan failed primarily because
Israel viewed it as pro-Arab and contrary to Israeli security. See id. at 334. See
also O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at 637-38.
15. The idea of a Palestinian state, then completely unacceptable to Israel,
was central to the Fez Plan. See O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at 647. See HAROLD H.
SAUNDERS, RECONSTITUTING THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS 422-23 (1988).
16. This peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon never entered into force
because it was not ratified by Lebanon. Lebanon, weakened by a long civil war
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1987 London Agreement Between Israeli Foreign Minister
Peres and Jordanian King Hussein," the Shultz Initiative of
1988,"8 the Cairo Dialogue of May 1989,'9 and the 1991 Ma-
and shocked by the assassination of president-elect Bashir Gemayel, froze the U.S.
brokered agreement due to intimidation by Syria. See PARKER, supra note 3, at
189, 195.
In light of the dominant U.S. involvement in the current peace process, it is
interesting to note one of the clauses of this earlier agreement: "Having delegated
their undersigned representative plenipotentiaries, provided will full powers, in
order to sign, in the presence of the representative of the United States of Ameri-
ca." Draft Agreement Between Israel and Lebanon, in THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT
AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 299 (Ruth Lapidoth & Moshe Hirsch
eds., 1992).
17. Israeli Foreign Minister Peres and Jordan's King Hussein conducted secret
meetings in April 1987. They arrived at a vague understanding that embodied the
following seven points: (1) an international conference (attended by the permanent
members of the UN Security Council and the Middle Eastern states in the con-
flict) would convene but would not impose a solution and would not veto any
agreement reached by the sides; (2) that negotiations would be conducted in bi-
lateral committees in a direct manner; (3) that the Palestinian issue would be
discussed in a meeting of the Jordanian, Palestinian, and Israeli delegations; (4)
that the representatives of the Palestinians would be included in the Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation; (5) that participation in the conference would be based
upon the renunciation of violence and terror; (6) acceptance of UN Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 242 and 338 by the sides, and; (7) that each committee would
conduct negotiations independently and that other issues would be resolved
through mutual agreement between Jordan and Israel. Israeli Prime Minister
Shamir, who opposed even indirect negotiations with the PLO, rejected the under-
standing, and Peres was publicly accused of negotiating "behind the back" of the
government and of conducting his own "private, independent foreign policy."
KLIEMAN, supra note 2, at 129. Conversely, Peres blamed U.S. Secretary of State
George Shultz for the failure of the London Agreement. See QUANDT, supra note
14, at 334.
18. In March of 1988, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz proposed a modi-
fied version of the Camp David Accords to attract the participation of the Pales-
tinians, who under pressure of the PLO, had boycotted the autonomy talks. See
Justus R. Weiner, Human Rights in the Israeli Administered Areas During the
Intifada: 1987-1990, 10 WIS. INT'L L.J. 185, 193-94 (1992). Shultz sought to allay
Palestinian fears that their acquiescence to the Camp David Accords would enable
Israel to forestall final status talks indefinitely by delaying the implementation of
the autonomy period. Shultz therefore suggested interlocking the two phases: final
status talks would begin shortly after an autonomy agreement regardless of wheth-
er it was fully implemented. The initiative was premised on Palestinian acceptance
of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and envisioned a joint Jordanian-Palestin-
ian delegation to represent the Palestinians. Prime Minister Shamir rejected the
initiative on the grounds that it invalidated the autonomy phase and "would pre-
determine a territorial compromise" which he opposed. MAKOVSKY, supra note 4, at
8. The PLO objected to having its delegation linked with the Jordanians. See
QUANDT, supra note 14, at 366-67. Likewise, the USSR was unenthusiastic about
the concept of an international conference. See id. The foundations of the plan col-
lapsed when King Hussein relinquished his legal claim to sovereignty in the West
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
drid conference. 0 The Oslo peace process introduces a new
angle to the persistent, Biblical conflict between the two popu-
lations, and their stakes in the land they consider their ances-
tral home. International negotiations and shared administra-
tive control are nothing new to the issue, nor to the script of
international relations. However, as distinct from these earlier
attempts at negotiating a Middle Eastern peace, the Oslo in-
terim agreements have developed a comprehensive institution-
al structure and shared administrative control within the
framework of federal solutions. Most importantly, this struc-
ture addresses practical concerns, primarily the welfare and
security of both sides, but it also deals, inter alia, with the
distribution of resources, control of holy sites, economic devel-
opment, airports, harbors, tourism, ecology and archaeology.
The accords provide for the establishment of over sixty joint
bilateral Israeli-Palestinian committees (see Appendix for rele-
vant abbreviations), approximately thirty of which have begun
to function. In the most recent agreements, the Wye River
Memorandum ("WRM" or "Memorandum") and the Sharm el-
Sheikh Memorandum, additional committees were created,
four of which were formed as trilateral entities. This was un-
precedented as, for the first time during the Oslo peace pro-
cess, Israelis and Palestinians, whose political leaderships had
lost faith in each other, inserted the United States as a third
party presumably trusted by both sides.
Bank. See id.
19. In 1989 the question, "Who will represent the Palestinians?" remained
unresolved. Prime Minister Shamir favored holding independent elections in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip to choose a Palestinian delegation to negotiate an
autonomy arrangement with Israel on the basis of Camp David. Egyptian-Israeli
relations had improved and at the time Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak pro-
posed a 10-point peace plan, formulated by two of Shimon Peres' aides. Eager to
advance Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, Egypt agreed to be the sight of what
became known as the "Cairo Dialogue." The PLO, however, wanted several mem-
bers of the Palestinian National Council to participate in a meeting with Israeli
officials in Cairo in order to demonstrate that Israel was actually dealing with the
PLO. Prime Minister Shamir was unwilling to recognize or negotiate with the
PLO, and the Cairo Dialogue floundered. See MAKOVSKY, supra note 4, at 9, 10.
20. The Madrid Conference, under the joint chairmanship of President Bush
and Premier Gorbachev, was attended by all of the major states in the region, as
well as a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. Although bilateral and multilater-
al meetings followed the plenary session, no agreements were reached, perhaps
because the parties expected the U.S. to take a more active role. See QUANDT,
supra note 14, at 404-06.
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The committee structures created are not limited to diplo-
matic and political officials around the negotiating table, but
involve high ranking military and civilian personnel and, per-
haps more significantly, on duty officers working together."
They bring together former enemies in new roles, and (at least
in theory) an equal environment, seeking to develop pragmatic
solutions to the challenges they face.22
Similar to the joint committee structure, federalism is
predicated on a combination of unity and diversity.' Specifi-
cally, it relies on the premise that two populations with differ-
ent, often opposing goals, may effect a working compromise
through joint governance of territory. This normally requires
some institutional structure within which the two sides coordi-
nate their responsibilities and resolve their everyday differenc-
es; but cooperation also depends on a desire of each side to
promote the interests of both populations.
The implications of a federal solution are far reaching
politically, territorially and historically. In the interim agree-
ments, the Palestinian Authority ("PA") was conferred powers
and responsibilities over ninety-nine percent of the Palestinian
population and a significant portion of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. However, the remaining responsibility and residu-
ary power that were retained by Israel mean that unless and
until a permanent status agreement is reached, there is no
Palestinian sovereign entity. The institutional structure of the
Oslo peace process introduces a sense of legitimacy, a frame of
21. E.g. - the Joint Patrols ["JPs"). See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the
Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 33 I.L.M. 622
(signed at Cairo) [hereinafter Cairo Agreement].
22. Political cooperation can produce mutual trust and good will beyond that
of the diplomats directly involved with negotiation. The effect of collaboration at
the administrative, bureaucratic level involves a degree of public awareness and
media coverage. Its main effect may be to create a working relationship between
officials on both sides which testifies to both populations that relations could be
readily established and mutually beneficial. However, similarities are more likely
to be recognized at this level outside the spotlight of media coverage. Cooperation
at this level is likely to create a model for positive relations in everyday functions
and to greatly improve the efficiency of operations concerning both populations, a
notable example being the JPs and Joint Mobile Units I"JMUs"]. The success of
the JPs and JMUs would be beneficial towards peace only if media portrayal em-
phasized that the Palestinian and Israeli forces were indeed working together, and
that this teamwork was the reason for their effectiveness.
23. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, TWO PEOPLES ONE LAND 38 (1991).
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reference, and a design for cooperation, as well as functioning
as a negotiating forum. This article will analyze the establish-
ment and development of these structures in the main areas of
concern, i.e. security, civil affairs, economic cooperation and
development, the relationships of the legal systems, and the
promotion of general dialogue.24 Section II considers the prog-
ress of the peace agreements and the crystallization and de-
velopment of an institutional structure. Section III seeks to
compare the development of the structure through the treaties
with its practical functioning. Section IV analyzes the major
structures with reference to a federal perspective of the peace
process. Conclusions are drawn from these observations in
relation to the continuing struggle for peace.
II. INTERIM AGREEMENTS OF THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS
Each agreement has incrementally advanced the peace
process; as the only stated objective is peace and a limited
degree of autonomy. The development of the treaty provisions
and the institutional structure has not been focused and linear,
but rather, has been heavily influenced by the underlying
policy objectives of the two sides, those of third parties in-
volved, and above all, by security considerations.
At this time only the DOP, Oslo II, the Hebron Protocol,
the WRM, and the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum are rele-
vant, since the other agreements have been superseded.
A. The Declaration of Principles
The first agreement of the Oslo peace process was the
DOP, which was signed on the White House lawn by the late
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman
Yasser Arafat." It brought about the mutual recognition of
24. See Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M. 557 [here-
inafter Oslo II].
25. The Interim Agreement superseded the Cairo Agreement, the Erez Agree-
ment and the Further Transfer Protocol. See id.
26. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept.
13, 1993, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Organization, 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter DOPI.
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Israel and the PLO, and established a framework of deadlines
for further interim agreements27 and ultimately a permanent
status settlement.28
The DOP contains nascent provisions for the establish-
ment of various committees. The concessions that each side
was willing to make did not allow for a comprehensive struc-
ture, as the drafters recognized that more extensive provisions
would have created unrealistic and unattainable goals, setting
each side against the process at the outset. This method has
been relatively successful in that the agreements have not
provoked wide scale opposition, though they have apparently
failed to reduce existing opposition to the process as a whole.
The absence of cooperation in civil affairs suggests that the
importance of security has overshadowed other areas, affecting
the negotiations behind the DOP.
The DOP required the parties to pursue negotiations via
interim agreements. This resulted in the agreements leading
up to, and culminating in, Oslo II. The DOP also required the
parties to pursue negotiations towards a permanent status
agreement, the deadline for which was set for May 1999. The
negotiations are the only forum capable of quasi-governmental
function in that the parties may not amend the agreements
through their respective administrative or governmental legis-
latures. The parties are also responsible for producing the
27. See id. at arts. 1, 7, and Annex II.
28. See id. at art. 5.
29. Structures of cooperation established in the DOP include: the Arbitration
Committee, DOP, supra note 26, at art. 15; the Joint Liaison Committee ["JLC"J,
DOP, supra note 26, at art. 10; a Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee
for mutual security purposes, DPO, supra note 26, at Annex II; the Protocol on
the Withdrawal of Israeli Forces From the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, DOP,
supra note 26, at para. 3(e) (which in the Cairo Agreement became the Joint Se-
curity Committee [JSC"] - see Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, art. 8 and Annex
I, art. II); a Joint Economic Cooperation Committee ["JEC"], DOP, supra note 26,
at art. 11; a Joint Continuing Committee of Economic Cooperation, DOP, supra
note 26, at Annex III (Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and
Development Programs); and, a recommendation as to the establishment of multi-
lateral working groups to promote regional development programs (with the assis-
tance of the G-7), DOP, supra note 26, at Annex IV. No reference is made to the
establishment of a committee for cooperation in civil affairs, such as the Joint
Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee ["CAC"], established in the
Cairo Agreement. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at art. 3, para. 5, and
Annex II, art. 2. However, in other areas, such as cooperation in the legal field,
mention is made of the need to cooperate. See, e.g., DOP, supra note 26, art. 9,
para. 2 (regarding joint review of laws and military orders presently in force).
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drafts of the peace agreements, and the parties involved are
responsible for the implementation of, or the failure to imple-
ment, existing agreements. In addition, they may be account-
able to the other for a failure to do so, though this operates
only at the political level. The provisions of the DOP were
largely adopted, and were first implemented, by the Cairo
Agreement.
B. The Cairo Agreement
The "Cairo Agreement," signed in the Egyptian capital,
provided for the partial redeployment of Israeli administration
and military forces in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, and
empowered the newly created PA to assume most functions of
local governance in those areas as a first stage of self-rule.30
The Cairo Agreement brought Yasser Arafat, his administra-
tion, and a police force from abroad to rule in parts of the
homeland they aspire to govern as the independent state of
Palestine. Therefore, it had to establish the initial framework
of cooperation so as to maintain the necessary Israeli involve-
ment in the territories.
The Cairo Agreement itself has been superseded entire-
ly." It provided for a Joint Liaison Committee ("JLC"), as re-
quired by the DOP, to coordinate the implementation of the
agreement and to be responsible for dispute resolution. Unlike
Oslo II, it did not specify that the JLC should form an over-
arching structure.3 This suggests that the parties did not
have such an institutional structure in mind, or that if they
did, they did not believe it could, or should, be implemented at
that stage. As a result, the Joint Coordination and Cooperation
Committee for Mutual Security Purposes, the Joint Civil Af-
fairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee ("CAC"), and
Joint Economic Committee ("JEC") were created.34
30. See generally Cairo Agreement, supra note 21.
31. See Oslo II, supra note 24.
32. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at art. 17.
33. See id.
34. The JSC was based on the principle in Annex II to the DOP (Protocol on
the Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area Agreement,
DOP, supra note 26, at Annex II, para. 3(e)), as established in the Cairo Agree-
ment. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, art. 8 and Annex I, art. 2. The CAC is
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The agreement moved towards establishing the mecha-
nisms that, under the supervision of these committees, would
carry out the day to day functions involved in coordinated
activities, and provide for the supervision required after
redeployment and the transfer of authority. 5 Under the Joint
Security Committee ("JSC"), the District Coordination Offices
("DCOs") were created, and under these, Joint Patrols ("JPs")
and Joint Mobile Units ("JMUs") were established.
At this stage, the recognition of the need for cooperation
within civil authority was illustrated by the creation of the
civil affairs subcommittees (later the Regional Civil Affairs
Subcommittees ("RCACs")) and the various Specialist Commit-
tees. While this necessity was acknowledged, the lack of dis-
trict level committees or inclusion of Legal and Legislative
subcommittees under the CAC, (despite their importance and
far ranging responsibilities), attested to the underemphasis of
this issue.
Other committees, under the same Annex as security but
not formally under the JSC, included the Maritime Coopera-
tion Center, Joint Aviation Committee, and the Committee on
Passages and Safe Passage. The Joint Liaison Bureaus
("JLBs"), created as part of the provisions of passages, initially
held the unique position of being under the DCOs and the
CAC, but this was altered by Oslo II. However, this is not
necessarily significant since, in practice, there is a great deal
of overlapping staff between committees.
The Cairo Agreement did not just create a framework
which could be adopted with the transfer of further authority
to the PA or further redeployment, but employed a structure
which simply could be extended to cover the greater responsi-
bility created by further developments.
established in art. 3 of the Cairo Agreement. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21,
at para. 5 and Annex II, art. 2. The Legal Committee is established in art. 5, pa-
ra. 6. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at art. 5, para. 6. The JEC is estab-
lished by Annex IV [the Protocol on Economic Relations]. See Cairo Agreement,
supra note 26, at Annex IV, art. 2.
35. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, Annex I, art. 17.
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C. The Erez Agreement and the Further Transfer Protocol
The third agreement, commonly know as the "Erez Agree-
ment" because it was signed at the Erez checkpoint between
Israel and Gaza, allowed for the transfer of authority to the PA
in certain limited spheres, such as health, social welfare, direct
taxation, tourism, education, and culture in the parts of the
West Bank outside of the Jericho area.36
Thereafter, a relatively concise agreement known as the
Further Transfer Protocol assigned powers in the West Bank
to the PA in the following civil spheres: labor, industry and
commerce, gas, petroleum, agriculture, local government, sta-
tistics and postal services." Unlike Oslo II, neither of these
created new structures, but the agreements did update them in
relation to the increased responsibility that arose with the
transfer of authority. 8
D. Oslo I - The Interim Agreement
The fifth agreement,39 generally referred to as Oslo II,
comprehensively structured the Israeli-PA relationship for the
duration of the interim period." This lengthy agreement was,
like the DOP, signed at the White House under President
Clinton's auspices. Its major provisions included establishing a
process for electing Palestinian executive and legislative au-
thorities, scheduling a phased redeployment of Israeli forces
out of the Palestinian populated areas (which to date has
placed 99 percent of Palestinians in Areas A and B), releasing
several thousand Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and
reiterating the PLO's commitment to cancel provisions in its
National Charter that call for the destruction of Israel. A s
well as adding the Monitoring and Steering Committee
("MSC") comprised of the heads of the main committees estab-
36. Agreement on Preparatory Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 29, 1994, Isr.-
Palestinian Liberation Organization, 34 I.L.M. 455 (signed at the Erez checkpoint
between Israel and the Gaza Strip, Aug. 29, 1994) Ihereinafter Erez Agreement].
37. Protocol on Transfer of Powers, Aug. 27 1995, Isr.-Palestine Liberation
Organization (on file with the author) [hereinafter Transfer Agreement].
38. See Oslo II, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
39. Id.
40. See id. at art. 1.
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lished in the Cairo Agreement (providing a coherent link be-
tween the JLC responsible for coordination at the highest level
below arbitration and dispute resolution),4 Oslo II added
committees in areas particular to security and civil affairs.
This allowed for an increase in workload with the transfer of
authority over the West Bank to Palestinian authorities, com-
pensated for insufficient provisions in the earlier agreements
and emphasized the importance of these organs of coopera-
tion.42 It introduces Regional Security Committees ("RSCs")
and relabels the RCACs, in addition to creating District Civil
Liaison Offices ("DCLs") at the same level as the DCOs created
in the Cairo Agreement under security provisions. These same
reasons may have been responsible for the merger of the Legal
and Legislative subcommittees of the CAC to form the Legal
Committee and its promotion to the level of the JSC, CAC and
JEC.
Most of the committees have met, as will be discussed
below, but the proposed structure has been deviated from, and
the MSC now represents a high level subcommittee in its own
right responsible for direction of the other committees, rather
than just a meeting of their heads. The committees, apparently
under the MSC's direction, may include more specialist com-
mittees, including the Joint Aviation Committee43 and Com-
mittees on Passage and Safe Passage,44 as well as those speci-
fied in Oslo II.
In creating the Standing Cooperation Committee45
("SCC"), Oslo II makes the first significant attempt to increase
support among the respective populations by creating a com-
mittee for this purpose within the institutional structure of the
agreement. The broader issues remaining after Oslo II are
reflected by the committees that were (and continue to be) the
least successful, such as the Legal Committee. Generally
though, difficulties have been more local, in areas where even
temporary solutions were not found for Oslo II.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 12.
44. Id. at Annex I, art. 9.
45. Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex VI, art. 3.
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E. The Hebron Protocol
The Hebron Protocol was the sixth interim agreement,46
and was intended to settle implementation issues that had
been problematic since the negotiation of the earlier Oslo II
Agreement. In addition, it was to facilitate a partial Israeli
redeployment from Hebron, thereby dividing the city into areas
designated H-1 and H-2, respectively the Palestinian and Is-
raeli-controlled sectors."
Implementation of the Hebron Protocol, in particular,
necessitated cooperation between Israel and the PA on a vari-
ety of levels and in less than ideal circumstances, given the
manifest political and religious tensions existing in Hebron. In
this context, a multi-national civilian peacekeeping force, the
Temporary International Presence in Hebron ("TIPH") has
been empowered to act as a facilitator and intermediary.49
46. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Israel, Protocol Concerning the
Redeployment in Hebron and Related Documents, Jan. 17, 1997, Isr.-Palestinian
Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M. 650 [hereinafter Hebron Protocol or Protocol].
47. See Oslo II, supra note 24.
48. The Hebron Protocol contains a map of the city indicating the boundaries
of H-1 and H-2, the Palestinian and Israeli controlled sectors, as well as police
stations, checkpoints, and the routes for the Joint Patrols. The Palestinian Police
are assigned public order responsibilities in H-1, while Israel retains responsibility
for the overall security of Israelis as well as all powers and responsibilities for
internal security and public order in H-2. Palestinian Police stations or posts,
staffed by a total of up to 400 police, with enumerated weaponry, are established
in H-1. The Hebron Protocol situates Palestinian Police checkpoints in H-l, form-
ing a buffer zone adjacent to H-2 "to enable the Palestinian Police, exercising their
responsibilities under the Oslo II, to prevent entry of armed persons and demon-
strators or other people threatening security and public order, into the above-men-
tioned area." See Hebron Protocol, supra note 46.
49. Agreement on the Temporary Int'l Presence in the City of Hebron, Jan.
21, 1997, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M. 547 [hereinafter TIPH2
Agreement. The TIPH2 Agreement outlines the tasks of TIPH2 personnel as fol-
lows:
a. to promote by their presence a feeling of security to the Palestinians of
Hebron;
b. to help promote stability and an appropriate environment conducive to
the enhancement of the well-being of the Palestinians of Hebron and their econom-
ic development;
c. to observe the enhancement of peace and prosperity among Palestinians;
d. to assist in the promotion and execution of projects initiated by the do-
nor countries;
e. to encourage economic development and growth in Hebron;
f. to provide reports as set out in paragraph 7 [TIPH2 Agreement]; and
g. to co-ordinate its activities with the Israeli and Palestinian authorities in
[Vol. XXVI:2
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The agreement added a sub-office to the DCO in Hebron,
created the Joint Coordination Committee for Hebron ("JCC"
or "JHC"), and added an additional JP to the area. The empha-
sis was squarely on security issues, with regard to the specific
difficulties faced in the city. Additional joint committees for
civil affairs were also created in respect to Transportation and
Municipal Inspectors operating in the city."0 The JCC is under
the immediate direction of the MSC in practice, though this
was not specified in the provisions of the Protocol.5'
Since the Interim Agreement, Oslo II, could not even tem-
porarily resolve the limited issues it did address, the Hebron
Protocol, like the Wye River Memorandum, was necessary to
fill in the cracks in a process that would otherwise undermine
it.
F. The Wye River Memorandum
The Wye River Memorandum ( MM")52 recognizes that
the parties agree to continue or reactivate all standing commit-
tees established in Oslo II." The idea that these could be
abandoned is a clear illustration of how shallow the roots of
the institutional structure and the will to cooperate generally
are. If the Memorandum can successfully prolong their exis-
accordance with paragraph 7 [TIPH2 Agreement].
50. See Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, at arts. 13, 14.
51. Interview with Daniel Taub, Legal Advisor to Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, in Jerusalem, Israel (Jan. 3, 1999).
52. The Wye River Memorandum, Oct. 23, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1251 (signed Oct.
23, 1998 at Wye River, Maryland by Prime Minister Netanyahu, Chairman Arafat
and witnessed by President Clinton [hereinafter WRM or Memorandum]. The intro-
duction to the WRM states that King Hussein of Jordan participated in the cere-
mony. The Preamble to the Memorandum states that it consists of steps to facili-
tate the implementation of the Interim Agreement, Oslo II and other related
agreements so that the Israeli and Palestinian sides can more effectively carry out
their reciprocal responsibilities, including those relating to further redeployments
and security. Steps are to be carried out in a parallel phased approach in accor-
dance with the Memorandum and time line attached to the Memorandum. They
are subject to the relevant terms and conditions of the prior agreements and do
not supersede their other requirements. Thus far the parties have not been en-
tirely compliant.
53. Including the most basic Monitoring and Steering Committee, the Joint
Economic Committee, the Civil Affairs Committee and the Legal Committee as
well as the Standing Cooperation Committee. See WRM, supra note 52, at Part III
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tence, it is possible that more cooperation could come from
these imperfect beginnings.
The agreement established three or four additional types
of committees, though there was no attempt to relate these to
the existing structure or to bring together committees previ-
ously created.54 A committee for negotiating third phase
redeployment was formed," implying the existence of some
kind of joint committee which came to an agreement on earlier
redeployment, in addition to higher level, less specific negotia-
tions. Trilateral security committees 6 were devised, introduc-
ing another new element into the peace process, although the
change really represented a shift from more ad hoc involve-
ment to incorporation into an institutional structure. The Ad
Hoc Economic57 Committee and other economically significant
committees" suggest that joint economic issues have arisen
that are too much for one economic committee to deal with,
and indicate continued emphasis on economic issues, being less
controversial than other matters. Provisions relating to areas
in which responsibility was conferred to a committee in an
earlier agreement bear no reference to those committees, either
indicating that they are not operative or implying that the
relevant committees will be involved.59 The committees on
54. Examples of this are: the committee relating to the Outlawing and Com-
bating of Terrorist Organizations created in the Memorandum at Part II A. 1 (c);
the committee to review and evaluate information pertinent to decisions on prose-
cution, punishment, or other legal means which affect the status of individuals
suspected of aiding and abetting or perpetrating acts of violence and terror, creat-
ed in the Memorandum at Part II A. 1. (e); the committee relating to the prohibi-
tion of illegal weapons, created at Part II A. 2.; and the committee relating to the
prevention of incitement, created at Part II A. 3. Memorandum, supra note 52, at
Part IIA These bear no relation to each other. The bilateral, forensic and trilater-
al committees created in Part II B, which bear no stated relationship to each
other, nor to the above committees, nor to the existing structure recognized in
Part II.C.1.(c) and Part III 1. of the Memorandum.
55. WRM, supra note 52, at pt. I B.
56. Id. at II A, B.3.
57. Id. at III 6.
58. Id.
59. Examples of this include: WRM Part II on security which bears no refer-
ence to the Joint Security Committee referred to in the DOP Annex II 3.e. and
created in the Cairo Agreement art. 7 (2); the WRM Part III 2, relating to eco-
nomic developments which contains no reference to the cooperation required by the
DOP Article, the Cairo Agreement and Oslo II, and provides for the establishment
of the Gaza Airport without mentioning the possible role for coordination through
the Joint Aviation Committee established in the Cairo Agreement Annex I art. 12;
and, in Part III 4., provisions relating to the Port of Gaza make no reference to
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future redeployment, the Gaza Port Committee" and the Ad
Hoc Economic Committee may be directly responsible to the
MSC.
According to the time-table set out in the DOP, arrange-
ments for the interim period are to be replaced by those estab-
lished in the permanent status accords no later than May 4,
1999. The six interim agreements postponed the most critical
points of contention.61
The WRM, the most recent agreement, is a response to the
deadlock in implementing the provisions of Oslo II and the
DOP in line with the prescribed schedule. It primarily deals
with two central issues: further redeployment,62 and a revi-
sion of measures relating to security.63 In addition, it reem-
phasizes and deals with issues that required attention in mat-
ters of Economic and Civil cooperation.' Further, a new time
the Maritime Coordination Committee created in the Cairo Agreement Annex I art.
11. The most striking omission is the Joint Liaison Committee, created in the
DOP art. 10, which was responsible for general cooperation including security,
whilst the new bilateral and trilateral committees established in the WRM Part II
B. are created to exercise similar functions, albeit limited to issues relating to
security, like the JSC.
60. WRM, supra note 52, at pt. III, para. 4.
61. These include the allocation of scarce fresh water sources, the custody of
religious sites holy to two or more faiths, the future of the Jewish settlements, the
desire of many Palestinian refugees (from the 1948 and 1967 Wars) to return
either to the Palestinian entity or to Israel, Palestinian aspirations to statehood,
and the future sovereignty of Jerusalem.
62. Including the transfer of thirteen percent of Area C to Palestinian control,
1 percent as Area A, the remaining area to become Area B. The Palestinian side,
it is noted in the agreement, has pledged to retain three per cent of the thirteen
as a nature reserve. In addition fourteen (point two) percent of what is currently
Area B is to become Area A status territory. A committee is to be established to
consider further redeployments, the progress of which is to be reported to the
United States regularly. See WRM, supra note 52, at pts. I (A)-(B).
63. See id. at II. The Memorandum strongly emphasizes the need to cooperate
to prevent terrorism and acts of hostility. Details are laid down as to how the
Palestinian Police and Israeli authorities should deal with outlawing and combat-
ing terrorist action, to prohibit illegal weapons and to prevent incitement. Bilater-
al, forensic and trilateral cooperation is called for. Bilateral cooperation implicitly
involves some form of committee not specified. In addition there is to be forensic
cooperation, i.e. exchange of forensic expertise, training and other assistance, and
trilateral cooperation involving a high-ranking US-Palestinian-Israeli committee and
as other specific U.S.-Palestinian Committees for security purposes. The Palestin-
ian Police are also required to present a list of its policemen to the Israeli side.
64. See id. at III. In civil and economic issues, the agreement specifies issues
relating to the Gaza Industrial Estate, the possibility of an International Airport
in the Gaza Strip, Safe Passage, the Port of Gaza and to the resolution of unre-
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line is attached to the Memorandum, and the accelerated per-
manent status negotiations maintained the May 4, 1999 dead-
line.65 The Memorandum reiterates the more symbolic, than
practically significant requirement, that the Palestinian Coun-
cil formally revise the PLO Charter to bring it in line with the
policy presented in entering the peace process."
The need for the Memorandum emphasizes the primary
difficulties the peace process seeks to circumvent: the creation
of a vacuum in areas of redeployment, the chance of serious
delays in and limitations on the assumption of responsibility
by the Palestinian Police and the refusal to carry out
redeployments until security arrangements are settled. It also
emphasizes two ways of dealing with the problem. The first,
through international involvement, which has been pursued for
nearly a century. Secondly, the Memorandum utilizes the insti-
tutional structure, and creatively adds to it.
G. The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum
Signed on November 4, 1999, the Sharm el-Sheikh Memo-
randum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commit-
ments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Perma-
nent Status Negotiations ("Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum")67
marginalized American intervention, established a new basis of
trust between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships and
established a new time frame for negotiating final status is-
sues. The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum was drafted with the
aim of facilitating the implementation of the long-stalled WRM
by renegotiating major issues previously addressed by that
agreement.
The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum recognizes that the
parties must commit themselves to full and mutual implemen-
tation of the Interim Agreement and all other agreements
concluded since September 1993. In an attempt to refine the
solved legal issues. Economic dialogue is called for with institutional support, and
the need to enhance international donor assistance is addressed.
65. See id. at IV.
66. See id. at II (C), para. 2.
67. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding
Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status
Negotiations, November 4, 1999 (hereinafter the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum).
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existing structure, the Memorandum makes four specific de-
mands concerning committee action.68 These demands reflect
a direct progression of committee action based on original
structuring of these entities as defined by all previous agree-
ments. The Memorandum establishes specific deadlines for the
Monitoring and Steering Committee, all Interim Committees,
as well as Wye River Memorandum committees. 9 The Third
Further Redeployment Committee is required to commence its
activities by a given date."0 The Memorandum makes refer-
ence to Article XxvII of the Interim Agreement, in its request
that the Continuing Committee on displaced persons shall
resume its activity.71 Lastly, in this section, the memorandum
reiterates Article 111-6 of the WRM. It calls for the two sides to
implement the recommendation of the Ad-hoc Economic Com-
mittee. 2
The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum is not intended to be
innovative in addressing committee issues. Rather, the
Memorandum's reiteration and reassessment of committees
already established by the WRM indicates the failure of those
committees to fulfill their obligations. Therefore, the need to
readdress these failures in a new agreement does not call for
innovation, but rather for persistence and firmness. Ultimate-
ly, the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum only will be successful if
it can push implementation from the grassroots committee
level.
The need for the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum empha-
sizes the difficulties the peace process is facing in implement-
68. Examples of this include: the committee relating to the Outlawing and
Combating of Terrorist Organizations created in the Sharm el-Sheikh Memoran-
dum at Part II A. 1 (c); the committee to review and evaluate information perti-
nent to decisions on prosecution, punishment, or other legal means which affect
the status of individuals suspected of aiding and abetting or perpetrating acts of
violence and terror created at Part II A. 1. (e); the committee relating to the pro-
hibition of illegal weapons created at Part II A. 2.; and the committee relating to
the prevention of incitement created at Part II A. 3., which bear no relation to
each other; the bilateral, forensic and trilateral committees created in Part II B.
which bear no stated relationship to each other nor to the above committees, nor
to the existing structure recognized in Part II.C.1.(c) and Part III 1. of the Memo-
randum.
69. See The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, supra note 67, at pt. IV (B).
70. See id. at IV (A).
71. See id. at IV (C).
72. See id. at IV (D).
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ing prior agreements. These difficulties include, the creation of
a vacuum in areas of redeployment, the chance for serious
delays in, and limitations on, the assumption of responsibility
by the Palestinian Police and the refusal to carry out
redeployments until security arrangements are settled. There
seems to be a trend with agreements that require implementa-
tion, reach standstills, and are replaced by new agreements.
With the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum there is hope that the
reiteration of the need for committee activity in a federally
structured implementation process will bring this trend to a
higher and more effective level of peace making.
III. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE CREATED BY THE PEACE
AGREEMENTS
The treaties adopt structures that are meant to be tempo-
rary, insofar as they pave the way for a final status agreement,
although these ephemeral structures, if effective, may be used
as a model for the final settlement. While federal systems aim
to promote individual and mutual goals, the security interests
of Israel, coupled with the Palestinians' desire for self-determi-
nation, produces serious difficulties for both. The interim sys-
tem has been structured in the hope of reconciling these inter-
ests and promoting mutual ones through the development of
bilateral and trilateral structures, and currently shows signs of
developing a coherent framework of coordination.
While apparently desirable both in the short and long
term resolution of the conflict, cooperation is necessary and
unavoidable on a pragmatic level. Pursuant to the DOP, a
transfer of local governance authority over the disputed territo-
ry (or parts of it) is intended to grant a degree of self-rule for
the Palestinian population, though explicitly less than state-
hood.73 This involves Israeli redeployment which carries the
risk of creating a vacuum into which unknown forces (i.e.-
Hamas) could assert control with predictable consequences for
national security and public safety.74 Under the DOP, Israel
retains residual responsibility for defending against external
73. See DOP, supra note 26, arts. 1, 5.
74. See e.g., Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex I, art. 1 a and c.; art. 1, para 5.
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threats as well as the overall security of Israelis.75 This is
limited in order to give maximal autonomy to the PA.
The structure created in the interim agreements for coop-
eration in security matters consists of a Joint Coordination and
Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes responsi-
ble to the JLC, RSCs and DCOs.7 In addition, the WRM es-
tablished three committees to monitor and deal with terrorism,
illegal arms and incitement,77 and calls for bilateral coopera-
tion and a Trilateral Committee; a U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli
Committee, primarily to arbitrate and assist in security is-
sues.
78
The DOP establishes a high level Joint Liaison Committee
("JLC") to provide for the smooth implementation of the DOP
and subsequent agreements. 79 A Joint Security Coordination
and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes
("JSC") based on the principle in Annex II to the DOP,0 a
Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee
("CAC"),sl a Joint Economic Committee ("JEC")"2 and a par-
allel Legal Committee ("LC")83 initially under the CAC (but
which became responsible to the Joint Liaison Committee in
75. See DOP, supra note 26, at art. 8.
76. Oslo II, supra 24, at Annex I art. 3.
77. See WRM, supra note 52, at pt. II A.
78. See id. at II. B.
79. A Joint Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual
Security Purposes ["JSC"] based on the principle in Annex II to the DOP, Protocol
on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza strip and Jericho Area agree-
ment para. 3(e) was established in the Cairo Agreement, art. 3 and Annex I, art.
2, a Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee ["CAC"] was es-
tablished in the Cairo Agreement, Annex II, art. I. A parallel Legal Committee
["LC"I was created in the Cairo Agreement art. V, para. 6, under the CAC and
became responsible to the Joint Liaison Committee in its own right under Oslo II
arts. 17 and 18. A Joint Economic Committee [JEC"] was created in the Cairo
Agreement, Annex IV Protocol on Economic Relations, art. 2. The somewhat broad-
er Standing Cooperation Committee ["SCC"] was only established in Oslo II Annex
VI Protocol Concerning Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Programs, art. 3. Oslo II
brought these committees under the supervision of the Monitoring and Steering
Committee of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee. See Oslo II, supra
note 24, at art. 26.
80. Protocol on the Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza strip, and
Jericho Area agreement para. 3(e), and established in the Cairo Agreement. See
Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at art. 8 and Annex I, art. 2.
81. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at art. 3, para. 5 and Annex II, art. 1.
82. Id. at Annex IV, art. 2.
83. Id. at art. 5, para.6.
BROOK. J. INTL L.
its own right under Oslo II)' were created in the Cairo
Agreement. The somewhat broader Standing Cooperation Com-
mittee ("SCC") was only established in Oslo II Annex VI Proto-
col Concerning Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Programs, Arti-
cle III. Oslo II brought these committees under the supervision
of the Monitoring and Steering Committee of the Joint Israeli-
Palestinian Liaison Committee.8 5 The structure as well as the
individual committees do exist to some extent. This may be
true by virtue of the fact that the MSC has met, and for a time
after its establishment, sentiments about future meetings were
positive, at least on the Israeli side.86 However while the MSC
was initially active, as of mid to late 1997, it ceased convening
entirely. As perhaps the most significant coordinating body
within the institutional framework, the MSC obstructs the
ability of other committees to meet their goals when it is inop-
erative. However, the structure does not hinge completely on
the MSC, and the committees under it have continued, in most
cases, to function at least until the onset of the A1-Aqsa
intifada in late September 2000.87
The development and degree of implementation of each
committee will be considered within the major fields of cooper-
ation. The basic questions that must be addressed here are: (1)
Is there an identifiable structure? (2) How does it relate to the
institutional arrangement? (3) What are the committees' fre-
quency and composition in practice? (4) What are their func-
tions and what issues have they dealt with? Most importantly,
84. Oslo II, supra note 24, at art. 17, 18.
85. Id. at art. 26.
86. The committee met on November 16, 1995 at the headquarters of the
Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction outside Jerusa-
lem to discuss the progress of IDF redeployment and preparation for the Palestin-
ian elections. It was headed by Foreign Ministry Director-General Uri Savir, and
Palestinian Authority Economics Minister Ahmed Qreia. Savir is reported as hav-
ing said "there is every intention to keep the schedule as agreed." Jon Immanuel,
News in Brief, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 17, 1995, at 1.
87. Interview with Mordechay Cristal, Civil Negotiator for Coordination of
Government Activities in the Territories, in the Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv,
Isr. (June 14, 1999). Palestinian sources have dubbed the current disturbances the
"Al-Aqsa intifada." A1-Aqsa is the mosque in Jerusalem which observant Moslems
regard as their third holiest site, after Mecca and Medina. The word "intifada"
means "uprising" or "shaking off." The current violence should not be confused
with the earlier intifada which began in December 1987 and ended with the
launching of the Oslo peace process in mid-1993. See Lamia Lahoud, Fatah Calls
For Intifada Despite Summit, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 17, 2000 at 2.
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(5) How successful have the committees been in furthering the
purpose of the peace process, both individually and within the
given framework?
A. Security
1. Redeployment
In matters of security the DOP required the two sides to
come to an agreement on the redeployment of Israeli military
forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This was to in-
clude comprehensive arrangements to apply subsequent to the
withdrawal,88 resulting in the Cairo Agreement.
The Cairo Agreement states that Israel shall implement
an accelerated and scheduled redeployment of Israeli military
forces from the Gaza Strip and from the Jericho area, to be
completed within three weeks." However, redeployment was
necessary to maintain their responsibility over external and
internal security, as well as the public order of settlements."
Arrangements for the deployment of the Palestinian Police9'
had to be included in a general plan for coordination, to facili-
tate a smooth transfer of responsibility so that no vacuum in
authority would be created by the redeployment.92 The Cairo
Agreement also states that Israel should continue to carry the
obligation for defense against external threats, (including the
responsibility for protecting the Egyptian border and the Jor-
danian line, and for external threats from the sea and from the
air), as well as responsibility for the overall security of Israelis,
(having all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this
responsibility).93 In arrangements set out regarding the Gaza-
Egypt and Jericho-Jordan passages, and other international
crossings, it is stated that there should be maximum coopera-
tion and joint review of procedures after a year.94
Oslo II provides for the transfer of responsibility to the
88. See DOP, supra note 26, at Annex II, para. 1.
89. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex II, art. 2(1).
90. See id. at art. 2(3).
91. Id. at art. 2(6).
92. See id. at Annex I, art. 1(2).
93. Id. at art. 2.
94. Id. at Annex I, art. 10.
2000] 615
BROOK. J. INTL L.
Palestinian Police in phases,95 and withdrawal of the Civil
Administration after the inauguration of the Palestinian Inter-
im Self-Government Authority ("Palestinian Council" or "Coun-
cil"). 6 The first stage of redeployments was set prior to the
elections for the Council; the next phase of redeployments was
to be gradually implemented with the assumption of responsi-
bility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian
Police (to be completed within eighteen months). The Palestin-
ian Police were to assume responsibility for areas A and B
after complete redeployment, with coordination and residual
Israeli responsibility.9" While the transfer of Area C and in-
ternational security responsibility in Areas B and C was to be
phased over eighteen months following the inauguration of the
Council, exceptions remained as to the areas left for perma-
nent status negotiations. Ten days before each stage of
redeployment, commanders of each side were to acquaint the
respective commanders of the different echelons of the Pales-
tinian Police with the respective area and its specific prob-
lems.99 Again, enduring accountability for external security
and the overall security of Israelis remains with Israel, which
is to have all necessary powers to fulfill these duties. ' Ar-
rangements regarding passages are updated and generalized to
cover agreed seaports, airports and other international cross-
ings; the main aim being to maintain the dignity of persons
passing through the border crossings. ' °
The Hebron Protocol states that redeployment should be
carried out in accordance with Oslo II and with itself, to be
completed no later than ten days from the signing of the proto-
col. 02 The Palestinian Police are to assume responsibility for
areas specified as H-i, with special agreements for areas adja-
cent to the areas under the security responsibility of Israel in
area H-1, in the area between Palestinian Police checkpoints,
and the areas under the security responsibility of Israel in
order to enable the Palestinian Police, exercising their respon-
95. Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 1, app. 1.
96. Id. at art. 1.
97. Id. at art. 13.
98. Id. at art. 13 (2)(b)(8).
99. Id. at app. I, art. 1.
100. See, e.g., Oslo II, supra note 24, at arts. 1(1), 12(1).
101. See id. at app. I, art. 8.
102. Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, at para. 1.
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sibility under Oslo II, to prevent the entry of persons and dem-
onstrators threatening security and public order into the ar-
ea." 3 Special provisions are reiterated from Oslo II regarding
responsibility for the security of Jewish Holy Sites in Area H-
1.104
The WRM provides for further redeployment from thirteen
percent of "Area C," the agreement referring to the intention to
convert three percent of this area into designated Green Areas
or a Nature Reserve.0 5 Movements of the Palestinian Police
force in these Green Areas or the Nature Reserve require coor-
dination and confirmation.' 6 In the second phase, certain ar-
eas previously regarded as Area B are to be converted to Area
A status."0 7
The WRM explicitly establishes a committee to discuss the
third phase of redeployments envisioned under the terms of
the Memorandum.0 ° It is not clear whether such a committee
is wholly new or whether it reflects the reality in the negotia-
tions and coordination behind redeployments that have taken
place.
103. Id. at paras. 3, 4.
104. Id. at para. 6. In mid-April 1997, a media report indicated that Arafat
had ordered Palestinian security forces to renew cooperation with their Israeli
counterparts, ending a one-month break in contacts. Arafat had suspended the
contacts in mid-March after construction began at Har Homa. Reports indicated,
however, that the PA officially denied any cooperation was taking place and that
Dennis Ross was dispatched to the Middle East in an attempt to persuade the
Palestinians to resume security ties. See e.g., Hillel Kuttler, Ross to Present New
Peace Proposals, JERUSALEM POST, May 4, 1997, at 1. Individual Palestinians who
do provide information to Israel are branded as 'collaborators' and treated severe-
ly by the PA's security apparatus. Thus, when Israel passes on information to PA
officials concerning planned attacks, the Palestinian police take action against the
intelligence source rather than the terrorists. See generally Boaz Ganor, Israeli
Counterterrorism in the Shadow of Oslo, The Shalem Center, POLICY VIEW, Dec.
10, 1995.
The Head of the Palestinian General Intelligence Amin AI-Hindi told an
interviewer, [ilt is wrong to say that the Israeli side benefited from these ar-
rangements [security coordination], as we have never revealed any piece of infor-
mation that could harm the Palestinian side. Neither [two leaders of Hamas] . . .
a detainee inside a PNA prison, nor any other Palestinian will be handed over to
Israel." Interview of Amin AI-Hindi, Head of the Palestinian General Intelligence,
Security Demands, BILADI THE JERUSALEM REPORT (Jan. 24, 1997) at 6.
105. WRM, supra note 52, at pt. I.A.
106. Id. at I. A(1).
107. Id. at I. A.
108. Id. at I. B.
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Redeployment has taken place, but as the WRM illustrates
most recently,0 9 it has not followed the schedule largely be-
cause of the reasonably held fear that redeployment would
leave behind a form of authority in security matters which is
not sufficiently accountable to the more moderate political
authority. However, the current redeployments do not appear
to have left a political vacuum. In addition, the continuation of
violence, without comprehensive measures by the Palestinian
Authorities, inhibit redeployment as a result of the reaction of
the Israeli public to an attack, and the lack of trust inspired in
the diplomats and relevant military personnel when attacks
occur. The extent of the difficulties are illustrated by the fact
that the WRM has proved difficult to implement. The joint
committees are the only arena in which these mutual insecuri-
ties can be eradicated, resulting in substantial and effective
redeployment.
2. The Trilateral Committees
Evidently above the level that the JSC ought to operate
on, a high-ranking U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee is con-
ceived to meet as required, not less than biweekly, to assess
current threats, deal with impediments to effective security
cooperation and coordination, and address the steps being
taken to combat terror and terrorist organizations. "' It is al-
so intended to serve as a forum to address the issue of external
support for terror."'
In addition, the WRM established three more specialized
trilateral committees to address the issues of terrorism,1 il-
legal arms,"' and preventing incitement."4 These appear to
overlap with the functions of the JSC. It is not clear how they
relate to the JSC, or to the RSCs, DCOs and the other more
specialized committees or patrols. These may be concerned
with the appraisal and supervision of the work of the JSC. The
109. Id. at Preamble and pt. I.
110. Id. at II. B(3).
111. See id. at II. B(3).
112. Id. at II. AM1.
113. Id. at II. A(2).
114. Id. at II. A(3).
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work of any of the joint committees is only worthwhile if there
is consensus. That might be easier to achieve at a trilateral
committee level which is not also responsible for the imple-
mentation of adopted strategies. Alternatively, they may act as
working groups within the JSC to address particular areas of
its responsibilities in implementing, as well as coordinating,
measures to promote security.
The introduction of trilateral committees into the peace
process could be beneficial or equally detrimental. In certain
cases it could function as an effective mediator, reconciling
demands of the two sides. However, there exists the risk that
the side opposed to the position of the U.S. would simply ac-
cuse the American member of the committee of bias.
3. The Joint Security Cooperation and Coordination
Committee
The Cairo Agreement established JSC,"5 whose main
purpose is to ensure that there is cooperation, and not a vacu-
um in authority, in the transfer of responsibility. It stated that
the JSC shall: (1) recommend security policy guidelines for the
approval of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee,
and implement those approved, (2) deal with the security is-
sues raised by either side, (3) provide the proper channel for
exchanging information (needed to solve security problems)
between the two sides, and (4) provide directives for the
DCOs." 6 The Committee was further given the responsibility
of developing a plan to ensure full coordination between the
Israeli military forces and the Palestinian Police during the
withdrawal phases and the entry and deployment of the Pales-
tinian Police.'17 Five to seven members were allocated from
115. The DOP calls for the establishment of a Joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordi-
nation and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes [DOP Annex II,
para. 3(e)] later renamed the Joint Security Cooperation and Coordination Commit-
tee in the Cairo Agreement. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at art. 7(2) (referring
to provisions in Annex I, art. 2).
116. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 2.
117. Id. at Annex I, art. 1. This clause specifies that the plan should include
arrangements for the entry of the Palestinian Police, the introduction of police
arms, ammunition and equipment and related matters, as well as arrangements
intended to facilitate a smooth transfer of responsibility, including the transfer of
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each side,"8 and meetings were provided for every two weeks
or within 48 hours of either side's request for a special meet-
ing." The Committee was made responsible for determining
its own rules of procedure.2 °
As mentioned above, Oslo II adopts the text of the Cairo
Agreement.' 2 ' It additionally introduces Regional Security
Committees ("RSCs")' 22 through which it is to provide direc-
tives to the DCOs and to coordinate Israeli military forces and
the Palestinian Police during the interim period. 123 The JSC
is intended to develop a comprehensive plan to ensure full
coordination during the interim period,124 very similar to the
plan which was to be developed under the Cairo Agree-
ment.125 In addition Oslo II provides for two regional plans
for coordination and cooperation in security matters after
redeployment, 1 6 which are to be reviewed every six months
or whenever needed. 27 The JSC maintains five to seven
members from each side, 28 and meetings are held once every
two weeks or 48 hours after either side requests a special
meeting, 29 despite the additional responsibility for coopera-
tion over the West Bank and Hebron. This might suggest that
these provisions were sufficiently effective, or that there did
not appear to be any feasible arrangement which would be
more effective. Despite the optimistic goals set for the commit-
tee, the creation of the RSCs was to reduce the administrative
burden on the JSC members.
The JSC was established and operates to coordinate secu-
rity. '3 The staff that preside on the committee may have a
civil authority.
118. Id. at Annex I, art. 1, para. 1(d). Cf. Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex III,
art. 1 [CAC]; id. at Annex V, art. 2 [JEC]; id. at Annex VI, art. 3 [SCC].
119. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 1, para 1(d).
120. Id. at Annex I, art. 1.
121. Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 3.
122. As intermediaries between the JSC and the DCOs.
123. Oslo II, supra note 24, at app. I, art. 3, paras. 1 (b)(4), 1(g).
124. Id. at app. I, art. 3, para. 1().
125. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21.
126. Oslo II, supra note 24, at app. I, art. 3, para 1(i).
127. Id. at app. I, art. 3, para 1(j).
128. Id. at app. I, art. 3, para. 1(c).
129. Id. at app. I, art. 3, para. 1(d).
130. In October 1996 the JSC met in Kalkilya under Brigadier General Herzl
Getz and Brigadier General Ziad Atrash to discuss the (at that time) current secu-
rity situation following riots. Illustrating complications, a request to let Palestinian
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more significant role than the committee itself because they
hold positions in the respective security authorities in addition
to their JSC post. Ultimately, they must also encourage the
protection of both populations from those opposed to peace by
the cooperation of both Israeli and Palestinian security person-
nel, beyond the committee level. However, this has not been
always evident.131
As mentioned, the Israeli representative on the JSC is
that of the Committee which suggests that at least on the Is-
raeli side, the JSC and Trilateral Committee would seek com-
patible and complementary goals, although they serve different
functions and could be coordinated well. This seems to reduce
the diversity and thus the extensiveness of the institutional
structure which may be disadvantageous.
4. The Regional Security Committees
Two RSCs are created in Oslo II, one in the West Bank
policemen serving in the West Bank visit their relatives in Gaza was vetoed be-
cause of the failure of the PA to take measures against policemen responsible for
shooting IDF soldiers. The failure of the joint patrols in the West Bank were to
be discussed by the Palestinian Council. Jon Immanuel, Israel-PA Talks Resume,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 10, 1996, at 1.
131. In November 1997, Hisham Abdul Razik, a PA official on the JSC con-
demned the terrorist shooting that killed Ateret Cohanim Yeshiva student Gavriel
Hirschberg and wounded fellow student Benny Dil, but assigned the blame for the
attack firmly on Israel. In addition he stated that the Preventive Security Appara-
tus (headed by Colonel Jibril Rajoub) would not cooperate with the General Securi-
ty Service until two Hamas suspects, seized from PA custody, were returned.
Steve Rodan & Liat Collins, PA Officials Blame Netanyahu For Attack, JERUSALEM
POST, Nov. 21, 1997, at 3.
Herzl Getz, head of the JSC, has had to deal with several cases in which
PA officers were said to have systematically intimidated Israeli soldiers legally
patrolling through Gaza. They apparently included ambushes in which PA officers
would stop IDF jeeps and point their submachine guns at the Israeli soldiers.
Steve Rodan, The PA Leader Can Be Budged But Go Too Far And He'll Break,
Israeli Officials Tell Steve Rodan, JERUSALEM POST, March 1, 1996, at 8.
An urgent meeting of the JSC was called for in March 1995 by the Pales-
tinian security chief Major General Nasser Yusef a month after its establishment
in the case of an apparently deliberate attack on a Border Police Jeep by the
Palestinian security chief Major General Nasser Yusef to discuss the deterioration
in Israeli-Palestinian coordination. Alon Pinkas, Jon Immanuel, Bill Hutman, Amir
Rozenblit, IDF Inquiry: Jeep Ramming No Accident, JERUSALEM POST, March 31,
1995, at 1.
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and one in the Gaza Strip,132 so as to: (1) guide the relevant
District Coordination Offices with security policy guidelines; (2)
deal with security issues referred to it by the DCOs; (3) ensure
the proper transfer of information and guidelines to the rele-
vant DCOs and to propose to the JSC security policy guide-
lines, and; (4) forward issues to the JSC for determination.133
Regular meetings are to be held between the commanders of
the Israeli military forces and the Palestinian Police as appro-
priate, and each side is required to operate a regional security
coordination office 24 hours a day, with direct and constant
communication links between the two sides. Communication is
clearly a top priority, for joint coordination efforts have no
foundation without it. However, the extent to which this par-
ticular structure is adopted may depend on its practicality
compared with any pre-existing or potential alternatives.
5. The District Coordination Offices
The functions of the DCOs as set out in the Cairo Agree-
ment are to: (1) to monitor and manage matters requiring
coordination, as determined and according to the policy and
guidelines it established by the JSC; (2) monitor and manage
all matters of a joint nature within the specific district of each
DCO, including the coordination of activities by one side which
may affect the other; (3) review, investigate and report to the
JSC on the overall situation within the DCO's respective dis-
trict, with special regard to the events, incidents, and activities
occurring in the districts; (4) direct JPs and JMUs operating
within the DCO's respective district, and (5) direct the JLB in
conjunction with the CAC. 134
The DCOs are to be jointly operated 24 hours a day,13
staffed by a team of up to six officers from each side compris-
ing one commander and five duty officers,136 with at least one
duty officer from each side present during each eight hour
132. Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 3, para. 2(a).
133. Id. at Annex I, art. 3, para. 2(b).
134. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 2, para. 2(b).
135. Id. at Annex I, art. 2, para. 2(d).
136. Id. at Annex I, art. 2, para. 2(c).
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shift.137 Both sides must notify the relevant DCO on the oc-
currence of any military maneuver, hostile act or other threat
to security.'38 Upon such notice, the DCO must inform the
relevant Israeli and Palestinian headquarters, the JP operat-
ing in the relevant district, and the JMUs operating in the
area,139 in the interests of preventing friction and enabling
the two sides to deal with possible incidents. In addition, the
DCO must immediately report any injury to Israelis at any
location within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Though Isra-
el may employ any means necessary for the evacuation and
treatment of such injured persons, it must coordinate such
activity through the relevant DCO. 40 Under the Cairo Agree-
ment three DCOs were established,"' each with one or two
subordinate JLBs at crossing points.
Oslo II requires the creation of eight DCOs in the West
Bank,' including one for the Hebron district and one in
the Jericho district with their subordinate JLBs,"' while re-
taining the two in the Gaza strip with their JLBs. It largely
adopts the provisions of the Cairo Agreement. "5 It provides
for the introduction of the RSCs in that the RSC is recognized
as determining, together with the JSC, the policy to be adopted
137. Id. at Agreement Annex I, art. 2, para. 2(d).
138. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 3, para. 3(g) (which is identi-
cal to the provision in the Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, Annex I, art. 2, para.
2(e)), namely: (1) routine, scheduled or irregular activity or deployment by the
Israeli military forces or the Palestinian Police that directly affect the other side.
This includes activity or deployment in the proximity of settlements or Palestinian
villages, as the case may be; (2) events that pose a threat to public order; (3)
activities which disturb the regular flow of traffic on the main roads, including
roadblocks and roadwork; (4) incidents involving both Israelis and Palestinians,
such as road accidents, rescue of casualties or persons in mortal danger, engage-
ment steps or any incident in which a weapon is used; (5) a terrorist action of
any kind and from any source; (6) infiltration between the West Bank, the Gaza
Strip and Israel; and (7) all cases in which Israelis are hospitalized in the West
Bank or Gaza Strip or in which Palestinians of the West Bank or Gaza Strip are
hospitalized in Israel.
139. This is not mentioned in Oslo II. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at
Annex I, art. 2, para. 2(M (which also required that the JMUs be notified, super-
seded by Oslo II).
140. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 2, para. 2(h).
141. Id. at Annex I, art. 2, para. 2(a) (DCOs located in Gaza, Khan Yunis and
Jericho).
142. Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 5, para. 1.
143. Id. at Annex I, art. 5, para. 1(g).
144. Id. at Annex I, art. 5, para. 1(h).
145. Id. at app. III, art. 3, para. 3.
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by the DCO and the DCO is required to report the situation in
its district to the relevant RSC instead of the JSC. It does not
mention responsibility for directing the JLBs (and their estab-
lishment is mentioned separately).'46 The DCOs all exist in
the places in which they were created.
6. Joint Patrols and Joint Mobile Units
Cooperation at the most fundamental and clearly most
significant level occurs with the JPs and JMUs. The success of
the peace process at all levels lies with these groups. Coopera-
tion in other areas will be stymied if joint security needs can-
not be attained through Israeli and Palestinian cooperation.
The Cairo Agreement provided that these should consist of a
combined unit of two patrol vehicles, one Israeli and one Pales-
tinian.'47 The JPs and JMUs are given similar though dis-
tinct functions. The former ensures "free, unimpeded move-
ment and secure movement along the roads.""" The latter
was originally intended "to provide [a] rapid response in the
event of incidents and emergency situations."' The JPs 5°
146. Id. at Annex I, art. 3, para. 6. (Art. 8, para. 5(c), app. 5 - Annex I, art.
E).
147. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 1, para. 3(b). One can
compare the requirement of an officer and three uniformed, armed guards by Oslo
II, supra note 24, Annex I, art. 3, para. 4(b)., with Cairo Agreement, supra note
21, Annex I, art. 2, para. 3(b) (which requires that the unit be comprised of an
officer, a signal operator, a driver and a guard).
148. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 1, para. 3(a).
149. Id. at Annex I, art. 2, para. 4(a) (which is the same as Oslo II, supra
note 24, Annex I art. 3, para. 5 (a)), -which states that their function is to ensure
free, unimpeded and secure movement along their designated routes of activity,
(although Oslo II adds, in Annex I, art. 3, para. 5(d)(3), that the JMU may serve
any other function on top of those mentioned in the Cairo Agreement, supra note
21, Annex I, art. 2, para. c(1) and (2)).
150. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 4 (Security Ar-
rangements in the Gaza Strip), which creates two JPs in the Mawasi Area to be
led by an Israeli vehicle (id. at art. 4, para. 5(a)), provides for JPs to operate
along three lateral roads leading out of the territories from, settlements in the
Gaza Strip led by Israeli vehicle (id. at art. 4, para. 7(a)(2)), one along Central
North-South Road (Rd. No. 4) led by Palestinian vehicle (id. at art. 4, para. 8),
and a JP operated by a JMU at the Nitzanim Junction under direction of DCO
(id. at art. 4, para. 9(b)); and Cairo Agreement, art. 5 - (Security Arrangements
in the Jericho Area) which creates one JP on the main North-South road crossing
Jericho (Route no. 90) led by Palestinian vehicle (2). Id. at art. 5, para. 2.
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patrol 24 hours a day, in vehicles, along the routes of activity,
or as directed by the relevant DCO.' 5' The JPs are intended
to continually monitor movement within their area of operation
and to prevent and deal with incidents that may threaten or
endanger persons using the roads. 5 ' They are to report any
such incident or threatened incident, as well as any action
taken, to the relevant DCO and to the respective Israeli and
Palestinian district headquarters." 3 On reaching the scene of
an incident the JP is to provide as much assistance as possible,
or if the incident is dealt with by the authorities functioning in
the area, verify that appropriate measures have been taken
and report to the relevant DCO.14 If the JP becomes aware
of the happening of one of the hostile occurrences listed in the
agreement, 5 ' they must report the event to the relevant
DCO as well as the respective headquarters of both sides.'
The agreements show signs of sensitivity to the tensions be-
tween the two sides, in that the lead vehicle depends on which
party has responsibility for the particular road.5 7 Oslo II
adopts the text of the Cairo Agreement' adding provisions
for patrols on foot.'59
Oslo II, Annex I, art. 6 (Security Arrangements in the Gaza Strip) main-
tains two JPS in Mawasi Area, along lateral roads: one along central North-South
Road and one operated by JMU at Netzarim junction, as established by the Cairo
Agreement, supra note 21, Annex I, art. 4. Oslo II, Annex I, art. 5 (Security Ar-
rangements in the West Bank) creates 11 JPs in the region along roads crossing
Jenin, Tulkarm, Kalkilya, Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Jericho, two JPs along the
roads crossing Nablus, and two along the roads crossing Ramallah, and one on the
road crossing Hebron. Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex I, art. 7 (Guidelines for
Hebron). On the road from Ras e-Jura to the north of Dura junction via E-Salaam
road and on Route No.35, Oslo II Annex I art. 7 requires the DCO to consider the
reassignment of the JP to other parts of Hebron after the completion of
redeployment. Id. at Annex I, art. 7.
The Hebron Protocol creates an additional joint patrol to operate in Area H-
1 along the same road as the one created in Oslo II to operate in Hebron, thus
one is to patrol along the road from Ras e-Jura, and one on Route No.35. Hebron
Protocol, supra note 46, para. 4(d)
151. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex II, art. 2, para. 3(a).
152. Id. at Annex II, art. 2, para. 3(e).
153. Id. at Annex II, art. 2, para. 3(e).
154. Id. at Annex II, art. 2, para. 3(f).
155. See discussion of hostile occurrences in relation to the DCOs, infra note
163.
156. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex II, art. 2, para. 3(g).
157. Id. at Annex I, art. 1, para. 3(d).
158. Oslo II, supra note 24, at app. I, art. 3, para. 4.
159. Id. at app. I, art. 3, para. 4(c) (generalizing that in each vehicle there
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The JMUs.6° are intended to monitor movement along
their designated routes of activity from their stationary loca-
tions on agreed junctions, from where they may patrol at ran-
dom, on agreed roads, as directed by the relevant DCO. In
such routine cases, their duties are to be the same as those of
the JPs. In the event of an incident involving both Israelis and
Palestinians, they must reach the site of the incident in order
to provide assistance and to investigate. 6 ' The Hebron Proto-
col specifies the roughly equivalent weaponry which each side
of JMU are to carry.1"2
There is no explicit suggestion as to how the inherent
tension between those likely to operate the JPs or JMUs is to
be overcome. As mentioned, there is some sensitivity, though
they make insufficient provision for dealing with obstacles. It
would appear that distrust was intended to be overcome by
working together to accomplish a mission.
Even prior to the A1-Aqsa intifada, the Joint Patrols have
not operated smoothly altogether. There have been numerous
cases of violence and intimidation from the PA police within
must be an officer, and three uniformed, armed guards rather than specifying a
signal operator, a driver and a guard).
160. In Cairo Agreement, Gaza Strip - Four JMUs at Nissan, Netzarim, Deir
el-Ballah and Sufa-Morag junctions; one JMU at Netzarim to check Israeli vehi-
cles, and operate JP between Netzarim Junction and Wadi Gaza under direction of
relevant DOP, Annex V-Jericho-i at Auja junction (3.a.), 1 at Nahal Elisha junc-
tion (3.b.). Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 4.
In Oslo II, Gaza Strip - Same four JMUs; West Bank - JMU to operate in
vicinity of and on access routes to each Jewish Holy Site in Area A (2.b.(1)(a)), 3
JMUs to operate in Area B located at each DCO, two other in Area B to perform
missions led by Israeli vehicle(5.a.). JMU at Auja junction led by Israeli vehicle.
JMU at Nahal Elisha junction; Hebron - no JMU. Oslo II, supra note 24, at An-
nex I, arts. 5, 6, 7.
In Hebron Protocol - JMU in Area H-2 to handle incidents that involve
Palestinians only. To focus on areas Abu Sneinah, Harat A-Sheikh, Sha'aba, high
ground overlooking new Route No. 35. Visitors to Holy Sites in Area H-i; the cave
of Othniel Ben Knaz, Elonei Mamre, Eshel Avraham, Maayan Sarah, to be accom-
panied by a JMU to ensure free, unimpeded and secure access to Holy sites as
well as their peaceful use. Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, at paras. 4(b)(c), 6(b).
161. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, Annex I, art. 2, para. 4. Oslo II
again adopts the provisions in the Cairo Agreement on JMUs, adding the provi-
sion (included regarding the JPs in the Cairo Agreement) whereby the leading
vehicle in the patrol depends on the authority which controls the particular road
[Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 3, para. 5(c)] and that the JMU is to
perform any other function determined by the relevant DCO [Oslo II, supra note
24, at Annex I, art. 3, para. 5(d)(3)].
162. See Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, at para. 4(e).
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the JPs. 6' The JPs also have been abandoned by one side or
another many times because of acute security concerns." 4 A
163. Herzl Getz, head of the JSC, has had to deal with several cases in which
PA officers were said to have systematically intimidated Israeli soldiers legally
patrolling through Gaza. They apparently included ambushes in which PA officers
would stop IDF jeeps and point their submachine guns at the Israeli soldiers. See
Steve Rodan, The PA leader can be budged but go too far and he'll break, Israeli
officials tell Steve Rodan, JERUSALEM POST, March 1, 1996, at 8.
Complications were created by refusal of the requests by Palestinian Po-
licemen serving in the West Bank to visit their families in Gaza, discussed by the
JSC, because the joint patrols were not functioning in the West Bank (therefore
policemen would have to be accompanied by soldiers). See Jon Immanuel, Little
Headway in Hebron Talks As New Subcommittees are Formed, JERUSALEM POST,
Oct. 10, 1996, at 1.
In July 1998, a case of a PA policeman on the sensitive patrols in the Gaza
Strip beat up his Israeli Border Police counterpart. (The joint patrol as taken to
the DCO for a clarification of the matter and members were chastised.) Yoram
Barak, spokesman for the DCO in the Gaza Strip is reported as having said "it
was a small incident, and there is nothing to write about. These are common
occurrences, and I am sure they will happen again." Israeli officers now wear
ceramic-plated vests as a result of the riots of September 1996 when several mem-
bers of the JPs were wounded in riots that left 16 IDF soldiers dead. Herzl Getz,
head of the JSC, has had to deal with several cases in which PA officers were
said to have systematically intimidated Israeli soldiers legally patrolling through
Gaza. They apparently included ambushes in which PA officers would stop IDF
jeeps and point their submachine guns at the Israeli soldiers. Arieh O'Sullivan, PA
policeman beats up IDF soldier on patrol, JERUSALEM POST, July 15, 1998, at 1.
164. In March 1997, the IDF halted joint patrols with Palestinian Police due to
the suspicions that the general strike called by the Palestinians throughout the
territories (to protest plans for Har Homa) would spark rioting. Palestinian police-
men enforced the strike in some areas. See Jon Immanuel, Israel-PA Talks Re-
sume, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 10, 1996, at 1; Arieh O'Sullivan & news agencies,
Strike shuts down territories, JERUSALEM POST, March 4, 1997, at 4.
In March 1998, riots resulted in the evacuation of a dozen yeshiva students
from Joseph's Tomb in Nablus as a precautionary measure after the Palestinian
Police suspended joint patrols. See Arieh O'Sullivan & Margot Dudkevitch,
Mordechai moves to ease tensions. Scores of Arab protestors injured, JERUSALEM
POST, March 12, 1998, at 1.
In February 1998, in response to Israeli suppression of a pro-Iraqi demon-
stration held near Rachel's Tomb, and consequent damage to the property of a
high ranking Palestinian officer, the Palestinian officers threatened to discontinue
JPs with the IDF. During an ensuing dispute, Palestinian police officers aimed
their weapons at IDF troops and fists were raised. Later they agreed to restore
the JPs. See Margot Dudkevitch & Jay Bushinsky, IDF Palestinians clash near
Rachel's Tomb, JERUSALEM POST, February 8, 1998, at 2.
In February 1998 riots gave rise to further concern when Palestinian police-
men trained weapons on soldiers with whom they carried out joint patrols. See
Margot Dudkevitch & Mohammed Najib, Arafat threatens new intifada if talks fail,
JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 13, 1998, at 1. However apparently through restraint, vio-
lence was contained in March 1998 after paratroopers shot and killed three Pales-
tinian laborers at the Turkemiya crossing, and in May 1998 during the Nakba
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deputy inspector of the JP at the Netzarim junction served in
Gaza's joint patrols for four years and spent sixteen hours on
duty with his Palestinian counterparts, yet testified that while
they share food, drink, and small talk, he felt he could not
trust them. 6 '
However, there have been events where, without extensive
cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian forces, significant-
ly graver consequences would have resulted. On one "Day of
Rage," called for by the Palestinian Authority in protest of
settlement activity, Israeli Army officials commended their
Palestinian parallels for their coordinated efforts in limiting
violence and protests. As protests began near Bethlehem, the
head Israeli and Palestinian officials shook hands as a symbol-
ic gesture to cooperatively disperse the few thousand Palestin-
ians.' That the Palestinian Police were so integral to stop-
ping protests called for by the PA itself attests to the realiza-
tion by soldiers of the importance of Israeli-Palestinian collabo-
ration, in spite of political propaganda.
7. Passages and Safe Passage
JLBs were created in the Cairo Agreement at each cross-
ing point to deal with matters regarding passengers passing
through the Palestinian Wing, issues requiring coordination,
and differences concerning the implementation of these ar-
rangements, as well as incidents.6 7 They are comprised of an
equal number of representatives from each side, located inside
each terminal.'68 They are stated to be subordinate to the rel-
protests when many JPs became dysfunctional for the day when Palestinians re-
fused to participate. See Arieh O'Sullivan, PA policeman beats up IDF soldier on
patrol, JERUSALEM POST, July 15, 1998, at 1.
Conversely, after the arrest of a suspect for his involvement in the murders
of collaborators and abduction of two Border Policemen two years ago, reports
claimed that the IDF has stopped JPs in the Jenin Area. See Itim Margot
Dudkevitch & Mohammed Najib, News in Brief, JERUSALEM POST, March 5, 1998,
at 2.
165. See Arieh O'Sullivan, PA policeman beats up IDF soldier on patrol, JERU-
SALEM POST, July 15, 1998, at 1.
166. See Margot Dudkevitch & Ben Lynfield, 'Day of Rage' leaves one dead,
dozen hurt, JERUSALEM POST, June 4, 1999, at 1.
167. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 10, para. 5(a).
168. See id. at Annex I, art. 10, para. 5(b).
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evant (regional) subcommittee of the CAC, 161 though in the
Cairo Agreement the DCO was required to direct the JLBs. 7 °
In each border crossing the agreement provided for one
terminal consisting of two wings. One of these was for Pales-
tinian residents of the Gaza strip and Jericho, the second for
Israelis and others, with special arrangements for VIPs. 7' An
Israeli director-general was to be appointed as responsible for
the management and security of each terminal, together with
two deputies, one Israeli and one Palestinian, each of whom
was to have an assistant for security and for administra-
tion.' Palestinian policemen at the terminals could be
armed with handguns, but other Palestinian officials would
remain unarmed.'73 Details were given for inspection of docu-
ments and identity, as well as personal luggage and persons on
entry from, and exit to, Egypt and Jordan.'74 Arrangements
for safe passage between the Gaza Strip and Jericho also were
set out in the Cairo Agreement. 7 '
Oslo II largely adopts these provisions, but provides for a
joint committee to decide on the application of arrangements to
a particular crossing,'76 reducing the process to two lanes
since the distinction between the Gaza strip, Jericho and the
West Bank is no longer relevant,'77 and does not mention
DCO direction of the JLBs. 75
Safe passage is extended to cover the West Bank,
7 9
though Article X adds specific provisions for the denial of use
of safe passage by persons who have seriously violated the safe
passage provisions.' 0 Coordination is referred to the JSC.'8 '
The Wye Memorandum calls for the immediate renewal of
169. See id. at Annex I, art. 10, para. 5(c).
170. See id. at Annex I, art. 2, para. 2(b)(5).
171. See id. at Annex I, art. 10, para. 1(f).
172. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 10, para. 2.
173. See id. at Annex I, art. 10, para. 2.
174. See id. at Annex I, art. 10, paras. 3, 4.
175. See id. at Annex I, art. 9.
176. The Damya Bridge crossing. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art.
7, para. 1(c).
177. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 7, para. 3(d).
178. Compare Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I art. 3, para. 3(c) and the
Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 2, para. 2(b)(5).
179. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 10.
180. See id. at Annex I, art. 10, para. 2(d)(e).
181. See id. at Annex I, art. 7, para. 2(g)(h).
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negotiations on safe passage."8 2 Agreement about the south-
ern route were to be concluded within a week of entry into
force of the Memorandum, and implementation of this Agree-
ment is to start as soon as possible. Negotiations for the north-
ern route are to continue with the goal of agreement and im-
plementation as soon as possible."8 3
A committee on Passages and a separate committee on
Safe Passage have been created. However a semi-freeze on the
work of the Joint Committee on Safe Passage has been main-
tained by the PA.'84
8. Other Structures for Cooperation
i. The Maritime Coordination and Cooperation Center and
the Joint Aviation Subcommittee
Other structures for cooperation under the JSC include the
Maritime Coordination and Cooperation Center ("MC") which
deals with security issues off the coast of the Gaza Strip18
and a Joint Aviation Subcommittee ("JAC").1 86
The WRM mentions the importance of the Port of Gaza to
the regional economy and calls for the joint committee to re-
sume its work immediately with the aim of producing a proto-
col within sixty days to allow commencement of building the
port. It also recognizes the conclusion by the parties of a "Pro-
tocol Regarding the Establishment and Operation of the Inter-
national Airport in the Gaza Strip During the Interim Period"
and their arrangements to permit the timely opening of the
Gaza Industrial Estate.
Although the Gaza Airport has been agreed upon, and the
airport has opened, the JAC continues to meet. A committee on
the Port of Gaza exists. An Ad Hoc committee on the Karni
182. See WRM, supra note 52, at pt. III. 3.
183. See id. at III. 3.
184. Apparently because progress over this issue, and similarly over the ports
under the PA, might result in decreased US pressure on Israel. See Jay
Bushinsky, Netanyahu Briefs Arafat On Proposal, JERUSALEM POST, Nov 26, 1997,
at 1.
185. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 11, para. 3.
186. See id. at Annex I, art. 12, para 2.
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Industrial Estate exists. These are under the direction of the
MSC.
Oslo II (in the spirit of cooperation) provides for many
other joint activities."8 7 This may be the basis for the Joint
Coordination Center ("JCC") established to assist with the
special security situation in Hebron.'
ii. The Joint Coordination Committee in Hebron
Oslo II provides for the establishment of a high level Joint
Coordination Committee (Joint Hebron Committee - "JHC") to
deal with the security situation in Hebron after the completion
of the redeployment.'89
In the Hebron protocol, the purpose of the JHC is to coor-
dinate the joint security measures in the City of Hebron. 9 '
The authorities on each side are required to notify the JHC of
demonstrations, and actions taken with respect to demonstra-
tions, and any security activity close to the areas under the
responsibility of the other side; including in the areas of the
special security arrangements which apply adjacent to the
areas under the security responsibility of Israel, in area H-i, in
the area between the Palestinian Police checkpoints, and the
areas under the security responsibility of Israel. 9' The agree-
ment of the JHC must be sought for activities involving the
use of rifles by the Rapid Response Teams (established and
stationed in Area H-i, one in each of the police stations) in the
Agreed Adjacent Areas, and the JHC must be informed of such
activities in the rest of Area H-1.1s2
This reflects the rather limited response of the agreements
to the tensions that have remained in spite of negotiation,
transfer of authority, redeployment, provisions for cooperation
and the multi-tiered structure that is established to promote
that harmony.
The TIPH2 agreement institutes changes in the composi-
187. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 3, para. 7.
188. See Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, at para. 4(f.
189. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 7, para. 8.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at para. 5(d)(2), (3).
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tion of the JHC.' 9' The removal of the Israeli Civil Adminis-
tration from Hebron under the Oslo II Agreement is reflected
in the Israeli representatives to the JHC who are no longer
drawn from the Israeli Civil Administration, as was the case
under the TIPH1 Agreement, but rather from the Israeli mili-
tary.' The extended role accorded to TIPH2 on the JHC
may have led to an increased confidence within the mission to
play a more central role as a permanent member on the
JHC.195
Some 9 ' do not view the JHC meetings as necessarily a
forum for problem solving, but rather as an opportunity for the
IDF to receive feedback.'97 To a certain extent, TIPH2 acts as
a mediating force in the JHC. Despite fluctuations in the peace
process, the Palestinians and the Israelis are forced to sit to-
gether with TIPH2 on the JHC, in which discussions are
straight forward and productive. Even when Arafat suspended
all negotiations with Israel as a protest against Israeli building
at Har Homa, and the Palestinians were under pressure from
their leadership to cancel the JHC meetings, TIPH2 succeeded
in pressuring both parties to continue with the meetings. 9 ' It
could be argued that TIPH2's presence as a mediating party in
the JHC reduces the possibility of Israel and the PA develop-
193. In accordance with the new authority of the Palestinian police in the city
of Hebron, the Palestinians are represented on the JHC by the Palestinian Police
Commander in Hebron rather than the Mayor of Hebron, who is specified as the
senior Palestinian representative in the TIPH1 Agreement.
194. Up until Sept. 15, 1997, the IDF was the Israeli representative at the
JHC. However, in September this role was been transferred to the Civil Adminis-
tration.
195. Under the TIPH2 Agreement, a TIPH2 representative is accorded member-
ship on the JHC. The Agreement states in Article 7(b) that the JHC shall meet
on a weekly basis or on the request of any of its members, which suggests that
TIPH2 can request a meeting of the JHC on its own initiative. Furthermore, the
JHC is required "to deal with any issues arising from the ITIPH2] presence and
the activity of the TIPH[2 which cannot be dealt with by the DCO [District Co-
ordination Office]." TIPH2 Agreement, supra note 49, at art. 7(b).
196. Such as IDF liaison Major Rocky Abramson.
197. For example, TIPH2 may provide reports which show that the IDF is tak-
ing too long to carry out security checks on Palestinians wanting to cross Israeli
checkpoints. TIPH2 Agreement, supra note 49.
198. Herb Keinon, TIPH Mandate Extended Amid Calls To Resume Talks, JE-
RUSALEM POST, Jul. 1, 1998, at 4. "If you will not meet, we may as well go home
as there is no use for us here." Id. Foreign Minister Director-General Eitan
Bentsur is reported to have said that the extension of the TIPH mandate is an
example of the type of cooperation that will lead to an overall agreement. See id.
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ing a direct relationship. Nevertheless, the JHC pressures the
Palestinians to come and sit with the Israelis, thereby giving
consistency to the dialogue between Israel and the Palestin-
ians. The JHC is officially under the direct direction of the
MSC, although this is not suggested in the treaties.
9. Specific Areas
The agreements detail provisions for specific areas based
on the structure of the above JSC, RSC and DCOs. The Gaza
strip'99 and Jericho were dealt with in the Cairo Agreement,
199. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 6. Two DCOs are created in
Annex I, art. 6, para. 10: one for Gaza district, at Erez Crossing point with subor-
dinate Joint Liaison Bureaus at Erez and Nahal Oz crossing points, one for Khan
Yunis district, at Nuriya Camp with subordinate Liaison Bureaus at the Sufa
crossing points and at the Rajah Terminal. Oslo II adopts this provision at Annex
I, art. 6, para. 10. The Palestinian Police are given responsibility for security in
the Security Perimeter (see Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 4,
para. 2(b)), and for the enforcement of special security measures aimed at prevent-
ing infiltration across the Delimiting Line or the introduction into the Security
Perimeter of any arms, ammunition or related equipment except for the arms,
ammunition or equipment of the Palestinian Police, authorized through the rele-
vant DCO. See id. at art. 4, para. 2(c). The activities of the Palestinian Police in-
side the Security Perimeter are to be coordinated through the relevant DCO. See
id. at art. 4, para. 2(d). Security activities in Israel in the vicinity of the Delimit-
ing Line that directly affect the other side are to be coordinated through the rele-
vant DCO. See id art. 4, para. 2(c). Oslo II adopts these provisions. See Oslo II,
supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 6. The interim agreements state that Israeli set-
tlements are to remain under Israeli control. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21,
at Annex I, art. 4, para. 3; Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 6. Control
over specified areas in the agreements "the Yellow Area" specified is shared, the
Israeli authorities having overriding responsibility and powers for security, and the
Palestinian Authority for civil affairs. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at
Annex I, art. 4, para. 4(a); Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 6. The entry of
Palestinian policemen into the Yellow Area and their activity therein may take
place only as agreed upon through the relevant DCO. See Cairo Agreement, supra
note 21, at Annex I, art. 4, para. 4(b); Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 6,
para. 4(b).
In the Mawasi Area, the Cairo Agreement states in Annex I, art. 4, para. 5
that the Palestinian side is to have responsibility and powers for public order for
Palestinians, while Israel is to retain the responsibility and powers for internal
security. See also Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 6, para 5. Palestinian
uniformed Civil Police officers are allowed to enter the Mawasi Area after coordi-
nation and confirmation of their movement and activity through the relevant DCO
for the purposes of exercising Palestinian public order responsibility. See Cairo
Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 4; Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I,
art. 6, para. 4(c). Two JPs are to operate in the Mawasi area along the coast
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while Jericho is included subsequently in the provisions on the
West Bank2°0 in Oslo II; which sets out special provisions for
road, led by Israeli vehicle. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art.
4; Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 6, para. 5(a). The agreements allow the
PA to operate sections of the Mawasi beach. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21,
Annex I, art. 4; Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex I, art. 6, para. 5(c).
The Egyptian border is to remain under Israeli authority. See Cairo Agree-
ment, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 4; Oslo II, supra note 24, Annex I, art. 6,
para. 6. On three lateral roads to the settlements Israeli authorities are to have
the responsibilities and powers in order to conduct independent security activity
including Israeli patrols, JPs to operate along the Lateral Roads, to be led by
Israeli vehicle. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 4; Oslo II,
supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 6, para. 7(a). Where Israeli authorities take en-
gagement steps, they are to do so with a view to transferring the continued han-
dling of the incidents falling within Palestinian responsibility to the Palestinian
Police. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 4; Oslo II, supra note
24, at Annex I, art. 6, para. 7(a). Where Lateral Roads overlap the Security Per-
imeter, the two sides, in the exercise of their respective powers and responsibil-
ities, to fully coordinate their activity in order to prevent friction. See Cairo Agree-
ment, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 4; Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art.
6, para. 7(b).
A JP led by the Palestinian vehicle is to operate on the Central North-
South Road. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 4; Oslo II,
supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 6, para. 8.
JMUs are created at four junctions (Nissanit, Netzarim, Deir al-Ballah and
Sofa-Morag), and at the Netzarim Junction, the Israeli side of JMU is to check
Israeli vehicles, which, are then allowed to continue journey without interference.
This JMU is to also operate as JP between Nitzarim junction and Wadi Gaza
under the direction of the relevant DCO. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at
Annex I, art. 4; Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 6, para. 9(b).
200. Eight DCOs are created for Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqiya, Ramallah,
Bethlehem, Hebron and Jericho Districts (in Jericho to maintain a subordinate
Joint Liaison Bureau in the Allenby Terminal). See Oslo II, supra note 24, at
Annex I, art. 5, para. 1. The PA will assume powers and responsibilities for inter-
nal security and public order in Area A. See id. at Annex I, art. 5, para. 2(a).
Jewish Holy sites in Area A are to be under responsibility of Palestinian Police,
but a JMU is to function in the vicinity and on access routes to each site, as
directed by the relevant DCO, to ensure free an unimpeded access, and the peace-
ful use of such site, to prevent disorder or to respond to any incident. See id. at
Annex I, art. 5, para. 2(b). Area B is to be under PA responsibility with regard to
the public order of Palestinians, overriding responsibility for security for the pur-
poses of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism to remain with
Israel. See id. at Annex I, art. 5, para. 3. The movement of uniformed Palestinian
policemen outside places where there is a Palestinian police station or post, may
be carried out only after coordination and confirmation through the relevant DCO,
though some relaxation of this rule is to be considered after redeployment. See id.
The Israeli side of the DCO is to give its response following a request regarding
the movement of policemen in a normal or routine cases within one day and in
emergency cases no later than 2 hours. See id. Joint security activities to be car-
ried out on main roads. See id.
The Palestinian Police must notify the RSC of details of its police force, and
these procedures are to be reviewed within 6 months. See id.
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Hebron.2"' These are developed in the Hebron Protocol." 2
Eleven JPs are created in Oslo II. See id. at Annex I, art. 5, para 4(a).
Each DCO is allowed, within 3 months after the completion of the redeployment
in its respective district, to decide that JPs will function on roads crossing areas
A, B and C. See id. at Annex I, art. 5, para. 4(b). The three JMUs at each DCO
in Area B are to be led by an Israeli vehicle, one is to be on 24 hour alert, while
the other two perform missions directed by the DCO during daylight hours. See
id. at Annex I, art. 5, para. 5. The JMU at Aula junction Route No 90 and road
to Yitav is to be led by the Israeli vehicle, and may be directed by DCO to deal
with certain incidents occurring on the road between Aula and Jericho. See id. A
JMU is to be located at the Nahal Alice junction on the road from Jericho to the
Mousse Alamo project. See id.
The movement of Palestinian Police in Area C must be confirmed and coor-
dinated by the relevant DCO and movement between Area A and B to be ap-
proved by the relevant DCO. See id. at Annex I, art. 5, para. 6.
Israeli guard posts may be located in the Rachel's tomb, without derogation
from Palestinian security responsibility. See id. at Annex I, art. 5, para. 7.
201. One DCO was created at Har Manoakh. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at
Annex I, art. 7, para. 6(a). Redeployment is required to take place. See id. at
Annex I, art. 7, para. 1. Palestinian Police to assume responsibilities in Area H-1
similar to those on other cities in the West Bank. See id. at Annex I, art. 7, para.
2(a). Any activity or movement by it outside this area may only be carried out
after coordination and confirmation through the DCO. See id. at Annex I, art. 7,
para. 2(d). Following the DOP, Israel continues to carry responsibility for overall
security of Israelis for the purposes of safeguarding their internal security and
public order. See id. at Annex I, art. 7, para. 3. Israel retains powers and respon-
sibilities for internal security and public order in area H-2. See id. at Annex I art.
7, para. 4(a). On the completion of redeployment, a JMU was to operate
throughout the city, including the Old City, if required to do so by the DCO. See
id. at Annex I, art. 7, para. 6(b). One JP was to function in Hebron on the road
from Ra E-Jura to the north of Dura. See id. at Annex I, art. 7, para. 6(c). Three
months after completion of the redeployment, the DCO is required consider the
reassignment of the JP to other parts of Hebron. See id. at Annex I, art. 7, para.
6(d). Measures are to be taken to normalize life in the Old City. See id. at Annex
I, art. 7, para. 7. A High Level Joint Liaison Committee is established to deal
with the security situation in Hebron after the completion of the withdrawal. See
id. at Annex I, art. 7, para. 8. Finally, since the parties cannot reach agreement
on the Tomb of the Patriarchs, they have agreed to keep the present situation as
it is. Three months after the redeployment, the High Level JLC is required to
review the situation. See id. at Annex I, art. 7, para. 9.
202. Redeployment is to be carried out in accordance with Oslo II and the
Protocol. See Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, para. 1. The Palestinian Police are
to assume responsibility in area H-i, similar to those in other cities in the West
Bank. See id. at para. 2(a).
Israel is to retain powers and responsibilities for internal security and pub-
lic order in Area H-2, and to carry responsibility for overall security of Israelis.
See id. Both sides are required to reconfirm commitment to main parts of Oslo II.
See id. at para. 2(b). Special security arrangements are to apply. See id. at para.
3. Palestinian checkpoints are to be established to prevent entry of armed persons
and demonstrators or other people threatening security an public order, into areas
adjacent to areas under the security responsibility of Israel, in area H-1, in the
areas between the checkpoints and areas under the security responsibility of Isra-
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The Hebron Protocol adds a sub-office to the DCO, a JP in
addition to the one allocated in Oslo II, providing for two in
Area H-1.20
3
The WRM alters the status of certain areas but does not
contain any provisions relating to the particular security ar-
rangements of the individual areas."4 This might suggest
that this (detailed) aspect of the previous agreements was
relatively successful, or no better arrangements could be found
under the current circumstances at the present time. Despite
some difficulties in most areas and severe tension in some
areas such as Hebron, the measures taken so far seem not to
have incited more opposition and violence than they have man-
aged to prevent.
10. Elections
An additional area of cooperation through the DCOs in
Oslo II is coordinating security issues regarding rallies and
el. See id. at para. 3. The DCO is to establish a sub-office in the City of Hebron.
See id. at para. 4(a). One JMU is to operate in Area H-2, coordinated by DCO
(See id. at para. 4(b)), and another in the adjacent areas. See id. at para. 4(c).
Two JPs are to function in Area H-1. See id. at para. 4(d). The Palestinian and
Israeli side of the JMU in the City of Hebron are to be armed with equivalent
types of weapons (Mini-Ingraham submachine guns the Palestinian side and short
M16s for the Israeli side). See id. at para. 4(e). As described above, a Joint Coor-
dination Center is to be established. See id. at para. 4(f). The Palestinian Police
are responsible for protection of Jewish Sites; visits by worshipers and other visi-
tors accompanied by a JMU to ensure free, unimpeded and secure access to the
Holy Sites as well as their peaceful use. See id. at para. 6. Further provisions for
Normalization of Life in the Old City are set out. See id. at para. 7.
203. See Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, para. 4 (a), (d); Agreed Minute, Amer-
ican Plan on AI-Shuhada Street, Related Document to Hebron Protocol, Jan. 17,
1997, [hereinafter Agreed Minute] at 20. This is a plan of infrastructure improve-
ments financed by American aid, on one of the main streets in Hebron. Id. Ten
days after the signing of the Hebron Protocol, Arafat began criticizing Israel for
not immediately reopening Shuhada Street. Voice of Palestine (BBC Short Wave
Broadcast, Jericho, Jan. 31, 1997) (ME/2833 MED/1). According to the Protocol's
terms, Shuhada Street was to be fully reopened within four months. See Agreed
Minute, supra note 203, at 20. Charges and counter-charges of violations have be-
come almost routine. See, e.g., Voice of Palestine (BBC Short Wave Broadcast,
Jericho, Feb. 1, 1997) (ME/2833 MED/1). PA officials have come to defend their
violations by saying that Israel is also violating the agreement in various spheres.
See, e.g., Voice of Israel (BBC Short Wave Broadcast, Jerusalem, Jan. 29, 1997)
(ME/2830 MED/6).
204. See WRM, supra note 52, pt. I. A.
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meetings leading up to elections, under the authority of the
Palestinian Police." 5 This raises potential political issues re-
garding the influence of Israeli participants in the DCO con-
cerned, which are likely to produce a counter reaction whereby
they have little influence over these in practice unless a partic-
ular threat is posed. In such cases, other political mechanisms
may be more active in resolving any dispute that may arise.
11. Summary
The committees can inspire confidence in the parties by
removing some of the dangers of redeployment and maintain-
ing a degree of security, while promoting peace between the
populations in the long term. The determining factor is the
extent to which the two parties take their responsibilities seri-
ously. Though there have been high points in the cooperation
between the Israeli Government and PA, there on the whole
has been tension and reluctance at all levels. Israel reserves
the right to conduct hot pursuit and pre-emptive raids.0 6
Methods of maintaining security have failed in very serious
situations, such as the ongoing AJ-Aqsa intifada, because of the
reluctance of one side to carry out their responsibilities.0 7
205. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at art. 4, para. 2.
206. Inside area H-1 in Hebron. Herb Keinon & Alon Pinkas, IDF Removes 2
Roadblocks in Hebron: Biran Attempts to Reassure Settlers but Presents No Maps,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 3, 1995, at 1; see Eric Silver, Hebron Deal Ends Months of
Wrangling, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 1, 1997, at 7. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at
Annex I, art. 10, para. 4; see id. at Annex I, art. 12, para. 1. Thus far Israel has
not made use of these rights in other evacuated cities. See Keinon & Pinkas, su-
pra note 206, at 1.
207. E.g., Palestinian Police checkpoints in H-i, intended to form a buffer zone
adjacent to H-2 "to enable the Palestinian Police, exercising their responsibilities
under Oslo II, to prevent entry of armed persons and demonstrators or other peo-
ple threatening security or public order, into the above-mentioned area," have not
proven to be an effective deterrent during the weeks of daily Palestinian rioting
that followed the disagreement over Har Homa. See Hebron Protocol, supra note
46, at art. 3(b); see Silver, Hebron Deal Ends Months of Wrangling, supra note
206, at 7. Indeed the entire structure of security cooperation in the Protocol which
is aimed at "preventing any provocation or friction that may affect the normal life
in the city" (see Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, art. 7(a)) appears to have been
ignored by the PA in permitting, and according to some reports, encouraging these
rioters. See Ian Black, Nails Hammered into Coffin of Peace, THE GUARDIAN, Apr.
2, 1997, at 7.
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Perpetrators of terrorist attacks within Israel often escape
punishment by fleeing to the PA self-governed areas, and Isra-
el has had no success persuading Arafat to transfer them for
trial in accordance with the Oslo II Agreement.2"5  Even be-
fore the A1-Aqsa intifada, the PA's ineffectual response to the
terrorists' suicide bombings, drive-by shootings, roadside
bombs, kidnappings, and knife attacks has contributed to de-
lays in the peace process and has threatened its continu-
ance.
20 9
As a result, mutual trust runs thin, threatening the
overall prospects for the Oslo peace process. 21 Their commit-
ment and willingness to cooperate can be strengthened by
208. See Black, supra note 207, at 7.
209. See Eytan Rabin, Two Hikers Murdered in Wadi Kelt; Gang of Terrorists
Escaped to Jericho, HA ARETZ, Jul. 19, 1995, at Al; Moshe Toubal et al., 5 Killed
in Suicide Bombing of Bus in Ramat-Gan, HA'ARETZ, Jul. 25, 1995, at Al; Serge
Schemann, Bus Bombing Kills Five in Jerusalem; 100 are Wounded, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 1995, at Al. See, e.g., Jon Immanuel, Israel Suspends Talks in Cairo,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 12, 1994, at 2; see, e.g., Derek Brown, Israeli Fears Put
Pact With P.L.O. At Risk, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 7, 1994, at 14; see, e.g. A Majority
of One, TIME, Nov. 13, 1995, at 64; Bill Hutman & Raine Marcus, 25 Killed in
Jerusalem, Ashkelon, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 26, 1996, at 1. Arafat's reluctance to
challenge the Islamist opposition is generally understood to be based on his fear of
provoking a Palestinian civil war. See Guy Bechor, Between Peace at Home and
Peace with Israel, HA ARETZ, Mar. 4, 1996, at B3. Even after the most recent sui-
cide bombings in Tel Aviv and the Gaza Strip, Arafat continues to hold meetings
with leaders of Hamas (Hamas is an Arabic acronym meaning zeal or fervor). The
movement's full Arabic name is Harakat al-Muquwama al-Islamiyya which trans-
lates as the "Islamic Resistance Movement." See Justus R. Weiner, Israel's Expul-
sion of Islamic Militants to Southern Lebanon, 26(2) COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
357, 380-385 (1995). See Arieh O'Sullivan, Hamas Activists Arrested, JERUSALEM
POST, Apr. 23, 1997, at 2. In the view of one Israeli critic of the peace process,
Arafat derives political advantage from Hamas terrorism: It allows him to play a
"good cop-bad cop" game. The worse Hamas looks, the more appealing Arafat is in
contrast. Arafat can play the terror card and weaken Israeli resolve by backing
Hamas in private, while reaping the benefits of Israeli concessions in the public
negotiations. Arafat will be able to claim that he is doing his best to control ter-
rorism - after all, even Israel could not block all attacks - and to do a better job
he needs more forces, more equipment, and more authority. See YECHIEL LEITER,
CRISIS IN ISRAEL: A PEACE TO RESIST 57-58 (1994).
210. As regarding security cooperation, Israel is apparently hedging its bets.
Following shooting attacks by the Palestinian Police, the IDF has prepared contin-
gency plans and carried out training exercises to prepare for entering the areas
under Palestinian self rule. See Arieh O'Sullivan, IDF Training for War with PA,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 28, 1997, at 1; see, e.g., Haaretz (BBC Short Wave Broad-
cast, Tel Aviv, Nov. 26, 1996) (ME/2780 MED/7)). Although the government reject-
ed their assessment, Israeli Military Intelligence and the General Security Service
steadily warned of the likelihood of a new Palestinian uprising characterized by
gun battles with Palestinian forces. See O'Sullivan, supra note 210, at 1.
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committees' relations, provided they do in fact meet. Where
one side incites the population,"' even in spite of explicit
calls for restraint in the agreements,212 while refusing to ad-
mit that cooperation is taking place,213 there certainly needs
211. Far from preventing incitement, Arafat has been a major source of it
throughout the peace process. A few months after signing the DOP, he was taped
during a speech in a mosque exhorting those present to wage a jihad with the
goal of liberating Jerusalem. Jihad is Arabic for to strive or holy war against the
non-Muslim. See David Pryce-Jones, THE CLOSED CIRCLE 322 (1989). Arafat also
likened the DOP to the peace agreement signed by the Prophet Mohammed with
the Quraysh tribe, and then abrogated ten years later. See P.L.O. Chairman
Yasser Arafat, Speech on Jerusalem to South African Muslims, in Johannesburg,
South Africa (May 10, 1994), in 24 J. PALESTINIAN STUD. 131, 132 (1994); David
Makovsky, Rabin: Arafat's Call for Jihad Puts Peace Process in Question, JERUSA-
LEM POST, May 18, 1994, at 1; but see Walid Awad, Jihad of Peaceful Struggle,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 6, 1995, at 7. Arafat has lauded the memory of slain Pales-
tinian terrorists by referring to them as martyrs. See, e.g., Ze'ev B. Begin, Oslo
and Mideast Logic, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 17, 1996, at 6. (This reference was to
Yihye Ayash, the master bomb-maker whose suicide bus bombings killed scores of
Israelis). Despite recriminations, Arafat continued to frequently call for fihad and
the use of violence against Israel. In November 1996, Netanyahu's office prepared
a paper featuring ten such statements that Arafat had made in the previous
months. Voice of Israel (BBC Short Wave Broadcast, Jerusalem, Nov. 27, 1996)
(ME/2781 MED/5).
A new low in inciting propaganda was reached in April 1997 when the
Palestinian Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
Nabil Ramlawi accused Israel of "infecting by injection 300 Palestinian children
with the HIV virus during the years of the intifada." Uriel Heilman, UN Won't
Counter Palestinian AIDS Allegation, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 11, 1997, at 18. Also,
the PA's security chiefs organized weeks of low-intensity intifada-type violence
after the Har Homa controversy erupted, enabling Arafat to use violence as he
condemned it. Ian Black, Nails Hammered into Coffin of Peace, THE GUARDIAN,
Apr. 2, 1997, at 7.
212. See, e.g., Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 18 (the Preven-
tion of Hostile Acts, which follows the stated aim of creating a positive and sup-
portive public atmosphere in art. 20, which regards confidence building measures).
213. In mid-April 1997, a media report indicated that Arafat had ordered Pal-
estinian security forces to renew cooperation with their Israeli counterparts, ending
a one-month break in contacts. Arafat had suspended the contacts in mid-March
after construction began at Har Homa. Reports indicated, however, that the PA
officially denied any cooperation was taking place and that Dennis Ross was dis-
patched to the Middle East in an attempt to persuade the Palestinians to resume
security ties. See, e.g., Hillel Kuttler, Ross to Present New Peace Proposals, JERU-
SALEM POST, May 4, 1997, at 1. Individual Palestinians who do provide informa-
tion to Israel are branded as 'collaborators' and treated severely by the PA's
security apparatus. Thus, when Israel passes on information to PA officials con-
cerning planned attacks, the Palestinian police takes action against the intelligence
source rather than the terrorists. See generally Boaz Ganor, Israeli
Counterterrorism in the Shadow of Oslo, The Shalem Center, POLICY VIEW, Dec.
10, 1995, at 124.
The Head of the Palestinian General Intelligence Amin Al-Hindi told an in-
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to be some form of grass roots approach. Instead of focusing on
existing structures, or the details of cooperation, the WRM
introduces a new element with a very broad scope - U.S.
involvement through the Trilateral Committees. However, this
largely political factor was introduced through the institutional
structure of the agreements. It could represent the failings of a
purely structural approach to bringing the parties together, in
which case hopes for a permanent, governing situation without
a third party might seem problematic, if not impossible, in the
future. The changes could be seen as relatively minor, also
implying that they are of no concern, that they are effective, or
the most effective structure that has been envisioned so far.
B. Civil Affairs
1. General
Cooperation in the civil sphere is structurally similar to
that of coordinated security issues established in the agree-
ments. The DOP states that authority over the Gaza Strip and
Jericho will be transferred to the PA, and specifies the immedi-
ate transfer of authority over education and culture, health,
social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism, pending the estab-
lishment of the Palestinian Council " upon which the Israeli
Civil Administration would be completely withdrawn."5
Annex II of the DOP states that the Interim Agreement
should include an economic development and stabilization pro-
terviewer, "lilt is wrong to say that the Israeli side benefited from these ar-
rangements [security coordination], as we have never revealed any piece of infor-
mation that could harm the Palestinian side. Neither [two leaders of Hamas] ...
a detainee inside a PNA prison, nor ay other Palestinian will be handed over to
Israel. Interview of Amin Al-Hindi, Security Demands, BILADI THE JERUSALEM
REPORT, Jan. 24, 1997, at 6.
214. See DOP, supra note 26, at art. 6.
215. See DOP, supra note 26, at art. 7, para. 5. To the extent that areas of
economic concern overlap and come under provisions for civil cooperation it may be
noted that the DOP also specifies certain economic measures to be taken by the
PA, and that an Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee should be established to
promote the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and (the rest of) Isra-
el whilst also recognizing that both parties view multilateral working groups as an
appropriate instrument for promoting the "Marshall Plan," the regional programs
and other programs including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
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gram.116 It is also mainly concerned with Israeli-Palestinian
cooperation in Economic and Development Programs, as well
as providing for the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian
Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation." 7
Annex IV to the DOP provides for an Economic Develop-
ment Program for the West Bank and Gaza Strip,21 creating
numerous multilateral working groups." 9
The Cairo Agreement.. requires the Civil Administra-
tion to transfer authority in specified areas over the Gaza strip
and Jericho22" ' to the PA. In doing, it compels the former to
provide all the necessary assistance to the Palestinian Council
including access to offices, registers, records, etc.,222 required
for the transfer of powers and responsibilities. The Cairo ac-
cord also stipulates that Israel transfer offices, equipment,
registers, files, and so forth,22 and immovable property nec-
216. Including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign
investment, and financial and economic aid in support of which both sides are to
coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international
parties. See DOP, supra note 26, at Annex II, para 3(g).
217. Specifying the fields of water, electricity, energy, finance, transport and
communications, trade, industry, labor relations and social welfare issues, human
resources development, environmental protection, communication and the media as
areas of cooperation as well as any other programs of mutual interest. See DOP,
supra note 26, at Annex III, paras. 1-12.
218. Including a Social Rehabilitation Program, Small and Medium Business
Development Program, Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity,
transportation and communications ete), a Human Resources Program, and provi-
sion for other programs and a Regional Economic Development Program which
may include the establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, a Middle East
Development Bank, the development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan
for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area, the Mediterranean Sea (Gaza)
and Dead Sea Canal, for regional desalinization and other water development
projects, a regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated re-
gional effort for the prevention of desertification, the interconnection of electricity
grids, regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation
of gas, oil and other energy resources, a regional Tourism, Transportation and
Telecommunications Development Plan, and furthermore, regional cooperation in
any other spheres.
219. The two sides are to encourage these, coordinate towards their success,
encourage intercessional activities as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies
within the various multilateral working groups. See DOP, supra note 26, at Annex
III.
220. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, Annex II, art. 2, para. A(2).
221. See id. at Annex I, arts. 1, 3; Id. at Annex II, art. 2.
222. Systems and equipment and all necessary information, data and statistics.
223. Computer programs, reports, archives, records, maps, scientific data, rele-
vant licenses, installations, registers and other movables.
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essary for the functioning of the PA. Arrangements were re-
quired for the transfer of funds, assets and contracts particu-
larly in regard to the transfer of treasury responsibilities. 4
The Cairo Agreement further necessitates means of com-
munication to be set up so as to ensure efficient and direct
contact 24 hours a day to deal with any urgent matter arising
in the civil affairs field2' (a provision restated in Oslo 11).226
The Transfer Agreement, which similarly warrants the
transfer of specified areas of civil authority over the West
Bank,227 contained a similar provision regarding assistance to
the Council.228 Oslo II, which provides for the complete with-
drawal of the Civil Administration in the West Bank after the
inauguration of the Council, 229 repeats the words of the Cairo
Agreement and includes the provision regarding the establish-
ment of effective means of communication." ° The Hebron
Protocol transfers to the PA certain civil powers and responsi-
bilities.231' The WRM recognizes the parties agreement to con-
tinue to use, or to reactivate all standing committees estab-
lished by Oslo II, including the Joint Civil Affairs Coordination
and Cooperation Committee ("CAC"), though apparently with
the objective of promoting economic development.
The provisions for the transfer of civil authority have been
better complied with than those requiring redeployment.
224. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, Annex II, art. 2, paras. A(2), B(38).
225. See id. at Annex II, art. 1, para. C(1).
226. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex III, art. 1, para. 4(a).
227. See id. at Annex III, arts. 2-5.
228. See Transfer Agreement, supra note 37, at art. 4.
229. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex I, art. 9.
230. See id. at Annex III art. 3; id. at Annex III, art. 39, app. 1.
231. See Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, pt. 2. For sanitation, health, postal
delivery, traffic and education for all residents of Hebron except for the Israelis
living in H-2. There specified are limitations on construction in H-1 regarding the
height of buildings, which might conceivably be used for sniping into H-2, and
limitations on construction of factories that could adversely affect the environment.
Specific responsibility is assigned to the Palestinian Police to protect four
Jewish holy sites in H-I, and the visitors to these sites are to be accompanied
and protected by a Joint Mobile Unit. The Palestinians shelved their demand to
help provide security in the Tomb of the Patriarchs, although the demand was to
be reassessed three months after the pullout. In an article entitled "Normalization
of Life in the City," both sides "reiterate their commitment to maintain normal life
throughout the City of Hebron and to prevent any provocation or friction that may
affect the normal life in the city." This end is to be achieved by taking "all steps
and measures necessary." Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, pt. 7.
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2. The Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation
Committee
In the Cairo Agreement, the civilian equivalent of the JSC,
the CAC, 2' was established to provide for coordination and
cooperation in civil spheres between the PA and Israel. The
functions of the CAC were to coordinate between both the PA
and Israel, including Israel's remaining Civil Administration in
the West Bank. It was to continue to be responsible for every-
day civil matters consisting of: (1) the transfer of civil powers
and responsibilities; (2) matters arising with regard to infra-
structures, requiring coordination as stipulated; (3) questions
regarding passage to and from the Gaza strip and Jericho and
safe passage between them, including crossing points and in-
ternational crossings; (4) day-to-day contacts between the two
sides; and (5) joint projects, and any other matters requiring
coordination and cooperation. 4 The CAC was required to
meet at least once a month unless otherwise agreed."5 With
regard to matters of policy and principle, the CAC was re-
quired to function under the direction of the JLC."6
The Transfer Agreement simply states that the CAC
should deal with all issues of mutual concern regarding the
Agreement,237 i.e. issues of cooperation regarding civil admin-
istration in the West Bank,238 and that its operation should
not impede the daily contact between representatives of the
Civil Administration and the PA in all matters of mutual con-
cern.
239
Oslo II restates the more detailed provisions in the Cairo
Agreement, extending them to cover the West Bank, stating
that it should additionally deal with relations between the two
sides in civil matters pertaining to issues such as the granting
of permits, as well as matters dealt with by the various Profes-
232. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex I, art. 3, para. 5; Id. at
Annex II, art. 1(A), para 1.
233. See id. at Annex I, art. 3, para 5.; Id. at Annex II art. 1(A), para. 1.
234. See id. at Annex II, art. 1(A).
235. See id. at Annex II, art. 1(A). Like the JSC, the CAC was to determine
its own rules of procedure.
236. See id. at Annex II, art. 1(A).
237. See Transfer Agreement, supra note 37, at art. 4, para. 1.
238. See id. at art. 2.
239. See id. at art. 10, para. 2.
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sional Committees established in civil matters in Annex III to
Oslo 11.24' Arrangements by the PA for civilian inspectors
monitoring compliance with laws and regulations within the
powers and responsibilities transferred to it in Area C must be
appoved by the CAC.241 As mentioned, the WRM recognizes
the agreement by the parties to continue to use or reactivate
the CAC.
The CAC has been created to coordinate cooperation in
civil authority through the Joint Regional Civil Affairs Sub-
committees ("RCACs") and the established Professional Com-
mittees. The CAC attempts to meet an average of two to three
times a year as a complete committee, which would include all
the heads of both the RCACs and Professional Committees,
such as, inter alia, electricity, water and transportation. How-
ever, contact between the heads of the CAC, General Ya'acov
Orr for Israel and Jamil Al-Tarifi for the PA, in addition to the
coordinators, generally occurs on a weekly basis. While this ex-
plicitly "is not a committee meeting ... it is definitely a mecha-
nism."242 As mentioned above, the Cairo Agreement did state
that the CAC was not required to meet monthly if it deemed it
unnecessary, and apparently the frequent contact of committee
heads and members has proved somewhat effective in the civil
sphere.
3. The Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees
Two Subcommittees, analogous to the RSCs, were estab-
lished in the Cairo Agreement to deal with the "day-to-day civil
affairs" of the CAC, to convene no less than every two
weeks.243 The Subcommittees were permitted to establish ad
hoc working groups if and when the need arose.244 Oslo II
adopts these groups, renaming them the RCACs; one for the
West Bank and one for the Gaza Strip, specifying that they
should deal with the respective regional civil matters referred
to them by the District Liaison Offices, while matters of princi-
240. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex III, art. 1, paras. 1(c), 4, and 5.
241. See id. at Annex III, art. 4, para. 6(a), (b).
242. Interview with Mordechay Cristal, supra note 87.
243. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex II, art. 1, para. B(1)-(4).
244. See id. at Annex II, art. 1, para. B(4).
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ple and policy not settled within the RCAC should be passed
on to the CAC.245
While the RCACs are required to meet no less than every
two weeks as stipulated by the Cairo Agreement, these com-
mittees meet only once or twice a month as full committees.
However, just as in the case of the CAC, the members and
heads of these committees are in constant dialogue, handling
everyday issues. In some instances where official meetings are
not being held, interaction and progress are actually taking
place on a daily or weekly basis.246
4. District Civil Liaison Offices
In addition, Oslo II introduces the equivalent of the DOCs,
the DCLs,247 to assist with the prosaic civil affairs of the
CAC.248 The DCLs are to operate on a daily basis, and repre-
sentatives of the DCLs are required to meet daily, while the
heads of the respective DCLs are to convene official meetings
at least once a week. 49 The composition of the DCLs is not
specified.
5. Hebron
The Hebron Protocol recognizes that civil powers and re-
sponsibilities had not been transferred, and states that the
transfer must occur concurrently with the beginning of
redeployment, which had also not taken place.50 The Protocol
makes the exception in area H-2, in which civil responsibility
is transferred, for matters relating to Israelis and their proper-
ty."' Special provisions are established regarding planning,
245. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex III, art. 1, para. 2.
246. Interview with Mordechay Cristal, supra note 87.
247. In Jenin, Tulkarem, Kalkilya, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron and
Jericho. Oslo II provides for their establishment in the Gaza Strip. See Oslo II,
supra note 24, at Annex III, art. 1, para. 3(a)-(c).
248. See id.
249. See id. at para. 3(d).
250. See Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, at para. 10.
251. See id. at para. 10.
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zoning and building, to be coordinated through the DCL in
Hebron.252 In addition the DCL is to be informed of activity
regarding the infrastructure, and may request the municipality
carry out works regarding roads or infrastructure."'
A traffic regime is established, and further cooperation is
to be carried out through the transportation sub-commit-
tee.254  Municipal inspectors are created, and it is ac-
knowledged that they may require the assistance of Israeli
Police through the DCL of Hebron to carry out their enforce-
ment activities in area H-2."' Municipal services are to be
provided regularly and continuously without discrimina-
tion."
6. Specific Spheres of Authority
As mentioned above, the DOP suggests in which spheres
authority is to be transferred."7 The Cairo Agreement de-
tailed provisions in no less than 38 areas.258 The Transfer
Agreement provided a limited list of areas of transfer."9
Most comprehensively, Oslo II sets out areas of authority
transferred to the PA,260 which are more simply laid out in
the Cairo Agreement and where cooperation is specifically
mentioned.26' Uniquely in relation to cooperation over water
252. See id. at para. 11.
253. See id. at para. 12.
254. See id. at para. 13.
255. See Hebron Protocol, supra note 46, at para. 14.
256. See id. at para. 16.
257. See DOP, supra note 26, at art. 6.
258. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, Annex II, art. 2, para. B.
259. See Transfer Agreement, supra note 37, art. 2 (covering education and
culture, health, social welfare, tourism, direct taxation and VAT on local produc-
tion, detailed in Annexes I through VI of the Agreement (art. 3, para. 1)).
260. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex III, app. 1, arts. 1-40. The Agree-
ment also states that withdrawal of the military government does not prevent it
from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the PA, whatev-
er these might be. See id. at art. 1, para. 5. They are phrased as such to provide
as a precaution against the possible creation of a vacuum in administration areas.
261. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex III, app. 1. Examples include:
(1) a Joint Committee of experts in archaeology which is to be established by the
CAC to deal with issues of common interest (art. 2, para. 4);
(2) cooperation between the Bank of Israel and Palestinian Monetary Authority
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and sewage, the Agreement cites that both sides recognize the
need to establish a joint mechanism for supervision over, and
enforcement of, their agreements in the West Bank (Joint
Supervision Enforcement Teams).2 62
The Professional Committees acting under the RCACs and
the CAC convene with different frequency due to their respec-
tive needs, the political and legal weight that their issues car-
ry, as well as the degree of mutual interest in the field. For
example, the need for the Agriculture Committee to convene
frequently is not great, because the ministries interact on a
daily basis. They may meet to "save the mechanism as a mech-
anism, 26' but when concerns of principle arise, these may be
addressed at the RCAC or CAC levels. Electricity is similar in
that the meetings are not consistently held, rather the officials
from Israel and the PA confront matters of a daily nature.
(art. 4);
(3) the provision that the Israel Electric Company continue to supply the electrici-
ty in order to meet existing and future expected demand in the West Bank (art.
10, para. 3);
(4) cooperation over environmental protection including an Environmental Experts
Committee for environmental cooperation and understanding (art. 12, para. B);
(5) the provision that the health systems of Israel and of the Palestinian side are
to maintain good working relations in all matters including mutual assistance in
providing first aid, in cases of emergency, medical instruction, professional tracing,
and exchange of information (art. 17, para. 7);
(6) the provision that the two sides are to agree on methods of cooperation regard-
ing the protection and preservation of Nature Reserves, through a Joint Committee
of Experts from the two sides (art. 25, para. 4);
(7) that both sides respect and protect listed religious rights of Jews, Christians,
Moslems and Samaritans; protection of Holy Sites, free access to Holy Sites and
freedom of worship and practice (art. 32);
(8) that without derogating from provisions in the Protocol on Economic Relations,
a Joint Committee to be established through the CAC to facilitate coordination
and cooperation on day to day tourism issues (art. 37);
(9) that while respecting each side's powers and responsibilities in the sphere of
water and sewage in their respective areas, both sides agree to coordinate the
management of water and sewage resources and systems in the West Bank during
the interim period (art. 40, para. 3), and that in order to implement their under-
takings under the Article, the two sides to establish a permanent Joint Water
Committee (JWC) for the interim period under the auspices of the CAC (art. 40,
para. 11) and Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (art. 40, para. 17), de-
tailed in schedules 8 and 9 of Annex III respectively.
262. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex II, app. 1, art. 40, paras. 16-17,
detailed in Schedule 9.
263. Interview with Mordechay Cristal, Civil Negotiator for Coordination of
Government Activities in the Territories, in the Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv,
Israel (June 14, 1999).
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When matters require input because of the possible political
repercussions, or there is simply a "serious professional debate,
a deadlock,"2 the RCAC and CAC are used to reach profes-
sional and political settlements. When there is mutual interest,
as with employment, these mechanisms can be effective,
whereas when there is not, as in the case of environmental
concerns,"' they are virtually non-functional.
The Professional Committees that have operated are the
Agricultural, Employment, Postal, Environmental, Telecommu-
nications, Transport, Electricity, Population Registry, and Wa-
ter Committees. Ad hoc mechanisms have been established
where necessary, as in the case of the Water Committee, with
the creation of technical subcommittees for, inter alia, pricing,
drilling and pipelines. However, there still remain untouched
issues of vital concern. Coupled with final status controversies,
this complex bureaucratic structure ignores the most pressing
matters, such as sewage.266 This vividly illustrates both polit-
ical and bureaucratic weakness of the structure, considering
the area of failure in this case.
C. Economic Cooperation
264. Id.
265. The interest of environmental protection and preservation is not the pri-
mary concern of the PA, considering that economic considerations come before all
else. This is undoubtedly the trend of any "developing" or newly forming entity.
266. The Palestinian Israeli Water Committee met to discuss the findings of a
report released by the Institute for Peace Implementation ("IPI") in which the
Water Commission and Palestinian Water Authorities blamed both Israel and
Palestinian Authorities for the deterioration of sewage pollution. Jerusalem Post
Staff, West Bank Water Pollution at "Dangerous Level", JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 30,
1997, at 2. The report suggests that a joint effort to purify waste water would
solve the problem, but issues such as how to allocate the purified water and
where to build treatment plants which could affect final status arrangements,
would cause delay in resolving the problem. The IPI studies involved implementing
permanent status arrangements as well as economic development and democratiza-
tion in the region. See id.
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1. Economic Relations, Agreements and the Joint Economic
Committee
The DOP specifies extensive economic measures to be
taken by the PA."7 In addition, it indicates that an Israeli-
Palestinian Liaison Committee should be established to pro-
mote the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and
the rest of Israel.26 At the same time, the DOP recognizes
that both parties view multilateral working groups as an ap-
propriate instrument for promoting the "Marshall Plan," the
regional and other programs, including special plans for the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.269
The preamble to Annex IV of the Cairo Agreements, the
Protocol on Economic Relations, stated that the two parties
view the economic domain as a cornerstone in their mutual
relations. The JEC was established to serve as the continuing
committee for economic co-operation envisaged in Annex III of
the DOP.27° Like Annex II, concerning civil affairs, Annex V
contained a list of the areas of transfer of economic respon-
sibility and specified areas of coordination." 1
Oslo II adopts a similar Protocol. 2 It adds that the JEC
should follow up the implementation of the Protocol, decide on
problems related to it that may arise, and review issues relat-
ed to the Agreement on request of either party. It additionally
details areas of cooperation and transfer. 3 These areas over-
267. See DOP, supra note 26, at art. 7, para. 4.
268. See id. at art. 11.
269. See id. at art. 16.
270. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex IV, art. 2. Like the JSC
and CAC, it was to consist of equal numbers of members from each side, to come
to decisions by agreement and determine its own rules of procedure. See id. at
paras. 3-4.
271. See id. at Annex IV, arts. 3-11.
272. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex V.
273. See id. at Annex V, arts. 3-11. Oslo II requires:
(1) coordination in certain areas relating to the import tax regime and import
policy of the PA by the JEC or a sub-committee established by it (art. 3, para.
16);
(2) the establishment of a mechanism for cooperation and for the exchange of
information between the Bank of Israel and the Palestinian Monetary Authority
(art. 4, para. 9(f));
(3) discussion through the JEC of the possibility of introducing mutually agreed
Palestinian currency (art. 4, para. 10(b));
(4) exchange of currency between the BOI and PMA and these two to meet annu-
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lap considerably with Annex III Concerning Civil Affairs," 4
and the Standing Cooperation Committee ("SCC").
A joint economic conference met in Paris in 1993 to set a
framework for economic cooperation. Both sides emphasized
the centrality of economics to the success of the peace process
and the need for cooperation. However, the Palestinians fo-
cused on cooperation between two independent entities, while
the Israeli delegation suggested cooperation devoid of barriers.
Three subcommittees were established in addition to the JEC;
ally to discuss and determine the annual amount of convertible NIS during the
following calendar year and to meet semi-annually to adjust the amount (art. 4,
paras. 16-20);
(5) a provision that Israel transfer 75% of income tax collected from Palestinians
from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area employed in Israel, and the full amount
of income taxes collected from Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area
employed in the settlements, and that the two sides agree on a set of procedures
to address all issues concerning double taxation (art. 5, paras. 4-5);
(6) that the two sides establish a sub-committee to deal with the implementation
arrangements regarding the clearance of VAT revenues (art. 6, para. 5(11));
(7) that Palestinian side has the right to regulate the employment of Palestinian
labor in Israel through the Palestinian employment service, and the Israeli Em-
ployment Service to cooperate and coordinate in this regard (art. 7, para. 1);
(8) that Palestinians employed in Israel to be insured in the Israeli social insur-
ance system (art. 7, para. 2(a));
(9) that the JEC to meet at the request of either side and review the implementa-
tion of Article VII and other issues involving labor, social insurance and social
rights (art. 7, para. 10);
(10) provisions regarding the free movement of agricultural produce (subject to
certain exceptions) (art. 8, para. 1);
(11) the establishment of sub-committees of the respective official veterinary (the
Veterinary Sub-Committee) and plant protection services (art. 8, para. 14);
(12) provisions regarding the free movement of industrial goods subject to each
side's legislation (art. 9, para. 1) JEC to meet and review issues pertaining to
Article IX on industry (art. 9, para. 7);
(13) the provision that JEC or a tourism sub-committee established by it to meet
on the request of either side the implementation of art. 10 on Tourism and to
discuss and consider tourist issues of benefit to both sides, to promote educational
programs for tourism entities of both sides in order to further their professional
standards and their ethics (art. 10, para. 9), and that complaints of one side
against the behavior of tourism entities of the other side are to be channelled
through the committee; The PA to maintain compulsory absolute liability system
for road accident victims, and any change requires prior notice to the other side
(art. 11, para. 2(a), (c));
(14) the two side are required to establish immediately upon the signing of the
Agreement, a sub-committee of experts (tht- Sub-Committee) to deal with issues
regarding the implementation of art. 11 on insurance (art. 11, para. 10(a)).
274. See, e.g., Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex III, app. 1, arts. 4 (on banking
and monetary issues), 6 (containing provisions regarding commerce and industry),
8 (on direct taxation), 18 (on indirect taxation), and 19 (on insurance).
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one to deal with trade and labor issues, another with fiscal
matters, and the third with finance and banking.
25
The WRM strongly emphasizes cooperation in the interest
of promoting economic development in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip.2 6 The parties are stated to have agreed to con-
tinue or to reactivate all standing committees established by
Oslo II. These include the JEC, the MSC, the CAC, the Legal
Affairs Committee ("LAC"), and the SCC in the same section of
the Memorandum emphasizing the importance placed on the
provisions relating to economic issues.277
Strategic economic dialogue is to be launched within the
framework of the JEC and with an additional Ad Hoc Commit-
tee.2 8 This is to review Israeli purchase taxes, cooperation in
combating vehicle theft (apparently a civil or legal concern),
dealing with unpaid Palestinian debts, and the impact of Israe-
li standards as barriers to trade (and the expansion of Al and
A2 lists).79
The WRM refers to agreements reached on the opening of
the Gaza Industrial Estate and the International Airport in
the Gaza Strip.80 Uniquely, these committees have fulfilled
their purpose, although the reasons for their success may be
their relatively specific aims and the willingness of both sides
to compromise. The issues represent the common desire for
greater economic independence amongst the Palestinian popu-
lation and concessions in this area do not appear to be a defeat
in any way, while significant for both sides. The achievement
in the agreements is more in the details of how these projects
275. Israeli representatives included the Finance Minister Avraham Sharon.
The Palestinian delegation was led by Abu Ala. Ala, focusing on respect for his
side's opening, stated in his opening speech, "the economic issue is one of the
main issues in the peace process and I believe that cooperation between us on a
basis of parity and equality will create and motivate this process and make a real
change on the ground (to meet) the aspirations of our people." Josh Rosenfeld,
Shohat Makes Goodwill Gesture to the Palestinians. Cooperation Offer at Economic
Talks, JERUSALEM POST, November 17, 1993, at 1. Sharon proposed sharing the
benefits and market access the country draws from its international trade
agreements. See id.
276. See WRM, supra note 52, at pt. III, paras. 6, 7.
277. See id. at pt. III, paras. 1, 6, 7.
278. See id. at pt. III, para. 6.
279. See id. at pt. III, para. 6.
280. See id. at pt. III, para. 2. The Memorandum requires negotiations on the
Port of Gaza to take place as well. See id. at pt. III, para. 4.
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could be pursued rather than settling whether they would be
able to at all. This appears to support the notion that compro-
mise and coordination are certainly possible and can be effec-
tive provided there is some basic agreement, even though the
outcome requires subtle, patient development; particularly in
order to maintain the mutual trust that resulted in the initial
point of consensus.
The two sides agree on the importance of continued inter-
national donor assistance to facilitate implementation. In the
interests of enhanced donor support, the parties are said to
agree on jointly approaching the donor community to organize
a Ministerial Conference to seek pledges of such assis-
tance.281
The JEC meets once a month on average, with the respec-
tive officials in contact on a weekly basis. Despite mutual in-
terest on many issues, seeming progress is offset by politically
fueled hesitation, the A-1 list in WRM being a prime exam-
ple." 2 Another case is the lack of joint promotional efforts for
tourism in the year 2000.8' Considering the projected oppor-
281. See id. at pt. III, para. 7.
282. Confidential Interview with Senior Israeli Official involved in the Oslo
Peace Process, in Jerusalem (Jan. 4, 1999). In WRM, 4 issues of pending economic
concern were brought to the JEC to be addressed, 2 of Israeli interest and 2 of
Palestinian interest. The 4 were to be completed as a package within the delegat-
ed time of the Memorandum. One of the Palestinian demands was the expansion
of the A-1 list, whereby Israel would grant importation of goods from Jordan and
Egypt at reduced or duty free expense.
Israel agreed to 75% of the goods on the A-1 list, but with the decision for
early elections, the WRM was frozen, and "we put everything on hold. And then
after . . . King Hussein passed away and the new King ... took power, and
Netanyahu and Sharon went to Jordan, they said, let's split the issue of the list
because the list is also assisting Jordan, because the Palestinians are also allowed
to import from Jordan. So this was an issue in favor of Jordan, let's take it from
the package and deal with it . . . What happened is that when Israel invited the
Palestinians, we said . . . [for] now it will be only for Jordanian products, not
Egyptian products, so they said no, we don't want to sign this extended list . . .
(a) because we don't want to give you any political rewards during [the frozen
Wye period], we don't want to show any progress with this process, and (b) we
think that Egypt also should be included . . . This is an example of an issue that
was agreed, professionally it was agreed, it benefit the Palestinians, it doesn't
harm Israelis, but because of political reasons."
283. Confidential Interview with Senior Israeli Official, supra note 282. "The
higher level of cooperation we have is with the Palestinian Minister of Tourism
and the Palestinian Minister in charge of the year 2000 celebration, but they are
very limited, they are very restricted because they don't have the green light from
the highest level to go on with this cooperation."
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tunities for both the Palestinian and Israeli economies, this is
clearly an area where mutual interest has not been exploited
to its potential,2' and may turn out to be an area of tension
instead of collaboration.
2. Summary
Both the JEC and the SCC may create sub-committees or
working bodies which may include or be assisted by ex-
perts.2 ' This gives them greater potential to deal with this
broad and complex area of responsibility, though this may be a
blank check for bureaucratic profligacy.
Financial support can be the deciding factor in the surviv-
al of a particular system, and in a largely capitalist world, once
peace has been achieved, maximization of wealth is the next
major goal. However, this depends on the precondition that
peace and security be achieved without stunting economic
growth, wasting vast amounts of resources, and destabilizing
investment. Although without economic power in a positive or
negative sense,286 it is possible that security could not itself
be achieved.
284. See Abed Al-Jawad Hassan, Bethlehem 2000: Behind Schedule?, THE JERU-
SALEM TIMEs, June 11, 1999, at 7. "[I]n the coming months, the large number of
tourists flooding to Palestine could possibly discover that in many respects, its
town and cities are not all that they had hoped for. It would not be an exaggera-
tion to say that to date, less than 25 percent of the planned for projects have
been carried out, particularly in regard to the various infrastructure projects that
were once spoken about so enthusiastically." Id. Actually, tourism was quite strong
in 2000 until, in late September, the A1-Aqsa intifada created a climate of fear
that virtually emptied the hotels and incoming flights.
285. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex VI, art. 3, para. 2; id. at Annex V
art. 2, para. 3.
286. That is the ability to fund a particular pursuit or to prevent funding be-
ing made available to the pursuits of another.
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D. Legal
1. Legislation and the Legal Committee
The DOP states that the PA should be empowered to legis-
late within the areas of authority transferred to it, while both
parties are to jointly review laws and military orders presently
in force in remaining spheres.
281
In the Cairo Agreement, legislation promulgated by the PA
had to be communicated to a legislation subcommittee, to be
established by the CAC (the "Legislative Subcommittee"), in
which its validity could be challenged by Israel. The potential
urgency of legislation was recognized in. the approval proce-
dure; if a decision was reached by the Legislative Subcommit-
tee within fifteen days, the matter was to be forwarded to a
board of review made up of jurists.288 The Legislative Sub-
committee was instructed to attempt to reach a decision on the
merits within 30 days.
The Transfer Agreement provided a slightly different ar-
rangement whereby legislation is communicated to Israel,
which may notify the PA of its opposition within thirty days
specifying the reason for opposition. If Israel has no problem
with the legislation, it still must inform the PA at the earliest
opportunity, though in the absence of opposition the legislation
was to enter into force after thirty days regardless.289 The PA
could, in the event of contention, submit a new draft or request
a review by the Legislative Subcommittee established under
the Gaza-Jericho agreement. The Subcommittee was to at-
tempt to reach a decision on the merits of the matter within
thirty days. If it was unable to do so, the PA was entitled to
refer the matter to the LC to consider the matter immediately
and attempt to settle it within thirty days.290 The PA could
request a speedy review of detailed technical regulations."'
Under Oslo II, PA legislation which is inconsistent with
the provisions of the DOP or any interim agreements is void
287. See DOP, supra note 26, at art. 9.
288. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at art. 7.
289. See Transfer Agreement, supra note 37, at art. 7.
290. See id. at art. 7.
291. See id. at art. 7.
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ab initio2" Oslo II also states that Israel and the PA should
cooperate through the LC.293 Legislation is to be communicat-
ed to the Israeli side of the LC, where it may be challenged.
There are no provisions to prevent delay, though the article
states that it should consider the legislation at the earliest
opportunity;294 suggesting that the previous procedures were
unmanageable.
The WRM states, under the Part entitled ",Interim Com-
mittees and Economic Issues," that the Palestinian side should
provide Israel with copies of all laws in effect."' This implies
that the process set up under Oslo II was not functioning.
The Legal Committee was established with two sub-com-
mittees: (1) the General Legal Affairs Committee, including
monitoring legislation, and; (2) the Prisoners Committee. How-
ever, due to the lack of mutual interest and shared goals, the
LC has met perhaps least frequently and with the least suc-
cess of all the committees. In the last three years, it is estimat-
ed that the LC has convened merely twice, and any other in-
teraction between the Palestinian and Israeli members is limit-
ed and unproductive. "96 Considering that next to security,
this is the most relevant field, some new legal structure will
have to be devised for the final status talks if there is to be
hope of cooperation in this area.
2. Cooperation in Criminal Law Fields
The DOP states that the PA's Legislative Council should
have jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza strip territories
except for issues to be negotiated in the permanent status
negotiations.29 '
The Cairo Agreement states that the PA should administer
justice through an independent judiciary.. as well as provid-
ing for PA jurisdiction in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Coopera-
292. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at art. 18.
293. See id. at art. 17, para 7.
294. See id. at art. 18, para. 6.
295. See WRM, supra note 52, pt. III, para. 5.
296. See Interview with Mordechay Cristal, supra note 87.
297. See DOP, supra note 26, at art. 4.
298. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at art. 6.
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tion is facilitated through a subcommittee of the CAC, detailed
criminal and civil jurisdiction, and legal assistance in these
fields. 9
In criminal matters, investigations were to be coordinated
and relevant information shared."0 Where an offense was
committed in the territories by an Israeli acting jointly with an
individual under Palestinian personal jurisdiction, the two
sides were to cooperate in conducting an investigation." 1 If
an Israeli committed a crime against person or property, the
Palestinian Police, upon arrival at the scene of the offense
could, until arrival of the Israeli military forces: (1) detain the
suspect in place while ensuring his or her protection and the
protection of those involved; (2) prevent interference with the
scene of the offense, and; (3) collect the necessary evidence and
conduct preliminary questioning. The Palestinian policeman,
meanwhile, should immediately notify the Israeli authorities
through the DCO. °2
The PA could take measures necessary in relation to Israe-
li vehicles or property used in the commission of a crime which
presented an immediate danger to public health or safety, but
they must notify the Israeli authorities immediately through
the relevant DCO. °3 If an Israeli were suspected of commit-
ting an offense and were present in the territories, the Israeli
military forces could arrest, search and detain the suspect as
stipulated. In areas where the Palestinian police exercised
powers and responsibilities for internal security and public
order, coordination with the Palestinian police was required,
including its presence and its assistance in making and follow-
ing up the arrest."4 Further cooperation would be obligated
in relation to the summons and questioning of witnesses,
transfer of suspects and defendants, in the execution of Court
Orders for the purposes of investigation, and legal assistance
in the conduct of judicial proceedings.0 5 For instance, if a
non-Israeli suspected of, charged with, or convicted of an of-
fense that fell within Palestinian criminal jurisdiction were
299. See id. at art. 5 and Annex III.
300. See id. at Annex III, art. 2.
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex III, art. 2.
304. See id. at Annex III, art. II.
305. See id. at Annex III, art. 2.
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present outside the territories, the PA could request Israel to
arrest and transfer the individual to the PA.3"' If an individu-
al suspected of, charged with, or convicted of an offense that
fell within Israeli jurisdiction were present in the territories,
Israel could request the PA to arrest and transfer the individu-
al to Israel. The party receiving the request was required to
perform the arrest and transfer."7
The Transfer Agreement provided very limited responsibil-
ity for the PA maintaining the status quo on most legal issues
in this regard."' However, Oslo II has a very similar protocol
to the Cairo Agreement." 9 It seems quite possible that indi-
vidual officers would not be aware of these provisions let alone
their complex details, and the effectiveness of these conditions
for cooperation would themselves require cooperation by the
relevant authorities in informing their staff of these stipula-
tions. It is likely that they would require significant elabora-
tion in practice, which is apparently an unstated goal for the
LC.
The WRM specifies that requests for the arrest and trans-
fer of suspects and defendants310 be submitted or resubmitted
through the mechanism of the LC, with a time limit of up to
twelve weeks to respond.31' U.S. involvement is provided for,
which the Agreement states was mandated by both sides, in
reporting on a regular basis on the steps being taken to re-
spond to requests.312 The WRM restates that the Palestinian
police are required to exercise powers and responsibilities with
due regard to internationally accepted norms of human rights
and the rule of law, to be guided by the need to protect the
public, respect human dignity, and avoid harassment. 13
In practice, the transfer of suspects and the procedures
that depend on the initial transfer have not proved effective.
Even prior to the A1-Aqsa intifada, meetings of the LC were
sporadic, and requests are either ignored by the PA or reject-
306. See id. at Annex II, art. 2, para. 7.
307. See id. at Annex IV, art. 2, para. 7(f).
308. See Transfer Agreement, supra note 37, at art. 8.
309. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex IV.
310. In accordance with Oslo II. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex IV, art.
2, para. 7.
311. See WRM, supra note 52, at pt. II (C), para. 3.
312. See id. at pt. II (C), para. 3.
313. See id. at pt. If (C), para. 4.
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ed. 14 Two subcommittees of the LC were created to deal with
314. The Oslo II Agreement and its predecessor, the Cairo Agreement, give
Israel exclusive criminal jurisdiction over terrorist attacks against Israelis. Yet
from the outset of the peace process, the PA has refused to implement mandatory
provisions requiring the transfer and trial of persons suspected of terrorism
against Israel. See, Disturbing Pattern of PA Non-Compliance Concerning the
Transfer of Terror Suspects to Israel; None of the 16 Terror Suspects Requested by
Israel Have Been Turned Over, PEACE WATCH, Sept. 19. 1995. At first, the ratio-
nale for non-compliance was found in the PA's interpretation that only offenses
perpetrated after the signing of the Cairo Agreement were covered. See, Transfer
of Suspects in Criminal and Terrorist Acts Between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority, PEACE WATCH, Dec. 6, 1994. When Israel subsequently requested the
transfer of suspects in attacks carried out after the signing of the Cairo
Agreement, the suspects were hastily brought to trial in PA courts, convicted and
imprisoned. The PA claims to rely on a loophole in both the Cairo and the Oslo II
Agreement that permits "the side receiving the request . . . [to] delay the transfer
[of the suspect] for the duration of the detention or imprisonment." Thus, under
this bad faith practice, a suspect requested by Israel is protectively sentenced by
the PA courts, even though the relevant provisions in the agreements only permit
the PA to delay transfer when the suspect is detained in connection with another
crime. Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex IV, art. 2, para. 7(f)(2); Cairo Agreement,
supra note 21, at Annex III, art. 2, para. 7(f)(2); see Press Bulletin, Israel Govern-
ment Press Office, State of Israel, Transfer of Terror Suspects to Israel by the
Palestinian Authority-Update (Dec. 18, 1996) No. 21 (on file with author).
In December 1996, the Israel Government Press Office, a division of the
Prime Minister's office, issued a Press Bulletin detailing the PA's continued failure
to honor its obligation to transfer suspects to face trial in Israel. The Bulletin
noted that in all but two instances of the 27 persons whose transfer was sought
by Israel, the PA had not even responded to Israel's request. See id. Moreover, at
that time 10 of the 27 terror suspects were either serving in the Palestinian Po-
lice, the PA Preventative Security Service or Palestinian Military Intelligence or
were in the process of joining their ranks. See id. Shortly before the signing of the
Hebron Protocol, the PA's Preventative Security Chief Jabril Rajoub rejected trans-
ferring two Palestinians who killed two Israeli civilians in a drive-by shooting. He
said that any request for transfer, "is a dream and won't happen. You can forget
about it." Jon Immanuel & Herb Keinon, Rajoub: Israel Can Forget About Asking
PA to Extradite PFLP Killers, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 19, 1996, at 1. Despite
Rajoub's attitude which apparently represents the mainstream viewpoint of the
PA's leadership, the Note for the Record reiterated the PA's obligation to transfer
suspects. Shortly afterwards Minister of Justice Hanegbi threatened that he would
"demand a unilateral freeze on all negotiations with the Palestinians" unless the
"Palestinian Authority begins fulfilling this part [the transfer of suspects] of the
agreement." Hanegbi indicated he would bring a list of 33 Palestinians suspected
of murder and other serious crimes against Israelis to his next meeting with the
PA Justice Minister. Batsheva Tsur & Jon Immanuel, Hanegbi to Demand Extradi-
tion of 33 Palestinian Suspects, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 28, 1997, at 20. Apparently
a list of 31 such requests was submitted to the PA in late February. See, Margot
Dudkevitch, Palestinian, Israeli Police Officials Meet, JERUSALEM POST, May 14,
1997, at 2.
In January 1996 the JLC failed to reconstitute after the Palestinian elec-
tions since Palestinian Authority Justice Minister Freih Abu Meiden and the new-
ly elected PA had not decided who would hold the justice portfolio. The Israeli
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civil legal matters and with questions relating to prisoners,
directly in response to what was thought to be a breakthrough
in the deadlock through talks between the Israeli Justice Min-
ister and his PA counterpart.315 The "breakthrough" proved to
be illusory.
3. Civil Law
In civil law matters, the Cairo Agreement requires cooper-
ation in the service of documents, temporary injunctions, the
taking of evidence and the enforcement of judgements.316 Os
Justice Minister David Libai stated that he would consider the transfer of Israelis
guilty of killing Arabs, though he raised the question whether the justification for
releasing prisoners, that their crimes were committed for ideological reasons, would
equally apply to them. Evelyn Gordon, Liba'i: Freeing Jews Who Killed Arabs is
Possible, JERUSALEM POST, January 23, 1996, at 2.
A meeting of the JLC was held in February 1996, the first after the Pales-
tinian elections. Liba'i resubmitted 14 requests for the transfer of terrorists. PA
Attorney General Khlaid al-Qidrah promised detailed written answers, and stated
that he wanted to honor his obligations. Requests for the murderers of Uri
Megidish in March 1993, and the murderers of Shlomo Kapah and Gil Revah in
August 1994 were previously rejected and other requests ignored. Evelyn-Gordon,
PA to Respond to Extradition Requests, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 6, 1996, at 2.
In December 1996, Justice Minister Tzahi Hanegbi made the first formal
request for the transfer of the suspects since the Netanyahu government took
office. Three other requests were to be submitted at the next meeting of the JLC.
There had been no meetings since the elections. The suspects were tried and sen-
tenced to life by the PA, and the PA stated this as the reason for delays in trans-
fer. 15 of the 17 requests by the previous government had been ignored, the other
two rejected. Since the offense took place in Israeli controlled areas, under the
agreements (See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex III, Section 1) the PA had no
authority to try the suspects, an issue that arose in previous incidents. Evelyn-
Gordon, Israel will demand extradition of PFLP killers, says Hanegbi, JERUSALEM
POST, Dec 20, 1996, at 2.
Regarding the PA's failure to keep judicial agreements, Justice Minister
Tzahi Hanegbi stated that "there is a deep crisis with regard to mutual trust,
cooperation, and the recognition that there is no way back ... a crisis leads to
frustration and frustration to despair . . . the most annoying issue is the total in-
fringement of the agreement which obliges the Palestinians to turn over to Israel
persons suspected of crimes, for whom an arrest warrant has been issued by the
courts at the request of the attorney-general." Batsheva-Tsur, Hanegbi: PA Violat-
ing Judicial Agreements, JERUSALEM POST, Sept 16, 1997, at 3.
315. See Tsur, supra note 314, at 2.
316. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at Annex III, art. 4.
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lo II adopts these provisions,317 though it leaves out stipula-
tions on temporary injunctions. 18
4. General Provisions
While the agreements generally transfer authority to the
PA, they state that Israel has the authority over areas not
under the territorial jurisdiction of the PA and, to this end, the
Israeli military government shall retain the necessary legisla-
tive, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities in ac-
cordance with international law. 19 Oslo II further emphasiz-
es cooperation to prevent hostile acts32 and in combating
criminal activity which may affect both sides, such as drug
related offenses and wide-scale theft.12' These provisions
seem intentionally vague and their effect is unpredictable.
The incarceration of terrorists (with very significant secu-
rity and political implications) appears to be underemphasized
in the agreements, which is a likely source of tension that
could have been ameliorated by cooperation through effective
lines of communication. 2 It was clear after the Hebron Pro-
317. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex IV, art. 4.
318. See id. at Annex IV, art. 4.
319. See id. at art. 17, para. 4.
320. See id. at art. 15.
321. See id. at art. 22, para. 3.
322. The PA's ineffectual response to the terrorists' suicide bombings, drive-by
shootings, roadside bombs, kidnappings and knife attacks has contributed to delays
in the peace process and has threatened its continuance. See Eytan Rabin, Two
Hikers Murdered in Wadi Kelt; Gang of Terrorists Escaped to Jericho, HA'ARETZ,
Jul. 19, 1995, at Al; Moshe Toubal et al., 5 Killed in Suicide Bombing of Bus in
Ramat-Gan, HA'ARETZ, Jul. 25, 1995, at Al; Serge Schemann, Bus Bombing Kills
Five in Jerusalem; 100 are Wounded, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1995, at Al. See, e.g.,
Jon Immanuel, Israel Suspends Talks in Cairo, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 12, 1994, at
2; see, e.g., Derek Brown, Israeli Fears Put Pact With P.L.O. At Risk, THE GUARD-
IAN, Dec. 7, 1994, at 14; see, e.g., A Majority of One, TIME, Nov. 13, 1995, at 64;
Bill Hutman & Raine Marcus, 25 Killed in Jerusalem, Ashkelon, JERUSALEM POST,
Feb. 26, 1996, at 1. Further, Arafat himself has continued to be a primary source
of incitement throughout the peace process. See discussion infra note 211.
Instead of dismantling the infrastructure of Hamas and other organizations
sponsoring suicide bombings, the PA has adopted a policy of conciliation backed by
limited force. Although the Palestinian Police and security services have carried
out arrests and held perpetrators and suspects in custody (see, e.g., Jon Immanuel,
Arafat Pledges To Fight Terror With Israel, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 5, 1996, at 2;
Jon Immanuel, PA Releases Three Hamas Prisoners, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 28,
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tocol that legal, specifically penal, cooperation to combat ter-
rorism was possible. However this has been the clearest area
of breakdown in the cooperative institutions, with serious fail-
ures in preventing terrorism and violence with profound impli-
cations for the peace process as a whole. 23
The WRM focuses on the primary security issues of incite-
ment and terrorism. 24 Each side is to take such measures as
are necessary to prevent acts of terrorism, crime, and hostili-
ties against person or property, and to take legal measures
against incitement by any organizations, groups or individu-
als."2 The importance of security is reemphasized and is to
be achieved in accordance with Annex I to Oslo II. The general
preamble on security stresses that measures must be compre-
hensively aimed at the support structure for terrorism, as well
as terrorism itself, and must be operationally cooperative
through the joint organs and the exchange of information. 26
WRM specifies that terrorism and terrorist organizations
must be outlawed and a zero tolerance policy adopted, one
which must combat those effectively and systematically. 2 A
U.S.-Palestinian committee is to be created to review, bi-week-
ly, steps taken to eliminate terrorist cells and support struc-
tures, and to review and evaluate evidence pertinent to deci-
sions on prosecution, punishment and other legal measures
affecting the status of individuals suspected of abetting or
1996)), officially banned the organizations (see Jon Immanuel, Arafat Bans Armed
Groups, Promises 'Serious Steps", JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 4, 1996, at. 2), and pun-
ished some of those responsible for terrorist attacks (see, e.g., Amira Hess, Head of
Hamas Ring in Ramallah Sentenced to Life Imprisonment in Palestinian Court,
HA'ARETz, Mar. 7, 1996, at A)), the PA generally favors accommodation (see The 6
Core Members of Hamas' Military Wing Have Not Yet Been Arrested by PA, PEACE
WATCH, April 1, 1996; but see, Palestinian Authority Arrested Number 2 on Israeli
Wanted List, Muhammed Diefs Subordinate, HA'ARETZ, April 26, 1996, at A6), and
has never comprehensively liquidated the infrastructure of the terrorist organiza-
tions. Terrorist suspects arrested by the PA have routinely been released after the
political protest from particular attack(s) has passed. See, e.g., Jon Immanuel, PA
Frees Hamas Activists, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 29, 1996, at 2; see Ze'ev Schiff,
That's Not How You Eliminate Terrorist Organizations, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 4, 1996, at
B1. Perpetrators of terrorist attacks within Israel often escape punishment by flee-
ing to the PA self-governed areas, and Israel has had no success persuading
Arafat to transfer them for trial in accordance with the Oslo II Agreement. See id.
323. See discussion infra note 314. See also discussion infra note 322.
324. See WRM, supra note 52, at pt. II, Preamble.
325. See id. at pt. II, para. A(1).
326. See id. at pt. II, Preamble.
327. See id. at pt. II, para. A(1)(a).
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perpetrating acts of violence or terror.328 To conform with
previous agreements, an effective legal framework to make
criminal any importation, manufacturing, or unlicensed sale,
acquisition or possession of firearms, ammunition, or weapons
in the territories concerned must be established by the Pales-
tinian side. 9 A program to collect and appropriate the han-
dling of all illegal items was to be created with U.S. involve-
ment.330 A U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee was to be es-
tablished so as to assist and enhance cooperation preventing
the smuggling or other unauthorized introduction of weapons
or explosive materials into areas under Palestinian jurisdic-
tion.3 3
1
The Palestinian Council agreed to decree the prohibition of
all forms of violence and incitement, comparable to the Israeli
legislation on the subject.3 2 A U.S.-Palestinian committee
was to be created to monitor cases of incitement or to make
recommendations and reports on how to prevent such incite-
ment.333 Israel, the Palestinian side, and the U.S., were to
each appoint a media specialist, a law enforcement represen-
tative, an educational specialist, and a current or former elect-
ed official to the committee.334
The Memorandum goes on to state that the two sides rec-
ognize that unresolved legal issues adversely affect the rela-
tionship between the two peoples.331 It, therefore, states that
they will accelerate their efforts through the LC to address
outstanding legal issues and to implement solutions to these
matters in the shortest possible period.3 6 It suggests that the
authors of the WRM considered legal measures to be relevant
to preventing terrorism.
It is not clear why cooperation in combating vehicle theft
is listed as an area to be reviewed by the Ad Hoc Economic
Committee created in the WRM which is somehow to act with-
in the framework of the JEC. 37
328. See id. at pt. II, para. A(1).
329. See id. at pt. II, para. A(2).
330. See WRM, supra note 52, at pt. II, para. A(2).
331. See id. at pt. II, para. C(2).
332. See id. at pt. II, para. A(3).
333. See id. at pt. II, para. A(3)(b).
334. See id. at pt. II, para. A(3)(b).
335. See id. at pt. III, para. 5.
336. See WRM, supra note 52, at pt. III, para. 5.
337. See id. at pt. III, para. 6 (dealing with the launch of a strategic economic
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It was hoped that economic incentives and sanctions from
the U.S. would bring both sides in line with the agreements.
However, they cannot be divorced from support amongst their
respective populations, nor from being able to exercise a mea-
sure of control over that population. The success of the WRM
depended upon whether the PA was willing to take the politi-
cally unpopular step of embarking on a program of sustained
and extensive suppression of violence against Israel.
E. The JLC and Cooperation in General
1. Dispute Resolution
The DOP provides, in virtually identical language, a three-
tiered blueprint for dispute resolution.338 The first mecha-
nism, the JLC has the purpose, inter alia, of dealing with gen-
eral controversies and disputes that may arise between the
parties throughout the interim period.339 These agreements
also allow for the creation of a conciliation mechanism for
disputes that the Joint Liaison Committee cannot resolve.34
Should conciliation prove ineffective in resolving the parties'
differences, the agreements provide for the formation of an
Arbitration Committee.34' Revealingly, each of the parties
has unfettered discretion to refuse to utilize these mechanisms
or to comply with the decision arrived at by the conciliators or
arbitrators.342 The Cairo Agreement 43 adopted this position,
dialogue).
338. See DOP, supra note 26, art. 15.
339. See id. The DOP states that the Committee's function is "to deal with
issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes." Id.
at art. 10. In addition, the DOP provides that "[d]isputes arising out of the ap-
plication or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent
agreements pertaining to the interim period" are to be settled through negotiations
by the same Joint Liaison Committee. Id. at art. 15.
340. See id. The DOP states, "[dlisputes which cannot be settled by negotia-
tions may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the
parties." Id. at art. 10.
341. See id. at art. 15, para. 3.
342. See id.
343. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at art. 17.
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as does Oslo II."'
To date, only the JLC which, in accordance with the DOP,
must convene, has served the parties as a forum for the resolu-
tion of their numerous differences. 45 The parties have not
invoked the optional conciliation and arbitration mecha-
nisms, 46 although Arafat and the PA have voiced occasional
demands for arbitration of various Palestinian claims.347 The
sides have failed to invoke these mechanisms because of a
common lack of faith in their efficacy. Both sides prefer to
make their case to the United States and in addition, Arafat
frequently takes his case to more sympathetic international
forums such as the United Nations Security Council and Gen-
eral Assembly,348 the Arab League,349 and the Non-aligned
Movement,"' the Organization of the Islamic Conference,51
344. Oslo II, supra note 24, at art. 21.
345. Telephone Interview with Dan Polisar, Director, Peace Watch, in Jerusa-
lem (June 12, 1995). The Joint Liaison Committee has been convened on numerous
occasions. Id.
346. Id. An Arafat aide, however, recently called for arbitration of the out-
standing controversies including Har Homa. Voice of Palestine (BBC Short Wave
Broadcast, Jericho, Apr. 19, 1997) (ME/2892 MED/14).
347. See, e.g., Jon Immanuel, PA to Request Arbitration if July 1 Deadline Isn't
Met, JERUSALEM POST, June 11, 1995, at 1; David Makovsky, Hebron Issue Keeps
Taba Talks Deadlocked, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 08, 1995, at 1; Jon Immanuel,
Arafat May Seek Intl Arbitration, JERUSALEM POST, Aug 12, 1996, at 1.
348. See The PLO Campaign, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 24, 1995, at 4. In early
April, 1997, Arafat called for an emergency session of UN General Assembly after
the United Sates vetoed two Security Council resolutions that were critical of
Israel. AP, Arafat Calls for UN Emergency Session, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 8, 1997,
at 3. It was the first time since 1982 that the General Assembly met in emergen-
cy session and the fourth time the UN debated the Har Homa project. Marilyn
Henry, Israel Slams UN Emergency Debate, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 25, 1997, at 2.
By overwhelming majority, the General Assembly passed a resolution calling Israel
to reverse its decision on Har Homa. See General Assembly Urges Israel to Reverse
Har Homa Decision, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 14, 1997, at 20. Israel criticized the
session "a relic of the Cold War era" and accused the PA of "clear incitement to
violence." Marilyn Henry, Israel Slams UN Emergency Debate, JERUSALEM POST,
Apr. 25, 1997, at 2.
349. At an Arab League meeting Egypt took the lead in reaching a recommen-
dation that member states freeze Arab-Israeli relations and restore the Arab boy-
cott against Israel. See Steve Rodan, US-Egyptian Ties Under Growing Strain,
JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 18, 1997, at 14. This is yet an additional manifestation of
the decay of the peace process.
350. See Moshe Zak, Is Israel Really Isolated?, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 11, 1997,
at 5.
351. See, e.g., Pakistan TV (BBC Short Wave Broadcast, Islamabad, Mar. 23,
1997) (FE/2876 S3/7-9). In his speech before the Islamic Conference Arafat repeat-
ed three times, "there can be no peace without the holy Al-Qods [Jerusalem]," and
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and the Gulf Cooperation Council. 52 This underscores a ma-
jor weakness in the interim agreements, as the dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms are ineffective, and the agreements provide
no sanctions for violations.
What appeared to keep the process going prior to the Al-
Aqsa intifada, apart from outside sanctions and promises, were
the political negotiations themselves, both regarding the inter-
im period and the permanent status negotiations which main-
tain some focus. Apart from that, the ultimate goal of peace
also allows the parties' negotiators to find practical solutions
which overcome obstructions, by establishing a working rela-
tionship with creativity and tenacity, and extending the com-
mon ground on which the negotiators and populations are able
to agree.
2. The Joint Liaison Committee (or Israeli-Palestinian
Steering Committee)
The DOP created the JLC to provide a smooth implemen-
tation of the DOP and to deal with issues requiring coordina-
tion, other issues of common interest, and disputes. 3
The minutes to the DOP regarding article X report that
the parties agreed that on the entry into force of the Declara-
tion of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations
should: (1) exchange the names of the individuals designated
by them as members of the JLC; (2) have an equal number of
members on the Joint Committee; (3) reach decisions by agree-
ment; (4) add other technicians and experts as necessary, and;
insisted that the city "and all the surrounding area are trusts which have been
entrusted by God to us to rescue them from the settlements and from the danger
of Judaization." Id. It is not clear what Arafat means in that since the 1870 Turk-
ish census, Jews have constituted a majority of the population of the city. Israel
Min. of For. Aff., Jerusalem: The City's Development from a Historical Viewpoint,
at http'//www.israel-mfa.gov.il/news/jerdev.html (last modified Apr. 15, 1997). In re-
cent decades the ratio between Jews and Arabs has been approximately 3 to 1.
See, id. He alleged that Israel is attempting through "treachery" and "conspiracy"
to "Judaize" and "isolate" Jerusalem, which he characterizes as a "Palestinian,"
"Arab" and "Islamic" city. Id.
352. See Moshe Zak, Is Israel Really Isolated?, JERUSALEM PoST, Apr. 11, 1997,
at 5.
353. See Oslo II, supra note 24, at art. 10.
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(5) decide on the frequency and places of its meetings.
The Cairo Agreement adopted the JLC as established in
the DOP" 4 The retention in Oslo II of the dispute resolution
mechanism in the DOP suggests that they were sufficient, or
the best arrangement under the political circumstances. It
expands the JLC and establishes it as the coordinating body
for the JSC, the CAC, the Legal Committee the JEC and the
SCC, through the MSC which is to be composed of the heads of
these committees, and the two heads of this committee are to
establish the rules of procedure, including the frequency and
places of its meetings.355
The WRM states that the two sides agree that security
cooperation will involve full bilateral cooperation between the
two sides, in addition to Forensic Cooperation and Trilateral
Cooperation with U.S. involvement.5 6 The Memorandum
names the MSC as amongst those groups to be continued or re-
convened." 7 The JLC is not mentioned because it clearly con-
tinues to function and needs no alteration. Similarly, the JSC
is not mentioned, though the JSC's primary function is covered
by the provision in the WRM for bilateral cooperation.5 8
However, dispute resolution is not mentioned. The WRM ex-
pressly states that it is subject to the relevant terms and con-
ditions of the prior agreements and that its terms do not su-
persede their other requirements.359
The JLC, or Joint Israeli-Palestinian Steering Committee,
as it has been called in practice, has served the parties as a
forum for the resolution of their varied and numerous differ-
ences.36 Pertinent issues have been discussed, although deci-
sions do not appear to have been taken at this level." 1 In one
354. Cairo Agreement, supra note 21, at art. 15.
355. Oslo II, supra note 24, art. 26.
356. WRM, supra note 52, at pt. II, para. B
357. Id. at pt. III, para. 1.
358. Id. at pt. II, para. B(1).
359. Id. at Preamble.
360. Telephone Interview with Dan Polisar, Director, Peace Watch, in Jerusa-
lem (June 12, 1995). The Joint Liaison Committee has been convened on numerous
occasions. See id.
361. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian Steering Committee (as the Joint Liai-
son Committee is called) met in Jericho in September 1996 for the first time after
the Palestinian Council elections, in order to renew the work of the civil, econom-
ic, and security subcommittees which appear to have lapsed then. Discussions over
Hebron did not make progress and issues were raised over further redeployment.
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meeting separate security and civil subcommittees of the JLC
were created to deal with the issues at hand, namely those
concerning Hebron.362
In addition, a multilateral steering committee has met
periodically.363 This represents another level of cooperation
altogether, but also illustrates both the use of established
Matters of prisoner releases, security arrangements at" Gaza's proposed airport,
safe passages, and easing of closure as well as Hebron were to be dealt with by a
separate meeting between Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai and PA Chairman
Yasser Arafat the week after the Steering Committee meeting. Those present in-
cluded Israeli team leader Dan Shomron, the Israeli Government Coordinator in
the Territories Major General Oren Shahor, and Brigadier General David Agmon,
Saeb Erekat, the Palestinian steering committee head, Hassan Afour, an Oslo
negotiator for the PA, and Jamil Tarifi, the PA Minister of Civil Affairs. See Jon
Immanuel, Israel-PA Talks Resume, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 10, 1996, at 2.
A meeting in October 1996 (scheduled in the September meeting) at Erez
split into security and civil affairs subcommittees as a result of the failure to
make progress in discussions about Hebron. Saeb Erekat headed the Palestinian
steering committee team. The security committee included Major General Shaul
Mofaz, head of the IDF Planning Branch, and Colonel Jibril Rajoub, West Bank
Preventive security chief. Hebron was discussed. PA Chairman Yasser Arafat or-
dered no compromises on the agreement, and Erekat is reported to have said on
Palestinian Radio that if Israel did not agree finally to implement the accord with-
out changes, the PA would seek arbitration. Dennis Ross US peace process coordi-
nator met briefly with a pared-down steering committee. The Israeli Government
coordinator in the territories Major General Oren Shahor and PA Civil Affairs
Minister Jamil Tarifi, headed the civil affairs subcommittee. Among the issues
discussed were untransferred areas of civil authority in Hebron, as well the devel-
opment of 400 Palestinian inspectors in the area to remain under IDF control.
More workers were to be allowed into Israel. See Jon Immanuel, Little Headway
in Hebron Talks as New Subcommittees are Formed, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 10,
1996, at 1.
A meeting was held in Jericho in February 1998 between Israeli Cabinet
Secretary Dan Naveh and Saeb Erekat representing the PA in their capacities as
heads of the steering committee for bilateral negotiations. Both concluded with the
statement that mutual implementation was required (Erakat was quoted as saying
that there is no point in "meetings for the sake of meetings" while the main issue
is "the implementation of agreements"). Hopes were expressed for the continuation
of the talks. Erekat appeared to call for greater international involvement. Jay
Bushinsky and Margot Dudkevitch, Israel-PA Talks Resume, JERUSALEM POST, Feb
24, 1998, at 1.
362. See Immanuel, Little Headway. .. , supra note 361.
363. The multilateral steering committee was to meet in Moscow in February
1997 after not having met for two years. American efforts to push the Arab coun-
tries to make good their pledges to continue normalization with Israel prompted
the meeting in the aftermath of the Hebron agreement. Oman, Qatar and Tunisia
froze emerging ties with Israel in the months after PM Netanyahu's election. Oth-
ers such as Saudi Arabia had no ties, but participated in previous multilateral
groups. See Hillel Kuttler, Moves Afoot to Revive the Moribund Multilateral Peace
Talks, JERUSALEM POST, Feb 9, 1997, at 2.
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committees as well as the weaknesses of a purely voluntary
system of attendance at meetings of such committees.
F. The Standing Cooperation Committee
The SCC is created in Oslo II to promote cooperation in
areas of economic, scientific, social, and cultural endeavors,
involving officials, institutions and the private sector.3 The
Committee is also intended to meet common challenges and to
strengthen regional cooperation in order to establish a dialogue
and cooperation on the bases of equality, fairness, and reci-
procity, as well as to act together to ensure peace, stability and
cooperation within the interim period.365
Concerned with promoting cooperation in the broadest
sense, the scope of the SCC covers environmental protection,
economic, scientific, technological, cultural, and educational
cooperation, in addition to enhancing dialogue through a Peo-
ple-to-People Program. 66 It is composed of an equal number
of members from each side, to reach decisions by agreement
and to determine its own rules of procedure. In addition, it is
required to meet once a month, or more frequently (at the re-
quest of either side)." 7 In the sphere of economics, the SCC
encourages industrial, agricultural, and environmental policy
cooperation, as well as promoting relations in the energy,
transport and tourism sectors.36
While the responsibilities of the SCC appear to be both
necessary and worthy, they are in fact diffuse and overly opti-
mistic. The notion that the SCC is accountable for promoting
dialogue and cooperation among all the aforementioned fields,
as well as with the general population, is unrealistic and un-
fair to the members of the SCC. It would seem as though a
committee such as this is desired if not indispensable to the
peace initiative. However, the structure of the SCC and strate-
gy of cooperation devised in Oslo II are far too general and
centralized within the SCC itself.
364. Oslo II, supra note 24, at Annex VI.
365. Id. at Annex IV, art. 1.
366. Id. at Annex VI, arts. 2, 8.
367. Id. at Annex VI, art. 3.
368. Id. at Annex VI, art. 5.
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For instance, the SCC is expected to devise economic coop-
eration programs separate from the JEC, as well as create
cooperation programs for civil fields such as environmental
conservation and transportation without coordination with any
RCACs or DCLs. This appears to be unnecessarily bureaucratic
and at the least counterproductive and repetitive. Instead of
setting up the SCC as a distinct entity attempting to encour-
age cooperation in other committees' fields in addition to gen-
eral dialogue, it perhaps would be more prudent to have SCC
members sit on other committees. SCC members could collabo-
rate with the specific committees to solve logistic and coopera-
tive issues, through coordination of the particular knowledge of
the committee and skills of the SCC representative.
Another possibility would be a forum for communication
and debate outside the political negotiations, which perhaps
would be more in line with the stated goals of the SCC.3 9
The SCC has been established, but has not convened recently.
IV. FEDERALISM AND THE PEACE PROCESS
A. Federal Solutions
If neighboring populations are not, or could not be entirely
self-contained and separate, they may interact to the advan-
tage of each other. Alternatively they may live antagonistical-
ly, seeking to weaken the other at every opportunity. However,
this would inevitably produce detrimental effects for both. The
conflict will have repercussions on neighboring countries and
the international community at large. In cases where there is
cooperation based on a combination of self-rule and shared
rule, the outcome has been labeled federalism. °
Federal entities exist on the basis of a mutual "will to
369. Id. at Annex VI, art. 2.
370. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, TWO PEOPLES, ONE LAND: FEDERAL SOLUTIONS FOR
ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS, AND JORDAN 6 (1991). Unfortunately, in the light of
the connotations this term has attracted, this term is perhaps best avoided in
relation to sensitive solutions such as that sought in the Oslo peace process. See
Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism and Peace Making, Paper Presented at the Interna-
tional Association of Centers for Federal Studies and Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs 1998 Conference (October 22, 1998).
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federate," which is essential for the federation to sustain it-
self.71 Were a federal body established by force, it would not
be truly federal by nature."2 A level of association whether
federal or something less extensive may be used both to settle
disputes and to strengthen the parties' commitment to the
resolution of the dispute, and thus to foster goodwill through
mutual trust and reliance.373 This is a prerequisite for effec-
tive operation of the structure of negotiations and peace,
whether temporary or intended to be permanent.
However, in federal arrangements the associative level is
twofold: that of structure as well as process. This notion came
from the realization that in the past, forms of government with
federal structures were not necessarily implemented within the
federal framework. Thus, "[m]any came to the conclusion that
federalism is as much a matter of process as of structure...
[and that] federalism must combine both structure and pro-
cess. That, indeed, is what creates a federal system."374
As much a part of federal solutions as the combination of
structure and process is the unique amalgamation of unity and
diversity. It is an attempt to unify separate people while ac-
commodating diversity into the system through direct political
expression, which would appear to be two antagonistic process-
es. The unity might be limited to joint issues of concern and
disagreement, such as security, resource sharing, employment
across federal divides, or access to holy sites. However, not all
federal arrangements can be conducive to a sustainable unity
due to the various combinations of diversity and their manifes-
tations in society. 5
According to leading political scientist, the late Daniel J.
Elazar, the most relevant forms are the modern federation.376
These are defined as a constitutional division of powers with a
single political entity between a federal government and the
governments of the individual entities that make up the feder-
371. ELAZAR, supra note 370, at 64.
372. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, FEDERALISM AND PEACE MAKING (1998).
373. Id. at 4.
374. ELAZAR, supra note 370, at 38.
375. Id. at 39.
376. Elazar describes the "Basic Forms of Federalism," which also include:
federacy and associated statehood, consociation, constitutionally decentralized
states, unitary states with federal arrangements, and federal combinations. See id.
at 39-64.
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ation, and a confederation "in which the constituent states [or
other entities] retain the better part of their political indepen-
dence but band together in perpetual union under a common
constitution to form a joint government for quite specific and
limited purposes ... Characteristics of postmodern confedera-
tions is that each of the constituent or partner entities main-
tains a full set of governmental institutions."377 Confederacy
provides for separate states within the territorial entity, insist-
ing on individual equality as well. Though this may seem more
radical than a federation, it is certainly more likely in terms of
the level of cooperation and compromise that could be expect-
ed.
Beyond this level of federacy, according to Elazar, are
leagues and inter-jurisdictional functional authorities which do
not have common government. Elazar posits that "[the federa-
tion], because it can be harmonized with modern nationalism
... has become the dominant federal arrangement in the world
today, and, in fact, is synonymous with the notion of federal-
ism in the minds of most people."378 This form he suggests
"requires strong general government operating directly on all
citizens who in return, are entitled to equal political status and
rights."79
Confederalism, as Elazar explains, began in pre-modern
federalism, before the rise of the modern nation-state, which
was at the time a method for bringing together small poli-
ties.38 Beyond a full set of governmental institutions for each
constituent, there may or may not be common citizenship in
the confederation (based on citizenship of the constituent enti-
ties), though confederal authorities "formally are excluded from
direct contact with the citizens of individual constituent enti-
ties."38 1 Characteristic of Elazar's post-modern confederation
is that they are constructed entities, "382 composed of joint,
extensional authorities established by the constituent elements
which are delegated certain duties. Seldom do they begin with
an encompassing confederal entity. Examples illustrate that
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. ELAZAR, supra note 370, at 43.
381. Id.
382. Id.
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they may or may not develop common comprehensive legisla-
tive, and/or judicial instruments.383
The principal advantage of confederation, according to
Elazar, "is that since the confederal government serves the
constituent or partner states first and foremost, issues of equal
political status and rights can be handled on two levels: equali-
ty of all states within the confederation as states and equality
of individuals within each state as defined by that state."3"
Temporary federal structures may be created during nego-
tiations as part of interim arrangements pending a final settle-
ment which requires extensive negotiation, perhaps as a result
of the difficult compromises required or the severe tension
between the negotiating parties. The temporary structures
created then may be adopted as a model for the final settle-
ment expected if they prove to be successful, or they may sim-
ply continue to operate as part of that settlement. Shared
governance may be extended to shared government institu-
tions, though this would be unlikely at an early stage.
The speed of any separation, and the degree of general
caution and efforts taken to promote support for the negotia-
tions amongst the populations concerned may be one of the
most influential factors in relation to maintaining the good will
necessary to successfully pursue negotiations of this sort.8
Particularly where security or essential resources are con-
cerned, it is likely that the specialist structures created during
negotiations to deal with the mutual concerns would be them-
selves maintained to promote those concerns once final agree-
ment is reached, rather than creating a new structure to per-
form the same function.
B. The Oslo Peace Process - Possible Federal Approaches
Any federal arrangement will integrate the self-rule of
constituencies with the shared rule of those groups into an
encompassing body. A federal resolution of the peace process
could involve shared rule over specified areas where Israelis
and Palestinians extensively coexist, namely the West Bank
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at note 372.
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and the Gaza Strip. This would give a degree of self-rule to the
PA over the Palestinian population, while maintaining the
security of the Israeli population.386 Whether this would in-
volve shared government under the strict definition of federal-
ism is doubtful.387
One approach reflected a priori would be total, immediate
withdrawal of Israeli security forces from the territories. Com-
plete withdrawal would create security threats which clearly
could result in attacks on Israelis living in the disputed territo-
ries, while extending the threat to the rest of Israel as well.
Access to or control of strategic points in the disputed territory
and the protection of the settlements would satisfy the concern
of Israelis in this respect.388 Through the cooperation, the
parties might come to agree on the limited areas of residual
military presence. Collaborative efforts also would prevent the
threat to the Palestinian population of extremists seizing con-
trol of the territory or other neighboring countries seeking to
take control.389
Another strategy that is not feasible by nearly everyone's
account would be the complete annexation of the disputed
territories.39 The annexation of these areas with consequent
Israeli sovereignty would be incompatible with the internation-
al demands, disadvantageous in the long run for maintaining a
Jewish national state, and unacceptable to the Palestinian
constituency.3 9'
Repartition or military redeployment and the transfer of
civil authority without shared control in any formal sense is an
alternative to a federal solution.3 92 The progress so far made
in resolving the conflict has been due to the acceptance of this
approach by Israel and also by the Palestinian population and
386. ELAZAR, supra note 370, at 23.
387. Id. at 37.
388. The alternative objection to withdrawal, the historic and religious feeling
that any territory in the area could justifiably have an Israeli Jewish population is
on the whole limited amongst those who hold this view by respect or tolerance of
existing settlement of the area.
389. ELAZAR, supra note 370, at 23-25.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. See id. at 101. The author details eleven basic options including the broad
approaches mentioned and approaches taking into account significant Jordanian
involvement. This factor appears to have become significantly less influential with
the higher profile of the PLO.
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its negotiators.393 However, because of Israel's strategic re-
quirements, difficulties in areas such as the settlements or the
city of Hebron, shared physical resources, economic interdepen-
dence,394 and the potential for subversion of authority in the
territory by extremist organizations (such as Hamas or by ex-
ternal powers), federal structures must exist to allow contin-
uing Israeli involvement in the areas. This must be clearly
defined in the interests of diplomacy.
The use of joint institutions in the long term, without joint
government, is implied by the DOP,395 but there is no explicit
reference to this. This would appear to be in the interest of
both populations, pragmatically in terms of long term economic
prosperity, at least and for the same security reasons, as in the
interim period.
C. The Oslo Peace Process - Federal Structures in the Interim
Agreements
The structures created by the peace process take limited
strides towards a cooperative, even federal solution, in the
fields of security and civil amenities. They bring together diplo-
mats and staff from both sides, in order to operate and monitor
the day to day functions involved in maintaining security and
civil obligations. They, therefore, sustain the integrity of the
lawful authorities and infrastructure at all levels from interna-
tional support of licensing, tariff and resource issues.
The negotiations and the JLC bring together politicians
from both sides. The JSC and other high level military commit-
tees bring together the top ranking military personnel. The
CAC and JSC bring together politicians and high level civil
servants. The JLC should bring together legislators, the judi-
ciaries, and law enforcement personnel as well. In theory,
these committee members are more than likely to come to see
their counterparts' perspectives, and establish dialogue with
them. The regional and district subcommittees bring together
middle ranking workers and require them not only to come to
393. Id. at 23, 27-30.
394. Primarily on the part of the Palestinian population who rely on the free-
dom to undertake and commute to work in Israel.
395. DOP, supra note 26, at art. 5.
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understand their colleagues, but to work constructively with
them. The JPs and JMUs require the closest cooperation aid a
great deal of mutual trust and good will. The specialist civil
working committees require similar dedication if they are to
operate; they are essential to both populations and it is their
interest to find willing staff. The influence of these on the
population at large cannot be zero, but may be limited to those
more directly affected by the decisions that result from the
work of the committees. These may form the basis of long-term
relations in the permanent status negotiations.39
The agreements do not seem to take the SCC seriously as
a means of creating a society, or at least societies receptively,
that desire to coexist and avoid prolonging the conflict. This
has been identified as the most serious failing in the agree-
ments, particularly from a perspective that views good will as
the basis of not only federal solutions, but of any solution that
is to promote peace. 97 The emphasis on security instead, less
explicit in Oslo II than, for instance, in the more recent
Hebron Protocol or Wye River Memorandum, goes against the
idea of emphasizing areas which are less controversial such as
economic cooperation.
V. CONCLUSION
Any declaration of Palestinian statehood prior to the suc-
cessful resolution of final status negotiations is prohibited by
the DOP 98 Pursuant to the interim peace agreements there
appears to be no intention to create a bi-national entity. Rath-
er, the best case scenario is coexistence without conflict. While
a federation involves tighter links between two populations,
confederacy provides for separate states within the territorial
entity, insisting on individual equality as well. Though this
may seem more radical than a federation, it may be more like-
ly in terms of the level of cooperation and compromise that
could be expected.
396. However, the DOP states explicitly that the outcome of the permanent
status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements for the
interim period. See DOP, supra note 26, at art. 5.
397. ELAZAR, supra note 372, at 5.
398. DOP, supra note 26, at art. 8.
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Built on the initial compromises reached in the interim
agreements, it is now conceivable that some constitutional
compromise or separation will occur. The direction appears to
be towards a Palestinian state, although the dimensions of
that entity are unclear. This also depends on both sides' ability
able to maintain popular support and interested third party
political and economic sponsorship.399
Successful interaction between Palestinian and Israeli
representatives on a functional level could be institutionalized
so as to endure after the peace process. High level committees
could be embellished to create joint bureaucratic departments
of a political body. Methods of protecting such a fragile struc-
ture could be molded from the existing joint organs on the
ground. However, some of the existing structures are still in
the initial stages, and, at this point, are clearly inadequate to
establish cooperation for the long term. Certain committees,
such as the JLC, appear inadequate at this juncture while
others show more promise.
The advancement of the peace process is illustrated not
only by the immediate effects of implementation and the politi-
cal reaction among diplomats and the populations involved, but
by how extensive the implementation of the terms and provi-
sions of the agreements has been. The tenacity of the diplo-
mats and the support they have is characterized by the conti-
nuity in the peace treaties; reflected in the ability to maintain
similar structures in the first eight interim agreements (from
the DOP through the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum). The Al-
Aqsa intifada has demonstrated, however, that in the absence
of continuous political good will, these structures are insuffi-
cient to ensure the survival of the peace process, never mind
forward progress. When the political echelon is moving for-
ward, the structures can maintain a framework. However
when the political eschelon breaks down, as it has during the
A1-Aqsa intifada, the federal structures are incapable of pre-
venting the outbreak of widespread hostilities which may, over
time, result in the disintegration of the peace process. Ac-
knowledging their limitations as well as their strengths, the
legal structures which form the core of the Oslo peace process
399. Elazar recognizes the further difficulties created by the diaspora popula-
tions. See ELAZAR, supra note 370, at 11-12 (although discussion of these difficul-
ties is beyond the scope of this article).
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have the potential to meet the day to day needs of the Pales-
tinian and Israeli populations. The extent to which these legal
structures succeed will be predictive of the long-term prospects
co-existence during and after this peace process.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
The Israel-PA relationship has taken a dramatic turn for
the worse during the period I was reviewing the proof copy of
this article. Despite being offered unprecedented unilateral
concessions by Israeli Prime Minister Barak at the recent
Camp David Summit, Chairman Arafat apparently made the
calculation that he can achieve more through confrontation
and violence than across the negotiating table."' As a result,
the peace process has ground to a halt and in its place a mini-
war has erupted in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and even cer-
tain locations in Israel. The flash points include road junctions,
IDF positions on the outskirts of Palestinian population cen-
ters, and even religious sites. Despite repeated efforts by Presi-
dent Clinton, whose formidable powers of persuasion had
moved the parties past previous impasses, the downward spi-
ral toward armed conflict has continued without respite for the
past six weeks.
Watching the television coverage of the daily Palestinian
riots,401 named the Al-Aqsa intifada, °2 one is immediately
400. Prime Minister Barak stated:
there is an understanding in the Arab world that Arafat and the PA, in
their decision not to reach an agreement with us that was within reach,
but rather to choose the path of violence, have taken upon themselves a
heavy responsibility that changes the character of the [peace] process. At
the moment the PA and Arafat have chosen the path of conflict in an
attempt to make us fold and to get us to surrender our vital interests
through force.
Herb Keinon and Lamia Lahoud, Egyptian Foreign Minister Moussa: Current Peace
Process Over, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 25, 2000, at 1.
401. A USA Today reporter noted that as dusk approached the television crews
left the Ramallah junction where hundreds of children had been hurling rocks and
Molotov cocktails at the IDF all day long. Noting that the children also dispersed,
the Israeli officer on the scene commented, 'The kids only want to die when the
TV cameras are on so they can get the sympathy of the world . ..They'll be
back tomorrow, as soon as the media arrives." Jack Kelley, Street Clashes Now
Deliberate Warfare, USA TODAY, Oct. 23, 2000, at 1.
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struck by the near total absence of adults. Indeed, most of
those hurling Molotov cocktails and stones are teenagers;
many are even younger. Intoxicated by the challenge of becom-
ing a hero, and lacking the maturity to calculate the dangers
they are assuming, thousands of young people have been per-
suaded to place themselves in harm's way. The message from
the top, from PA Chairman Arafat, is clear incitement. He
regularly panders to the agitated youth by lauding them as
"the generals of the rocks."0 3
Since the recent disturbances began, media reports have
often highlighted instances in which Palestinian children have
been killed or injured by Israeli troops or policemen. These
reports have generated much criticism of Israeli policies, al-
though few in the Western world have thought through the
chaos they see on the news to consider whose interests are
served by the violence. Even fewer have access to the informa-
tion necessary to place in legal and historical context these
weeks of death and disorder. The confusion has, however, pro-
vided an excellent opportunity for Arafat who, addressing the
Emergency Arab Summit in Cairo, went so far as to accuse
Israel of "a massacre" and "genocide." 4 Wielding their over-
whelming political clout, the Palestinians prevailed on the UN
Human Rights Commission to condemn Israel for "crimes
against humanity."4°5 Even the UN Security Council voted a
one-sided resolution condemning Israel."' Although these ac-
cusations are transparently rhetorical, there is little doubt
that, by their deliberate misuse of children, the Palestinian
cause has attracted new sympathy.
402. Palestinian sources have dubbed the current disturbances the "Al-Aqsa
intifada." Intifada is the Arabic word for "uprising" or "shaking off" and Al-Aqsa is
the mosque in Jerusalem which observant Moslems regard as their third holiest
site, after Mecca and Medina. See Lamia Lahoud, Fatah Calls for Intifada Despite
Summit, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 17, 2000, at 1. The current AI-Aqsa intifada
should be distinguished from the earlier intifada, which began in December, 1987,
had practically disappeared by the time of the Gulf War in January, 1991, ending
with the commencement of the Oslo peace process in mid-1993.
403. Alan Baker, Legal Advisor to the Israel Min. of Foreign Aff, Using Chil.
dren in Conflict, AIJAC (Melbourne)(n.d.).
404. Ironically, Arafat's frequent calls, directly and indirectly, for the annihila-
tion of Israel violate the Genocide Convention, which criminalize not only acts of
genocide but also incitement to commit genocide in articles II, III and IV.
405. Kelley, supra note 401.
406. U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4205th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1322 (2000).
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The participation of Palestinian children in these riots is
not accidental. The Palestinian Authority has intentionally
mobilized Palestinian children to man the front line in its
struggle against Israel; frequently using them as shields to
protect Palestinian gunmen. Improving on their widespread
use of children in the original intifada of a decade ago, the
children act as bait, burning tires and shooting slingshots, to
attract the television cameras and distract the IDF. Since the
Palestinian public knows that Israeli soldiers are ordered not
to shoot live ammunition at children,"7 the rioting children
act as shields to protect Palestinian snipers in ambush posi-
tions on rooftops and in alleys, who shoot to kill any exposed
members of the IDF.05
Israeli statistics reveal that during the month of October,
2000, there were 599 shooting incidents at military,"9 police,
and civilian targets.41° Twenty-six bombs were detonated
with intent to harm Israelis and 400 Molotov cocktails were
thrown at Israelis. In all there were 3,209 violent disturbances
407. IDF regulations make every effort to avoid incurring unnecessary casual-
ties. Especially strict rules apply to the employment of live ammunition, preferring
to make due, whenever possible, with loudspeaker warnings, tear gas, stun gre-
nades, and rubber bullets. Generally, live ammunition is aimed below the waist.
Kelley, supra note 401. The Israeli policy for use of live ammunition holds:
Soldiers are prohibited from opening fire with live ammunition unless, (1)
they are fired upon; (2) they are in a situation where despite verbal
warnings there remains an immediate danger to their lives or the lives
of Israeli civilians; or (3) they are apprehending an escaping suspect who
is believed to have committed a serious crime. Any soldiers who violate
the Rules of Engagement are subject to investigation, disciplinary trial
and, in serious cases, court-martial."
Telephone Interview with Col. Raanan Gissin, IDF Spokesman's Office, in Jerusa-
lem (Nov. 8, 2000).
408. Kelley, supra note 401. Ironically those very weapons were provided to
them to maintain order, as against terrorism and incitement, under the interim
peace agreements that Arafat signed.
409. See Interview with IDF Chief of Staff General Shaul Mofaz, Israel Radio
(Oct. 25, 2000).
410. Press Release, IDF Spokesman's Office, The Total 599 Shooting Incidents
of "Ebb and Flow" According to Destination of Incident 29109-29110/2000, Oct. 31,
2000. See Margot Dudkevitch, 3209 Violent Incidents in West Bank in October, JE-
RUSALEM POST, Nov. 1, 2000 at 3. Another report gave the figure of 780 shooting
incidents in the previous month. Arieh O'Sullivan, Gil Missile Used for First Time
Against Beit Jallah, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 2, 2000, at 2.
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including 1,397 stone throwing incidents.4" As a conse-
quence, six Israeli civilians and seven soldiers were killed, and
51 civilians and 139 soldiers were injured.412 One major dif-
ference between the current Al-Aqsa intifada and its predeces-
sor, the original intifada of a decade ago, is the enormous in-
crease of Palestinian firepower, primarily in the form of tens of
thousands of assault rifles.
This mobilization of Palestinian youth has, moreover, been
facilitated by the cumulative, long-term impact of incitement
contained in PA school textbooks, government-controlled me-
dia,4 13 and summer camp programs,4"4 which indoctrinated
the youth for violent confrontation with Israel even prior to the
current crisis. Once the Al-Aqsa intifada started, the PA not
only ignored its signed commitments under the interim peace
agreements but, despite repeated calls for restraint by world
leaders including President Clinton, its official media broad-
cast the PA-appointed cleric leading prayers at the A1-Aqsa
mosque in Jerusalem, calling for his followers to, "eradicate
the Jews from Palestine.""1 Also aired was a live sermon by
Dr. Ahmad Abu Halabiya. Halabiya, a member of the PA-ap-
pointed Fatwa Council and former acting Rector of the Islamic
University in Gaza, called for Israelis to be humiliated, tor-
tured, and butchered.4 6 His rant continued, "Have no mercy
on the Jews, no matter where they are, in any country. Fight
them, wherever you are. Wherever you meet them, kill them.
Wherever you are, kill those Americans who are like them...
and those that stand by them."417
411. IDF Spokesman's Office, supra note 407. Some have claimed that stone-
throwing is a purely symbolic act. Nothing could be further from the truth. It
often causes serious injury and occasionally even death. Thus, one of the Israeli
fatalities was hit in the chest by a large rock that was thrown at his car near the
Arab village of Jisr e-Zarka on the highway between Haifa and Tel Aviv, two of
Israel's largest cities. David Rudge, 2 Israeli Arabs Killed in Nazareth Clashes,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 10, 2000 at 1.
412. IDF Spokesman's Office, supra note 407.
413. Matthew Doff, Palestinian Children's Show Sparks Anger in Washington,
Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Aug. 17, 1998; George Will, The Downfall of Israel?,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 16, 2000, at 6.
414. John F. Burns, Palestinian Summer Camp Offers the Games of War, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2000 at 1.
415. Will, supra note 414.
416. IRIS, The Palestinians in Their Own Words, PALESTINIAN QUOTE SHEET
#50, Oct. 16, 2000.
417. Id.
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The exploitation of children in the new intifada has impli-
cations beyond its marked corrosive effect on the peace process.
In recent decades the international community has increasing-
ly condemned the exploitation of children in armed conflicts.
Article 38 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child condemns the recruitment and involvement of chil-
dren under 15 years old in hostilities and armed conflicts.418
The provision clearly states, "[s]tate parties shall take all feasi-
ble measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the
age of 15 years do not take a direct part in hostilities."4 '9
Current treaty law not only forbids children to participate in
combat, but it also proscribes a wide range of other indirect
activities.42 Recently, UN Security Council Resolution 1261
specifically described the use of children as soldiers as a "viola-
tion of international law."42'
In order to assure children are not involved in wars and
other violent conflicts it is necessary to keep them out of
harm's way both physically and emotionally. International law
broadly attempts to protect children from the horrors of armed
conflict. For example, the use by states of children as shields to
impede an adversary's military operations is prohibited. Article
28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention strictly forbids the use of
any civilian as a shield.422 Jean Pictet, in the official Red
Cross commentary on article 28, notes that the use of civilians
(of any age) as shields has been condemned as cruel and bar-
418. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. G.A. Res. 25, 44th
Sess., U.N. Doe. A/RES/44/25 (1989) reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1457 (1989) [hereinafter
Child Rights Convention]. This Convention has been ratified by 191 states, making
it the most widely ratified human rights instrument ever. UN Economic and Social
Council, Commission on Human Rights, Rights of the Child. Additional Report of
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Con-
flict, Mr. Olara Otunnu, Submitted in Accordance with General Assembly Resolu-
tion 53/128, U.N. Council, art. 2(6), E/CN.4/2000/71 (2000).
419. Child Rights Convention, supra note 418, at art. 38.
420. Alan Baker, Legal Advisor to the Israel Min. of Foreign Aff, Using Chil-
dren in Conflict, AIJAC (Melbourne)(n.d.).
421. U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4037th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1261 (1999), arts. 3,
8, 13.
422. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 ["Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion"], art. 28.
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baric.4"
The PA does not, at this point, enjoy sovereignty,4" and
therefore, is not de jure bound by the above mentioned conven-
tions.4 2 15 As a non-sovereign entity, the above mentioned in-
ternational conventions are not strictly binding on the PA.
However, it is nothing less than hypocrisy for this autonomous
entity to continuously pressure the international community to
condemn Israel for violating human rights while the PA or-
chestrates the massing of children in the front lines of the con-
flict. While the PA is not formally bound by international hu-
man rights conventions, it is nonetheless required by the Oslo
agreements, which PA Chairman Yasser Arafat signed, to
honor "internationally accepted norms of human rights and the
rule of law." 26 Moreover, their misuse of children should set
off an alarm for the world community raising doubt whether
the PA intends, if it obtains recognition as a state, to be a law-
423. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 422, at art. 28. Article 36 asserts
that state parties shall protect the child against all other forms of exploitation
prejudicial to any aspects of the child's welfare, which logically includes even their
voluntary recruitment to participate in a conflict. Id. Ironically, this standard ap-
pears to conform with Islamic law, which prohibits children under 15 from partici-
pating in a jihad. But neither international law nor Islamic law has curtailed the
use of children in the Al-Aqsa intifada by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, two of the
Islamist terrorist groups operating out of the Palestinian areas.
424. The PLO maintains diplomatic relations of various types with over a hun-
dred different governments even though it does not meet the standard indices of
state sovereignty as set forth in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States. See James Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too
Much Too Soon?, 1 Eur. J. Int'l L. 307; Ruth Lapidoth & N.K. Calvo-Goller, Les
Elements Constitutifs de L'Etat et la Declaration du Conseil National Palestinien
du 15 Novembre 1988, R.G.D.I.P. 777 (1992) (French original). But see Francis A.
Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine, 1 Eur. J. Int'l L. 301; M. Flory,
Naissance d'un Etat Palestinien, R.G.D.I.P. 385 (1989) (French original). This has
been recognized by the senior Palestinian peace negotiator and the senior deputy
to Arafat, Mahm oud Abbas, who referred to the DOP by stating that, "[W]e do not
claim that we signed an agreement that created an independent Palestinian State;
none of the provisions of the Declaration of Principals make such a claim."
MAHMOUD ABBAS, THROUGH SECRET CHANNELS 218 (1995).
425. Similarly, in response to the PA's declaration that it would adhere to the
Geneva conventions of 1949, and the subsequent two protocols, the Swiss Federal
Council stated that "it was not in the position to decide whether the letter consti-
tuted an instrument of accession," and deferred from making a decision "due to
the uncertainty within the international community as to the existence or non-
existence of the state of Palestine." Geneva Conventions, Aug. 12 1949 and addi-
tional protocols of June 8, 1977: Ratifications, Accessions and Successions, DD/JUR
98/820- CPS 32 (Dec. 31, 1998).
426. Wye River Memorandum, supra note 52, art. II C.4.
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abiding entity in the international community.
This sustained violence has had a cataclysmic impact on
the Oslo peace process, both on the political level and on the
structural level. Notwithstanding the accomplishments of bilat-
eral and trilateral committees, and despite the positive and
sometimes warm personal relationships that emerged out of
this federal cooperation, the structures and relationships have
proved virtually useless during the Al-Aqsa intifada. This be-
ing the Conclusion of an already too-long article, it will suffice
to provide several examples:
First, Israel and the PA agreed to abolish a customs union
and adopt free trade when a final peace agreement was
reached.427 This was expected to boost both economies and
thereby accelerate the peace process. The recent violence, how-
ever, has postponed indefinitely prospects for a final peace
agreement and, along with it, the implementation of free trade.
Second, the Erez industrial zone was created pursuant to
the peace process, located where Israel adjoins the Gaza Strip.
The zone was designed to promote the integration of the Pal-
estinian and Israeli economies and to ameliorate to the chronic
high unemployment in Gaza. These objectives suffered a major
setback when, a month into the violence, Palestinians set fire
to a rubber factory in the Erez industrial zone." 8 In the af-
termath, it is difficult to foresee new investors coming forward
to back such joint projects.
Third, a crucial test of durability of the peace process is
whether, despite the agitated political climate, the PA will
honor its commitments as regards Jewish holy sites. What
transpired at one such site, the prophet Joseph's tomb, has
been discouraging to say the least. The tomb was a small Is-
raeli enclave in the midst of Area A (under sole Palestinian
local administration). Until the recent violence, Israeli visitors
had access via a bulletproof bus with an IDF escort. Coopera-
tion by the PA was problematic in the best of times and once
the Al-Aqsa intifada got underway, the site was attacked by
hundreds of Palestinians. An IDF soldier stationed there bled
to death while the PA, despite repeated Israeli requests on the
427. Palestine and Israel to Abolish Customs Union, Adopt Free Trade, JERU-
SALEM TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at 9.
428. Margot Dudkevitch, Violence Persists, But Less Intense, JERUSALEM POST,
Nov. 5, 2000, at 2.
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highest level, delayed his evacuation to hospital. Because of its
exposed position, and because in recent years a number of
soldiers had been killed there, Israel secured an agreement
from the PA that it would guarantee the site's sanctity after
the IDF redeployed. Yet, the PA did nothing to stop the Pales-
tinian mob which descended on the tomb, torching and destroy-
ing its contents, even attempting to demolish it stones-by-stone
crowbars." 9 Israel's Regional Cooperation Minister, Shimon
Peres, said these events reveal Arafat's problem with protect-
ing holy sites, thereby confirming doubts that the PA can be
trusted to protect them in the event of future Israeli withdraw-
als. Given the number of Jewish holy sites, in the hypersen-
sitive city of Jerusalem and elsewhere, this will greatly compli-
cate peace negotiations.43 °
Fourth, another vehicle for Israeli-Palestinian. cooperation,
the joint patrols, was abandoned after an Israeli border police-
man, Yossi Tabaja, was murdered by his Palestinian counter-
part. The killer turned himself over to Palestinian Preventive
Security officials who immediately declared him mentally un-
stable and blamed the Israeli soldiers for provoking him.431
In the aftermath of this and other serious incidents, the IDF
said these patrols do more harm than good. Rather then defuse
friction between Israeli and Palestinian civilians, their original
role according to the peace accords, they create tension and are
a vessel of mutual mistrust.
432
Fifth, security cooperation-coordinating efforts to prevent
Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israeli targets-has also
fallen upon hard times since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa
intifada. Although high level meetings between Israeli and
Palestinian security officials have taken place, they have been
perfunctory and lacking in substance, missing the opportunity
to save lives and contain the fighting. For example, in an effort
to restore calm, IDF Major Generals Yitzhak Eitan and Yom-
Tov Samia met their Palestinian counterparts on October 25,
429. Margot Dudekvitch, Palestinians Ransack Evacuated Joseph's Tomb, JERU-
SALEM POST, Oct. 8, 2000, at 1.
430. Nina Gilbert, Peres Slams Arafat's Handling of Joseph's Tomb, JERUSALEM
POST, Oct. 8, 2000, at 3.
431. Margot Dudekvitch, Border Policeman Murdered by Palestinian Counter-
part, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 2, 2000, at 5.
432. Arieh O'Sullivan, IDF Considering Ending Joint Patrols, JERUSALEM POST,
Oct. 5, 2000, at 2.
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2000. The Israelis were disappointed by the meetings, and
according to one security official, "[i]t appeared that the Pales-
tinians had no intention of restoring working ties and instead
made political statements." 33 IDF Brigade Commander, Colo-
nel Gal Hirsch stated:
We have discovered that they don't keep their promises. On
at least five occasions, I have met in the morning with my
counterpart from the PA, and we agree. He will keep the
demonstrators under control, and I will pull back my forces.
So I pull back from the good positions we had taken. And
then the Palestinian police don't contain the demonstrators,
who break through their lines. Then we have to take back
positions we withdrew from a few hours earlier.434
During a subsequent meeting between Arafat and Shimon
Peres, an agreement was reached to restore intelligence and
security cooperation between the two sides which had been
frozen since the outbreak of hostilities a month earlier.43 It
remains to be seen if this latest agreement is more successfully
implemented than similar ones which preceded it.
In summation, it is too early to discern what these failures
portend for the long-term prospects for peace. What is clear is
that the new Palestinian intifada undermines not only the
spirit of the Oslo peace process, but its raison d'Otre to resolve
differences through negotiation rather than violence. As Arafat
proclaimed in his September 9, 1993, letter to Yitzhak Rabin:
The PLO considers that the singing of the Declaration of
Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new
epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other
acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the
PLO renounces the use of terrorism and all other acts of
violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements
433. Margot Dudekvitch & Lamia Lahoud, Fatah Calls to Continue the Intifada,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 25, 2000, at 1.
434. Hanan Sher, Brief, Encounter: Col. Gal Hirsch, JERUSALEM REPORT, Nov.
20, 2000, at 16.
435. Herb Keinon, PM Demands Arafat Put Terrorists Back in Jail, JERUSALEM
POST, Nov. 3, 2000, at 2.
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and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent
violations, and discipline violators.436
This was Arafat's price of admission into the US-brokered and
funded peace process. In return, Yitzhak Rabin agreed to rec-
ognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people
and commence negotiations with what previously had been
deemed a terrorist organization.437
The palpable frustration and mistrust caused by the Al-
Aqsa intifada will haunt new efforts at Israeli-Palestinian
peace making for years to come. But when it does start, the
federal structures which enjoyed some viability during the Olso
period will likely be reactivated or recreated to provide a sense
of legitimacy, a frame of reference, and a design for coopera-
tion, as well as functioning as a negotiating forum.
436. Yasser Arafat, Letter to Yitzhak Rabin, in PEACEWATCH: THE ARAB-ISRAELI
PEACE PROCESS AND U.S. POLICY 77 (Judith Wrubel ed., 1994).
437. Yitzhak Rabin, Letter to Yasser Arafat, Sept. 9, 1993. Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements.
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APPENDIX
CAC - Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation
Committee
DCL - District Civil Liaison Office
DCO - District Coordination Office
DOP - Declaration of Principles
IDF - Israeli Defense Force
IPI - Institute for Peace Implementation
JAC - Joint Aviation Subcommittee
JCC - Joint Coordination Center
JEC - Joint Economic Cooperation Committee
JHC - Joint Coordination Committee for Hebron
JLB - Joint Liaison Bureau
JLC - Joint Liaison Committee
JMU - Joint Mobile Unit
JP - Joint Patrol
JSC - Joint Security Committee
LC - Legal Committee
LAC - Legal Affairs Committee
MC - Maritime Coordination and Cooperation Center
MSC - Monitoring and Steering Committee
PA - Palestinian Authority
PLO - Palestinian Liberation Organization
RCAC - Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittee
RSC - Regional Security Committee
SCC - Standing Cooperation Committee
TIPH - Temporary International Presence in Hebron
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VAT - Value Added Tax
WRM - Wye River Memorandum
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